









AFRIKANER AND FRENCH CANADlAN NATIONALISM: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
MAURICE NOR BENATAR 
B.A. (Honours) (McGill) 
DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS 
IN POLITICAL STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
MAY 1993 



















The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The contribution of the following people in facilitating the 
completion of this dissertation is gratefully acknowledged: 
Mrs Jacqueline Berman for her invaluable typing assistance, 
encouragement and support. 
Professor Heribert Adam for his much needed encouragement when 
the task seemed almost insurmountable. 
My parents, for always being there when I needed them and 
believing in me throughout this degree. 
My girlfriend, Dalene, for her love, support and her 
interpretive Afrikaans skills. 
Finally, I acknowledge the financial assistance of the Centre 
for Science Development towards this research. Opinions 
expressed and conclusions arrived at, are those of the author 
and are not necessarily to be attributed to the Centre for 
science Development. 
Abstract 
This dissertation seeks to expose comparatively the ideological, 
institutional and economic underpinnings which have contributed to 
evolving nationalisms within two dual societies, those being Canada 
and South Africa. It attempts to explain the parallel historical 
development of Afrikaner and French Canadian nationalisms as they 
contend with a hostile and dominant English element beholden to 
the Empire. 
Expansion and rebellion coincides with the advent of British 
colonialism as French Canadian and Afrikaner segments find their 
previously dominant positions reversed. Their rural, agrarianist, 
peripheral culture evolves in isolation from the increasingly 
metropolitan British core culture. Demographics are here 
determined in conjunction with the interplay of alien cultures 
including that of the indigenes. Ethnic pre-nationalist 
consciousness is assessed according to intergroup contact. 
Religion and its institutional accessories are then looked at as 
they contribute to an evolving consciousness. Fragmented cultures 
are firmly imbued with a religious character, and religio-
ideological development adapts to new circumstances by preaching 
messianism, pre-destination as well as analogising the plight of 
their respective disciples with that of the ancient Israelites. The 
lines between temporal and heavenly matters are here smudged as 
Dutch Reformed and Catholic churches promote group enclosure 
mobilising members around core cultural and language issues so as 
to preserve clerical power. 
After numerous conflagrations pertaining to cultural, political and 
economic matters, a modus vivendi is achieved in both societies as 
fragment elites for varying reasons negotiate a binding 
constitution. The stratification system, however, is characterised 
as a cultural di vision of labour whereby French Canadian and 
Afrikaner national consciousness becomes a function of Anglo 
economic domination. The new dominions are not devoid of their 
connections with the Empire and nationalist ideologues are not 
hesitant to express the dismay and frustrations which accompany 
this power imbalance. Dominion comes to be seen increasingly as 
domination. 
The social transformations associated with urbanisation, 
industrialisation and secularisation further disturb ethnic 
relations between contending segments. The eclipse of rural 
agrarianism highlights the more pronounced cultural division of 
labour. Nationalist proponents are forced to deal with new social 
consciousness as peripheral fragment cultures are increasingly 
threatened by the alien urban environment. Ethnic conflagrations 
surrounding Imperialist ventures (the Two Great Wars) and economic 
power differentials usher in more exclusivist ethno-nationalist 
movements who stress autonomy and republicanism in Quebec and South 
Africa respectively. Eventually conservative nationalism is 
triumphant and its ideological doctrine, after a fascist interlude, 
succumbs to the realities of a modern era. The conservative 
monolith begins to crack as an increasingly interdependent global 
context spawns a trend towards democratisation. Afrikaner and 
French Canadian nationalisms are forced to redefine themselves 
dramatically. Their respective orientations and options vary in 
accordance with the most conspicuous demographic and constitutional 
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The duality of a young child, voluntarily banished from his country 
of birth and consequently "settled" in a new land. Unable to 
choose between two habitats. Confronted by his past in the new and 
conversely restricted by his present in the old. A body complex 
having to deal with, among other things, the confrontational 
dichotomies within. Such was the story of a young lad forced by 
circumstances at an early age to leave rife-torn South Africa on 
his way to the winter-land of Canada. Not fully being able to 
comprehend the influence and pull imposed upon him by his land of 
origin, those being his formative years; and again only gradually 
gaining consciousness and insight into his being within a strange 
new environment, those then being the years of his awakening. 
Neither here nor there or more precisely both here and there. 
Elements of both lands attempting to gain a foothold, to thwart the 
other and achieve dominance within the body. 
Not dissimilar is the body politic, the state in which ethnic 
combatants struggled to reaffirm their presence and to establish 
cultural supremacy. Both in Canada and South Africa, French 
Canadians and Afrikaners alike had to contend with a dominantly 
hostile English element. Both rejected an assimilationist formula 
which would have signalled their timely demise. Both were cast out 
like children from their motherlands, aliens to their beloved new 
environments; clinging strongly to their faith and resisting even 
further intrusion upon a newly adopted reality~ 
"Resistance", here, is a word which speaks loudly for it connotes 
not simply physical resistance. It can be more so a psychological 
resistance whic.h makes each group take precautionary measures so as 
to prevent a similar condition of alienation from occurring; 
"alienation" not being exclusively a Marxist tenet. Used more 
loosely, it can be applied to the brimming urban industrial 
centres, to a harsh new environment like the frontier or more 
vaguely to a territorial displacement. 
Taking into account the broadness of this work and the wide body of 
material available, it is immediately apparent that few s·cholars 
possess the necessary knowledge and skills to do justice to this 
comparative study. This thesis, therefore, presents a raw 
preliminary work so as to prepare the way for other projects of a 
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similar sort. Hence, it is my intention to initially highlight the 
most conspicuous similarities and differences, to compare and 
contrast these two ethno-nationalist movements and then attempt to 
account for them within their respective historical frameworks. 
While this dissertation strives to make use of historical 
processes, it is primarily a comparative analysis which admittedly 
at times appears to convolute a vast historical body so as to 
highlight certain structural and institutional parallels. 
The founding of new societies reflects the fragmentation of 
European culture and ideology. Louis Hartz1 argues that fragmented 
populations represent an escape from the past subsequently stifling 
future developments. The fragments attempt to disengage from the 
continuous process of ideological renewal in Europe, thereby 
lapsing into immobility. Nevertheless, the constrictive European 
ideological sphere which locks various "teleologies" together "in 
a seething whole" no longer governs ideological developments within 
the fragments. Thus, the fragment is permitted to develop without 
inhibition. A fragment ethic develops to cope with the "identity 
vacuum" brought about by an increasingly distant European homeland. 
out with the old and in with the new characterizes the emergence of 
new generations who conceive of themselves as being members of the 
fragmented "nation". Old world ideologies are refined and 
simultaneously converted into new nationalisms. Afrikaner and 
French Canadian fragments are forced to renew themselves from 
within so as to protect their new found boundaries. A conservative 
and traditional nationalist ethos developed to insulate the 
fragments and stave off immigrants and particularly, the threat 
they posed with their old world approaches. 
Unable to stop the hands of time, the fragment is eventually forced 
to contend with the impact of the Western Revolutions. The 
fragment develops "the passion to flee again, to duplicate in the 
face of all reality the original voyage, which comes out in 
isolationism. 112 Nationalism in tens if ies in the process. 
Nevertheless, the reactionary fragment undergoes a historical 
reversal and with it comes a moral liberation and an enlargement of 
consciousness. New generations shatter the confines of the 
fragments deserting their own milieu (as had been the case in 
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Europe) and exposing the relativity of their ethic. The new 
struggle becomes not an era of escape but an era of return, whereby 
mass communications and pressures of global political struggles 
breach the insularity of the fragments. 3 
The fragmentation theory is flawed. It makes assumptions 
concerning homogeneity and consensus existing within the fragment. 
It is inherently deterministic insisting that the fragment ethic 
remains constant over time without being susceptible to internal 
social processes. It also discounts the interplay between 
contending fragments and the potential repercussions that this may 
have upon the development of national consciousness. 4 Furthermore, 
the impact of modernization and the spread of mass communications 
has not contributed to the dissipation of ethnic consciousness. As 
Walker Connor suggests, nationalism correlates with "unsocial 
communication". Increased contact between ethnically diverse 
fragments, rather, accelerates and reinforces a divisive 
consciousness. 5 
Nevertheless, the fragmentation theory does convey a sense of 
disjointed development, of longing, and of waiting which seems to 
embody the emotive aspects of a developing nationalism. It 
recognises the ideological push and pull which intimately connects 
(both positively and negatively) the fragment to its point of 
origin. Its emphasis upon escapism, isolationism, ethos, and 
extrication lends itself to the vocabulary of nationalism as 
determined by historical analysis. The cyclical and deterministic 
nature of nationalism is, here, well captured. 
Nationalism remains a relevant topic as evidenced by the high 
profile which it currently commands upon the political agenda of 
numerous states. Distinctions have been made between ethnic 
mobilisation and nationalism. This is significant particularly when 
discussing nationalism as a movement aimed at wrestling state power 
in the interests of ethnic constituencies. Ethnic mobilisers strive 
to furnish in-group members with the necessary consciousness so as 
to empower them in the construction of "nationhood". Nationalism 
has also fallen victim to the interpretations of academia 
determined to account for it within their particularistic 
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frameworks. At the first opportunity, one has to draw a 
distinction between nationalism and its third world counterpart, 
referred to as nation-building. Nationalism in itself contains the 
notion of an exclusivist ethnicity while nation-building attempts 
to bond, to fuse diverse ethnic elements into an amalgamation under 
a common single authority. 6 
both Canada and South Africa. 
This distinction is significant in 
Throughout their complex histories, 
it is clear that struggle between contending ethnic and racial 
groups and within them to some degree has centred around this 
dichotomy. Canadian politics even until the present day is ripe 
with federalist versus separatist conflict; the former seeking to 
preserve the constitutional arrangements and the fabric of a bi-
ethnic (not to mention multicultural) state structure; the latter 
endorsing the destruction of the state structure through regional 
ethno-political (in Quebec) disengagement. In South Africa, 
ethnicity has been more forcefully politicised and ominously so 
under the cloak of apartheid. State separation of racial groups 
has cultivated a culture of exclusivity rendering necessary nation-
building difficult indeed. 
Recent developments in Eastern Europe have generated a revival of 
interest in the on-going debate on nationalism. The dissolution of 
the Soviet Empire and its subsequent fragmentation prompted 
previously repressed ethnic entities to rediscover and express that 
which had been declared off limits by Marxist-Leninist inspired 
internationalist doctrine. While the fragmentation of "Communist" 
Eastern Europe into national entities had not significantly 
influenced similar movements outside of that region, it had in fact 
mirrored developments less than a century earlier. The break up of 
Britain had produced a movement toward national sovereignty. 
"New worlds" which had become appendages to the Empire had sought 
to assert their individual notions of independence an<;i self-
determination. Even European fragments which constituted the 
Dominions pondered re-evaluation of their existing links with their 
colonial motherlands. 
The disintegration of the British Empire, referred to in academic 
circles as decolonization, marked the most notable similarity 
contextually of Afrikaner and French Canadian nationalism. Each 
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ethnic entity (its degree of cohesiveness subject to changing 
circumstances) became subject to British colonial policies in one 
way or another. As such, both fragments developed a national 
consciousness which to varying degrees became a function of their 
reactions to Anglo economic domination. What differentiates these 
two case studies from numerous other colonial situations (commonly 
associated with third world struggles) draws upon the fact that in 
each case, double-layered colonialism can be said to have occurred. 
Alternatively, one could say that both Afrikaners and French 
Canadian, themselves colonizers, were in turn to find themselves 
playing the unenviable role of the colonized. With the withering of 
empire came the critical reassessment of its psychic and material 
rewards in which ethnic "minorities" partook. It also contributed 
to the demystification and decline in the legitimacy of the 
centralized state authority. 
A form of internal colonialism came to exist intricately binding 
the culturally distinct peripheral collectivities to the core. 
National discrimination painted a picture not unlike the third 
world colonial situation. As such, trade and commercial endeavours 
tended to be monopolised by core members forcing the peripheral 
economy into a state of dependence. Thus, a cultural division of 
labour existed whereby economic differences correlated with 
cultural ones. Internal colonialism focuses upon "political 
conflict between core and peripheral groups as mediated by the 
central government." Peripheral cultures evolve in isolation from 
the rest of the world and are aggravated by increased transactions 
with the core collectivity. The survival of nationalism, however, 
would depend upon the continued existence of a stratification 
system giving cultural distinctions political salience by linking 
them to opportunity accessibility. 
A specialised occupational structure worked to strengthen intra-
ethnic bonds of solidarity. This promoted the interaction of 
status equals within group boundaries thereby increasing the 
prevalence of common economic interests amongst members. 
Collective mobilisation depended upon group enclosure, itself a 
function of, a collectively perceived, inadequate access to 
resources. Group enclosure would be maximised under conditions of 
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extreme social isolation and where selective incentives were 
apportioned to promote compliance. Furthermore, residential 
segregation frequently existed thus rigidifying the lines of 
division which already were present within the occupational 
structure. As such, peripheral regions tended to be relatively 
impoverished and prone to an arrested development. The emergence 
of a cultural division in labour reflected the super-imposition of 
cultural differences upon economic inequalities. These cleavages 
of interest arose in response to the differential advantage 
conferred upon each group as a result of an uneven wave of 
industrialisation over territorial space. This cultural division 
of labour, in turn, contributed to the development of ethnic 
identity thereby constraining the individual in all his/her 
activities. The major obstacle to nation-building related, then to 
the malintegration of the periphery with the core according to 
terms perceived to be unjust and unrepresentative by the former. 7 
The upsurge of nationalism, then, relates to the declining 
authority and effectiveness of the political core. "Undermining its 
moral claims on the allegiance of peripheral groups and reducing 
the economic and psychic satisfactions it is able to deliver 118 
lends credence to the claims of ethno-nationalist elites for 
autonomy and self-determination. 
The internal colonial model is readily applicable to Afrikanerdom, 
its secluded agrarianist development dissipating and its members 
increasingly peripheralized both culturally and economically within 
the Anglo dominated urban hub. Complications arise as Afrikaner 
nationalism appears triumphant usurping the role of superordinate 
group and seeking to stabilize its advantages through policies 
aimed at institutionalizing the existing stratification system. 
Although Africans are notably victimized in this process, likewise 
are the Anglo industrialists who previously formed the core 
particularly with regard to state sector employment. The internal 
colonial model only deals with two actors while changes relating to 
the South African context paint a menage a trois in which the 
superordinate position shifts from one group to the next while each 
group occupies the subordinate position at one time or another. 
This· model generates greater confusion when one notes that 
political, economic and cultural superordination do not necessarily 
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fall together onto the lap of a particular group. This model, 
furthermore, discounts the significant influence wielded by the 
metropole in dealing with settler-indigenous relations during the 
decolonization period. 
The internal colonial model better describes ethnic relations 
within Canada. French Canadian agrarianist ideology and rural 
development inadequately prepared group members who increasingly 
occupied lower strata occupations within the Anglo dominated urban 
realm. Nevertheless, again the roles would become confused after 
the "Quiet Revolution". Bilingualism tended to favour French 
Canadians within Federal Government structures, al though their 
minority status tempered the decision making influence that they 
were to wield. Furthermore, greater autonomy for Quebec would 
prove to shift the focus upon a newly subordinate group, that being 
the English minority within the province who became increasingly 
peripheralized in tandem with more nationalistic francization 
policies. Nevertheless, the internal colonial model is useful in 
both cases particularly prior to 1960. The cultural division of 
labour, a stratification system and the peripheralization of 
subordinate groups (particularly in the economic sphere) well 
explain the survival of nationalism and its intensification with 
greater inter-group contact. The internal colonial model seems to 
be highly interpretive. 
The opening up and closing of the frontier in both Southern Africa 
and North America produced a two-fold effect. Firstly, the 
exportation of colonial land agents and settlers to far reaching 
areas signalled the beginning of an era characterized by pre-
industrial rural development and the extension of European 
feudalism. Social pressures in Europe and aristocratic commercial 
undertakings had led to the creation of new settlements. The 
formative years were characterized by environmental hardships and 
an inter-play with alien native inhabitants. Ethnic consciousness 
was racially defined. Changing circumstances on the frontier and 
the struggle for land in particular provided opportunities and set 
the limits for human activity there. 
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The Canadian and South African frontier were similar in that rival 
segments within both the indigenous and colonial population found 
themselves competing with one another. Cross cutting ties were 
fostered in the process. Furthermore, both the Africans and the 
Indians became subject to manipulative European schemes as 
evidenced by continuously shifting alliances. Conversely, the 
indigenes in both cases were, at opportune moments, to exploit 
those cleavages which developed between contending European 
segments. 
The expansion of Europe (and ultimately capitalism) appeared to 
follow a similar chronology. While Europeans moved westwards in 
North America, they moved northward and eastward in Southern 
Africa. Notably, expansion was accompanied by devastating disease, 
the effects of which determined regional demographics. Lamar and 
Thompson suggest that vulnerability to disease seemed to correlate 
with varying degrees of isolation among the indigenous population. 
The Indians, who were historically isolated for a substantial time 
period remained a genetically uniform population while the people 
of South Africa were far less isolated and notably far less 
vulnerable. This hypothesis seems to have relevancy when one notes 
that the far less isolated Bantu populace was also far more 
resistant to the effects of disease than were the more isolated 
Khoikhoi herders and San hunter-collectors. 9 As such the crippling 
effects of disease upon the Indian population radically altered the 
demographic equation in that region, and coupled with a tide of 
white immigration, war and a shrinking land-base relegated the "red 
man" to a negligible numerical proportion. The apocalyptic impact 
of disease upon the Indians was not quite as dramatic with regard 
to the Bantu Africans who managed to weather the plague. Coupled 
with the fact that the South African landscape offered relatively 
fewer intrinsic attractions (prior to the diamond and gold 
discoveries) and presented much more formidable barriers to the 
expansion of settlements, fewer Europeans colonized the area so 
ensuring the continued numerical preponderancy of the African 
population. As such, while sufficient European settlement in North 
America made any subsequent reversal of power unattainable, white 
settlement remained inconclusive throughout Africa. These 
developments are significant. While the marginalization and 
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acculturation of the Indians had lent itself to a proportionately 
significant French Canadian population (about 26% at present), 
frontier developments had cast Afrikaners as a less significant 
(about 7% presently) proportionality. 
Merchant capitalism's seizure and shaping of the native economy 
both in Canada and South Africa can initially be seen to have been 
spearheaded by British imperialist ventures. Frontiersmen in both 
societies exercised their exit options so as to act independently 
within the open parameters of the frontier. As such, elements in 
both cases subjected themselves willingly to the hazards of 
frontier society. The threat of military force, whereby the 
colonial power attempted to subjugate unruly adventurers, met with 
resistance. For the most part, however, rural-based resistance was 
crushed by military force. Frequently, rebellious movements fell 
victim to native "predators" as was the case with both Piet Retief 
and Dollard des Ormeaux. When contending European foes were 
engaged in military struggle, the casualties were more extensive as 
was the case with the 1885 Northwest Rebellion and most notably the 
Boer War. 
Assimilationist designs and the more powerful British counter-
culture supplemented increasingly entrenched Anglo economic 
domination producing cultural anxieties within both fragment 
societies. Cultural concerns revolved primarily around language 
and educational issues. Despite these similarities, one need be 
cognisant of the fact that Canadian French, although dialectically 
different, could continue to regenerate itself in tandem with 
European French and its developing literature. The French language 
itself in Europe remained unscathed; and although cultural strains 
in French Canada gave birth eventually to a "bastardized" 
"Fringlish" lingo, the dilapidated "joual" lingua franca remained 
an embarrassment in the French Canadian courts. The French 
language remained sacrosanct as a barometer of status and, in spite 
of linguistic aberration in some areas, remained the official 
language of Quebec even unto the present day. 
The Afrikaans language, described by some as a "kitchen language" 
achieved official recognition alongside English in the Union 
10 
supplanting high Dutch both in the courts and in the educational 
sphere. Afrikaans became a newly developed language forced to 
struggle on its own account without the aid of an established 
European language and its literary accessories. Tl)e Afrikaans 
language had to, therefore, generate its own development without a 
securely established catalyst. 
Nevertheless, these differences, while undoubtedly relevant, were 
overshadowed by the similar views which Quebecois and Afrikaners 
held of their country of origin respectively. Conversely, even 
early on both were perceived by Europe as aberrant and 
underdeveloped Diaspora. These perceptions were fuelled by images 
of colonial boorishness, national proximity ( to the European 
motherland) and an increasingly diluted and degenerative spoken 
language. 
Confrontations between founding pioneers and Imperialist agents set 
the stage for a subdued compromise (in Canada, the BNA Act of 1867; 
in South Africa, the Union of 1910) in which both French Canadians 
and Afrikaners were respectively co-opted into the parameters of a 
new state. Sensing that the terms of the new dispensation were 
clearly biased toward Anglo hegemonic interests, each persisted in 
the struggle against Imperialism adhering to respected principles 
(notably, self-determination) wherever instrumental. The legacy of 
Imperialism remains a recurrent theme as evidenced by subsequent 
ethnic conflagrations surrounding conscription, language, 
educational and immigration issues. 
Contextual transformation within each case study becomes most 
pronounced after Dominion particularly as both societies are forced 
to adjust to new social consciousness arising from the effects of 
what is termed the industrial revolution. Others have dubbed this 
period as the inset of modernisation, commonly associated with 
urbanization, and significantly with secularization. 
Significantly, here, because institutional religion in both 
fragmented societies would serve as the sedimentary rock, the 
ideological underpinnings for an ethnically-based movement. The 
cohesive ideological force provided by institutional religion 
imbued each fragment with a sense of exclusivity (defined according 
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to changing circumstances), differentiating between those who were 
the select part of the Christianizing mission and the "heathen 
savage" population. Shrouded in mythological garb, clerical 
nationalists in both Afrikaner and French Canadian camps would 
analogise the plight of their "chosen" peoples with that of the 
Children of Israel as described in the Old Testament. 
The mind set of both fragmented ethnicities would rely heavily upon 
religious principles. Institutional religion strove to reinforce 
bonds of exclusivity by redrawing the line between temporal and 
heavenly matters according to changing contexts. Sensing that 
religious tenets, too, had to adapt to unsettling circumstances 
lest they should lapse into obsolescence, clerical nationalists 
were forced to overlap reality and testament. The historicity of 
each group, thus, had to be interpreted through a skewed clerico-
nationalist lens. 
Righteous suffering provides the flysheet for a nationalist tent 
propped up on the pliable pillows of ethnic constituencies. Pegged 
down with morality doctrines, the opening is strictly reserved for 
the compliant soldiers. Remaining solid and resistant to the 
roughest conditions, the camp ripples with the winds of change. No 
more room to pitch and the rain comes down hard. A peg loosens and 
is discarded. Another follows suit and shortly the faith no longer 
anchors the structures that be. 
A retrospective nationalist revival draws upon historical images 
depicting the bonding process in its progressive stages. A picture 
forms; the icy white alienation; the dark and sinister invader; all 
splattered blood red and of course the sun always remains overhead. 
The stage shifts from rural green pastures to grey concrete 
heights. 
The impact of industrialisation on ethnic relations and more 
specifically the ways in which the problem of inter-group 
competition for industrial jobs was addressed is a relevant subject 
for analysis. The industrial revolution and resulting urbanisation 
would significantly alter the sphere of operation for Afrikaners 
and French Canadians who were thrust unwittingly into the urban 
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domain. Outdated land-farm systems contributed in both cases to 
the gradual eclipse of rural agrarianism. The closing frontier 
made exit options no longer viable. No more was land a disposable 
commodity. New land could no longer be acquired at will. 
Anglo industrial principles set the standards for newly urbanised 
Afrikaners and French Canadians who increasingly found themselves 
lacking the necessary skills to compete openly on the market. 
Here, the differences between developing Afrikaner and Quebec 
nationalism are more pronounced. Vital differences relate to the 
use of indigenes for labour purposes. South African history has, 
from its beginning, witnessed an increasingly capitalist economy in 
which the indigenous African formed an integral part. The South 
African infrastructure was built upon the sweat of imported slaves 
and indigenous labour. Some found employment working as herdsmen 
or domestic servants in exchange for squatting rights. Still 
others braved the darkness peopling the underground mines so as to 
extract resources for the enrichment of weal thy magnates. The 
development of Canada relied primarily on European emigrant labour. 
The Indians served no practical economic function (save the fur 
trade) and were constantly removed from the paths of European 
advance. Denigrated and assimilated, Indians in the pre-industrial 
era were few in numbers yet they were not similarly enslaved. 
The Imperialist export-oriented market economy had become 
entrenched within the South African system. African reservations 
were maintained, their size limited so as to induce a constant flow 
of migrant labourers required to man the factories and mines which 
characterized the white establishment. The industrial capitalist 
society was not, however, initially colour-conscious. 
Impoverishment was not solely a black phenomenon. Afrikaans-
speakers were for the most part unskilled and the alien urban 
environment threatened to denationalize them. Vulnerable on two 
fronts, Afrikaners found themselves in competition with cheaper 
African labour while simultaneously having to contend with profit-
seeking English capitalists. Francophone Canadians likewise 
experienced the transitional trauma which plunged them into an 
environment clearly dominated by powerful English money interests. 
Yet for reasons aforementioned, the battle lines were clearly 
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drawn. No indigenous third front existed within the urban realm. 
Thus, one need be sensitized to differing definitions of "peoples" 
and "sides" which were applicable in each case. 
Later developments were to reveal that even upon attainment of 
political power and in spite of concerted efforts aimed at 
repressing the African population, Afrikaner nationalists could not 
defeat their indigenous opponents and increasingly had to rely on 
their labour and co-operation. One could posit the hypothesis 
that the triumph of Afrikaner nationalism and even its early 
evolution at the start of the century within the union had been a 
racial confrontation. This hypothesis could in fact reason that 
the co-opt~tion of Afrikaner leaders to within an inherited 
Imperialist framework (which divided the territory along racial 
lines according to the 1913 Land Act) after the Boer War clearly 
signalled where the battle lines were to be drawn. While not 
al together untrue, the notion of a flexibly homogeneous white 
racial block prior to 1960 superficially minimizes consequent 
ethnic antagonism which would mobilise Afrikaans-speakers and 
English-speakers into different camps. 
Similarly, there is a tendency to characterize the Canadian debate 
as a duel of sorts between French and English combatants rather 
than one between Federalists and Separatists. 
has captured the spotlight, historically, 
erratically buoyant French Canadian nationalism. 
Ethnic antagonism 
in part due to 
The battle lines 
within an ethnic framework between contending European fragments 
are more easily marked in Canada than they are in South Africa. 
This is due to the fact that the Quebecois have a clearly defined 
territory while the Afrikaners are interspersed. Canadian 
Federalism gives Quebec nationalists a political base from which to 
"stand their ground" against perceived opponents. Those attempting 
to dispute this "ethnic standoff" approach tend to redefine 
conflict on a constitutional plane. That is, conflict is rather 
viewed as a jurisdictional power-play between Federal and 
Provincial Government structures. While this relationship tends to 
be most problematic with regard to Quebec, gripings in the ranks of 
other Provincial Governments are, here, not marginalised. 
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Nevertheless, in spite of decades of successive efforts, the 
Federal-Provincial conferences have not resolved the impasse. 
Underlying these ·failures is disagreement which centres upon the 
terms and spirit of Confederation. Despite divergent outlooks 
within English Canada itself, there exists a loose consensus with 
regard to one issue. English Canada out-rightly rejects the notion 
of two founding nations and arrogantly refuses to make concessions 
acceptable to French Canadians. As a result, the present. 
constitutional arrangements have increasingly fallen out of favour 
with a disgruntled Quebec. English Canada disputes and rejects the 
ethnic equation preferring to take solace in the words rather than 
the spirit of the British North America Act. Conversely, French 
Canada thrives upon this cleavage which is perceived to be more a 
national than a constitutional dilemma (albeit recognising that the 
two are inseparable). 
Comparative studies must necessarily give full attention to the 
socio-economic and institutional underpinnings of nationalism. This 
is not to exclude ideological developments and expression which are 
significantly stressed in this work. The orientation of this 
project is emphatically ethno-nationalist. Nevertheless, adequate 
consideration has been awarded to those analysts and researchers 
who differ across the political spectrum in their terminology and 
approach. Avoiding a fully fledged theoretical analysis on 
nationalism, this work recognises the pitfalls associated with 
tackling the complex debate, which is a separate topic in itself. 
Drawing on both literatures, and selecting certain features, this 
thesis attempts to comparatively describe two diverse societies. 
Despite the overwhelmingly descriptive character of this project, 
a number of questions implicitly arise thus revealing explanatory 
objectives which strive to insert this study into a larger context. 
Questions of ethnicity and those processes which contribute towards 
the evolution of nationalism necessarily spring to mind. Competing 
interpretations squabble over the essence of consciousness and 
those factors which impact upon its progressive development. Few 
reject the significant applications which the principle of 
nationalities imposes upon society. Yet, whether nationalism is but 
a transient phenomena or a procreative reality remains unanswered. 
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This unsolved mystery touches upon the very heart of consciousness 
and changing identities which vary according to the needs and 
circumstances of individuals and associative collectivities. 
This comparative thesis seeks to distance itself from scientific 
approaches which attempt almost obsessively to find sociological 
rules, operationalise concepts and coherently situate data within 
the confines of changing paradigms. While models for fragmented 
societies can provoke a plethora of interesting "revelations", 
paradigmatic constrainsts inevitably detract from and falsely 
influence conclusions forthcoming. 10 There are those who proclaim 
that consciousness recognises itself in others, and knows the other 
in itself. "What is true for the individual is even more so for 
societies. There is no nation without otheF nations.nu 
This paper progresses in sequence, each sequence historically 
connected and intrusive upon the next. Like a drama or a play each 
chapter depicts a new sequence in which new actors and novel props 
are infused into the continuing saga. To achieve a coherent 
organisation and analysis of the vast subject matter, the 
development and evolution of ethno-nationalism has been divided 
into parallel phases or aspects, associated primarily with specific 
historical periods and sometimes with broad ideological and 
thematic influences. Being the producer in this instance, it was 
my aim to highlight and display significant actors and historical 
events so as to endear this project with some form of thematic 
relevance; ethnic nationalism being the theme of sorts. 
Political analysts, historians and sociologists have documented and 
commented upon the theoretical, institutional, economic, religious 
and political underpinnings of nationalism. It is such texts 
regarded as expert studies upon Afrikaner society, Afrikaner 
nationalism and Afrikaner political thought which lay the 
foundation for this project; similarly, with the French Canadian 
experience. Although these academic works may be seen as secondary 
materials, they are in this context primary, remembering that the 
comparative aspect be the ultimate objective. Frequently, the 
nationalists are themselves cited while at other junctures anti-
nationalist spokespersons bring greater clarity to the debate. 
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Newspaper articles and smaller essays also form part of the 
resource base, yet they are few and far between. The study 
recognises the vast literature available and succinctly strives to 
incorporate a workable resource centre. Historical review enables 
o~e to better draw out similarities and differences thereby making 
this project accessible to the common reader. Personal contacts 
with individuals from diverse backgrounds within both societies 
have perhaps provided me with more insightful perspectives. These 
non documented sources have proven to be motivators. My personal 
interest in this topic arises from my unique circumstances outlined 
in brevity. This thesis is expository and based solidly upon 
varying academic works. 
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CH APTER I: 
SECTION I 
THE FORMATNE YEARS: 
The Settlement of a New Land 
The Cape Colony and New France: 
The Nature of a Society 
Pre-Conquest Consciousness 
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The curtain opens revealing a sparsely inhabited land, 'unfounded' 
from a Eurocentric perspective until the arrival of colonists, the 
Dutch in South Africa and the French in Canada. This chapter 
attempts to recount the formative years of settlement and of 
national awakening. It is, furthermore, divided into two sections. 
The first deals with the nature of society in New France and the 
Cape Colony. It describes pre-Conquest consciousness as 
determined by the caste-like feudal structure in which the 
metropolitan company officials ranked above the more rural colonist 
population. Company business dictated the orientation and 
objectives of each colony which basically revolved around a single 
primary commodity. Trade also to a large extent depended upon the 
indigenes, various African and Indian tribes in South Africa and 
Canada respectively. The disposition and plight then of the native 
populations in both societies need be examined in-so-far as they 
affect the changing and evolving consciousness of the Euro-
settlers. Pioneer expansionism is also given voice once again 
within the context of a colonist-Company cleavage whereby pastoral 
adventurers chose to disengage from the rigidity and restrictions 
imposed by the latter. This section concludes with an evaluation 
of pre-Conquest consciousness as it relates to national 
development. 
The second section begins with an assessment of the Conquest, its 
legacy and the consequent struggle for survival. It concentrates 
primarily upon disengagement and pioneering movements which would 
eventually determine the demographics and territorial limitations 
of the future state in each case study. Disengagement refers to 
both a mass migration as in the form of a Great Trek and/or a 
rebellion. Charismatic and key personalities are also highlighted 
so as to show the significance of national figures within a 
developing nationalist mythology. The early dawning of British 
imperialist arrogance is discussed as is the sprouting of anti-
imperialist national consciousness. This chapter concludes with an 
historical appraisal demonstrating some comparative elements within 
each society. 
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The Cape Colony: 1652-1795 
The arrival of the Dutch in South Africa in 1652 and the 
establishment of the Dutch East India Company as a colonial trading 
post marked the beginning of a white settler society at the foot of 
Africa. The Cape Colony consisted primarily of traders, colonial 
officials or company servants, and free burghers. 1 Slaves and 
aliens (the Khoikoi and Bushman) filled the bottom rungs of the 
social ladder. Company farm land was awarded to the freeburghers 
who drew closer into an interdependent relationship with company 
officials dependent on their produce. The caste-like society which 
came to be set the stage for a pigmentocracy as racial 
consciousness developed in sync with privilege and status. The 
arrival in 1688 of French Huguenots fleeing persecution at home 
coupled with German and other European immigrants formed the ethnic 
base of what later came to be the Afrikaner. These European 
migrants became stock farmers in the 18th Century valuing land in 
a relatively open frontier. 2 By 1800, they were welded into a 
separate people with distinct characteristics and a unique 
language. Their simple rural based pattern of life and the 
hardships faced in the open veld carved a pioneering spirit which 
fostered personal values of independence, dexterity, stubbornness, 
resoluteness against force, and love of freedom and open land 
space. At the start of the 18th Century, the Cape was firmly an 
agricultural colony. Various economic constraints attributed to 
the autocratic nature of the Company inspired a revolt by the 
colonists in 1705 under the rule of governor Van der Stel. It was 
two years later that Hendrik Bibault first used the term 
"Afrikaner" to identify himself. An "Africaan" referred to a white 
colonist physically born in South Africa and in the 19th century, 
the term "Africaander" was in general use among white colonists to 
identify themselves as a group. 3 
Further grievances between the colonists and officials developed. 
Young Adam Tas became a hero as he successfully petitioned the 
removal of an exploitative governor. The widening gap between 
officials and colonists, and the latter's intolerance with the 
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former's practice must be noted.4 Each set of farms because a state 
in miniature; and the spirit of independence only grew as a slew of 
"Kaffir Wars' reinforced bonds of solidarity and attachment to the 
soil. The political and economic bankruptcy of the Company and its 
blatant disregard for colonist concerns would foreshadow the anti-
colonial struggle which would intensify with the arrival of 
imperialist Britain and its consequent control. Patterson states 
plainly that the Dutch Hollanders, who occupied influential posts 
in the church, schools and civil service were widely disliked for 
what the Boers 'regarded as supercilious sophistication and liberal 
views'; this was similar to the way in which the mainland French 
were regarded in Quebec. 5 
Company restrictions upon the economic advancement of the free 
burghers existed in the very nature of its role as a trading body 
holding political power. 6 The perceived economic heartlessness of 
the v.o.c. and the increasing hardships encountered by the 18th 
Century crop farmers of the Cape Peninsula and Stellenbosch led to 
the emergence of the trekboer as the Cape's first white 
frontiersman. This roving pastoralist driven by an adventurous 
spirit became enticed by the hunting and land which the interior 
presented before him. 7 Under the informal loan farm system, the 
trekboer could lay claim to huge tracts of land paying an annual 
fee in recognition of the Company's dominion. Yet in practice, he 
was unlikely to be evicted if he did not pay and so in essence lay 
outside Company control. The advance of the white frontier and 
their contact with the indigenous Khoisan hunting bands led do 
conflict. 
retreat. 
They were forced to accept incorporation or else 
Crapanzano's analysis reveals that from the beginning of Dutch 
settlement, there existed tension between the Company and those 
Cape residents outside of its employ. It was these rebellious 
renegades and adventurers who became trekboers, semi-nomadic 
pastoralists who lost more of their European heritage as they moved 
farther from Cape Town. Sir John Barrow displays his biased 
ethnocentricism describing the trekboers as (an) unindustrious, 
primitive, unenterprising gluttons, cigarettes/pipes in mouth and 
constantly getting drunk on spirits, laziness and mindless 
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racism; Crapanzano cites such an attitude as revealing in that it 
prompted, as did others 1 ike it, the Boers to trek into the 
country. 8 
The Khoikoi's experience of trading with European vessels seeking 
fresh provisions made them initially unalarmed by the Dutch 
intrusion. Yet they gradually came to realize that the Dutch were 
not passing ships in the night but rather had come to stay, 
increasing in numbers as well as in land holdings. 9 Thus the 
encroachment of white farming on the pasture lands led to conflict 
and war {1659-60; 1673-1677). The exploitation of the indigenous 
Khoikoi revolved around the cattle trade and of course, land. The 
unreliability of the former (as the Khoikoi supplied cattle) led 
the colonists to begin setting up a competing livestock economy. 
It also prompted them to use coercion as to deprive the Khoikoi of 
their remaining cattle. The disintegration of the Khoikoi economy 
and way of life resulted in Khoikoi migration to remote semi desert 
regions; some retreated to more mountainous areas where they 
adapted and blended in with the Khoisan hunters; still others hung 
around the white farms and settlements seeking casual labour. In 
1713, a devastating smallpox epidemic wiped out most of the Khoikoi 
population in the vicinity of areas of white habitation. 
Fredrickson sums it up well commenting on the fate of the Khoikoi 
and the coastal Indians. He states, "Again a weaker and less 
organized people gave way to a more powerful and unified invader. 
In both instances, there was a pattern of trade that turned out to 
be destructive to the indigenes". 10 
New France: 1534-1759 
The founding of New France in 1534 by explorer Jacques Cartier and 
the consequent establishment of a French trading post by navigator 
Champlain in 1603 marked the beginning of the French regime's 
colonial control in the new world. 11 Exploitation of the fur trade 
through manipulation of the native Indian populations led to firm 
commercial monopolies established by the Company. 12 The influx of 
merchants facilitated the economic exploitation of resources for 
the benefit of the metropolis. The companies were the legal owners 
of the land awarding strips known as· "seigneuries" to various 
individuals. 13 The recipient of the land became known as a 
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seigneur, ranked just lower than the French nobility on the caste-
type social ladder. There were approximately 100 "cenistaires" in 
each seigneurial domain, cultivating the land, paying taxes to the 
seigneur and receiving but three quarters of the grain ground at 
the mill. The seigneur in turn was responsible to the authorities 
for collecting rents, taxes, grains and accounting for them. As 
'socialist' historian Leandre Bergeron amply states, "the colony is 
a milk-cow (for the metropolis) that must find its own hay. 1114 
Guerilla warfare by the Iroquois against the colonists prompted the 
arrival of 100 French soldiers to protect Ville Marie (later to be 
known as Montreal) from such attacks. The Monarch Louis XIV 
tightened his grip on the colony, appointing a governor directly 
to control external relations and command the army. The 
"intendant", another civil servant, would be responsible for trade 
settlement, cultivation, finances and justice. Control of the fur 
trade became a priori obsession as Frontenac, then governor in 
1672, traded for furs with brandy. Expeditions into the Great 
Lakes, trading posts in Louisiana and English competition. would 
eventually lead to territorial treaties between the two colonial 
powers. The 17th century saw the metropolis saturated with beaver 
pelts. France lost interest in Canada setting the colony adrift. 
The French colonial presence grew encompassing Quebec, Ontario, New 
Brunswick, the Mississippi Valley and Louisiana. Yet it was 
sparsely populated and badly organized. Various forts were 
constructed especially around Quebec and Montreal and in the Lake 
Champlain area. Between 1713 - 1739, the white French settler 
population increased from 18000 to 43000 due to a high birth rate. 
The King's illegitimate daughters of grand French ladies, orphans 
and prostitutes, the rejects and outcasts, prisoners, and stranded 
soldiers mixed to form the foundation stock of the Quebecois. The 
Metropolitans were distinguished from the "Canayens" (people of 
French origin born in Canada) by their aristocratic manners, 
clothes and their refined language. It was not uncommon for a 
Canayen to sometimes leave the seigneurie to become a free coureur-
de-bois rejoicing in his independent spirit despite being 
exploited. 15 It soon became obvious that France had little interest 
in the development of New France. Only 10 000 migrants had come to 
Quebec, one-third of those consisting of military personnel. 16 
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Prior to the arrival of imperialist Britain, there had been little 
agricultural development as settlers lived on a river frontage 
divided into long narrow strips, giving each farm access to water, 
transport and forest resources. These rangs were feudalistic in 
nature despite the fact that the social gap between seigneurs and 
habitants (Canayens) was not insurmountably wide. Thus seigneurs 
could be likened, as does Postgate and McRoberts, to colonial land 
agents rather than feudal lords. Some were former farmers while 
some were drawn from the French nobility •17 Farms became self-
sufficient economic units as other economic activity had been 
banned either due to French mercantilist policy, or as in the fur 
trade, because France directly controlled it. The habitants were 
unskilled labourers, idle men and vagabonds cast out by France to 
create indigenous industry, develop agriculture and populate •18 
They were but "paupers" and prisoners pithy in comparison to the 
French merchants who wanted New France to remain a trading post and 
a source of raw materials (particularly the fur trade which was 
monopolised by a few French from France merchants). Fighting 
battles for the King, a continuous influx of soldiers with each 
war; and after each treaty, these soldiers now penniless remained 
to swell the ranks of the habitants. The seigneuries became 
overpopulated causing the land to deteriorate with resulting hunger 
strikes. 19 
Guindon describes the feudal trading society of New France as one 
initiated, financed, directed and stymied by the administration of 
the French Court. The caste system ranked in stature: the colonial 
administrators, soldiers, businessmen of the fur trade, clergy, and 
an emigrant population. Final authority rested in the hands of an 
appointed governor. 20 Jean c. Bonenfant and Jean-c. Falardeau, in 
their analysis of French Canadian nationalism, put forward that 
only a latent form of patriotism existed in French Canada. 
Collective traits developed which made French Canadians different 
from the France born French. Yet, nationalism did not exist in 
French Canada prior to the British conquest. 21 Nationalism involved 
a scale of values of which they were not yet aware. Marcel Rioux, 
in his academically acclaimed "La Question du Quebec" describes the 
original habitants as rather homogeneous, and as a result of the 
considerable Church influence upon the colony, the dangers faced 
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against the Amerindians and Iroquois, and the binding internal 
elements of values, institutions, language and religion, the 
Quebecois had to unite to survive. The habitants, furthermore, 
differed to the French in that the former were rural while the 
latter were metropolitan and lived in the cities. 22 The habitant 
was a man cut off bit by bit from the grand tradition, that 
isolated himself from other strata of society and became the pivot 
of Quebecois society. Falardeau compares the·parish of New France 
to that which existed in France at the same time (17th century). 
Three institutions shared the social and political power, the 
village Assembly, the seigneur and the cure. 23 In describing the 
rangs along the river, Rioux states that the habitations were not 
grouped around a central core as were French villages. The 
seigneur was preoccupied with administration and the war leaving 
the colonists to live independently. 
The consequences were significant instilling in the habitants, 
early on, a spirit of independence and liberty that they had not 
been exposed to in France. They also adopted quickly a life-style 
of a small enclosed group where all were regarded equally and 
shared the same ideals in life. With regard to Falardeau's 
comparison of 17th Century France and Quebec, Rioux states that 
while France had three institutions, each representing a certain 
weight, in Quebec the parish priest-cure stood alone. His role 
permeated all sectors of life notably education. 2 " Mason Wade 
refutes common claim that the French Canadians were primarily an 
agriculturally disposed people. Rather, they were soldiers and 
adventurers and artisans, somewhat gregarious in nature. Rather 
than isolating themselves in the country, they tended to cluster 
together in the towns. This is apparent when one notes that 
Montreal, by the beginning of the 18th century, had already become 
the commercial center of the colony. New France was really only 
made up of two classes, the ruling elite of administrators, clergy 
and noble seigneurs on the one hand and the masses on the other. 25 
The elite were French (native or by assimilation) while the people 
identified themselves as Canadians and were jealous of Frenchmen. 
Jesuit visitor Pere Charlevoix describes the habitants as putting 
all their happiness in liberty and independence. Their negative 
characteristics include "avarice, conceit, lack of scientific 
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knowledge, ingratitude, over-weaning pride, impetuousness ... " On 
the positive side, they were pious, religious, brave and clever. 
Charlevoix found the free and lax climate of Canada as ample to 
"retain those whom Providence has caused to be born there", yet the 
habitants frivolity and aversion to regular labour, and their 
spirit of independence have always led a number of young men to 
leave and so "prevented the colony from peopling itself". 26 The 
success of the fur trade would largely be dependent upon the 
"coureurs-de-bois" (roving fur trappers and traders). Thus many 
French settlers were lured away or "escaped" from the habitant way 
of life through this alternative route. This in turn acted as to 
prevent the consolidation of a thorough going regime of seigniorial 
feudalism in French Canada. It is therefore understandable that 
seigneurs and clergy alike denounced the fur trade for fostering a 
spirit of individualism, independence and materialism within the 
lower class. 27 
Bergeron plots out the chain of the fur trade. New France comprised 
of the Company, the Coureur-de-Bois and the Red Man. The Company 
is described as middlemen (for traders in the metropolis) of a 
bourgeois social class taking 60% of all profits while not 
providing any productive labour (Bergeron considers amassing 
capital as unproductive labour). The Coureur-de-Bois are portrayed 
as carriers and middlemen taking but 4. 99% of profits while 
contributing 5% of productive labour. The Coureur-de-Bois is 
described as quasi-proletarian. The sub-proletarian Red Man, on 
the other hand, takes but .01% of profits while accounting for 65% 
of productive labour. The Indian was therefore the real producer 
and the biggest loser in the commercial chain. 28 The Indians 
viewed the rapid expansion of white settlement with alarm. The 
resistance of the Indians in Canada to territorial loss and 
cultural disintegration was predictably limited by tribal rivalries 
which prevented unified action against the invaders. 29 The Iroquois 
watched the French and their "allies", the Hurons and Algonquins 
advance into their territory. Advancing on Trois Rivieres and Ville 
Marie, they inflicted heavy losses upon the French. Supported by 
arms supplies from the Dutch at Fort Orange (Albany) and by the 
English of "New England", the Iroquois, in 1658, intensified their 
guerrilla attacks. Dollard des Ormeaux and his men were 
26 
slaughtered as they attempted to hold off the Iroquois, and in 
1662, Ville Marie nearly fell. Finally, however, the Iroquois 
onslaught fell victim to smallpox contracted from blankets left 
behind by the French to cover their sick. Iroquois morale was 
furthermore dealt a crippling blow as widespread famine set in and 
another hundred French soldiers arrived. 30 
Concluding Synthesis 
The settlement in the Cape Colony and New France can be seen in a 
similar light prior to the British conquest. Both developed as 
splinterings of Europe serving as trading posts to furnish the 
needs of their Euro-metropolis. The hierarchical nature of both 
societies approached a caste-like superstructure in which status 
and social class correlated with identification or "national 
proximity" to Europe. In the Cape, the Company made up of 
Hollanders exerted control upon the free burghers, an ethnic 
melange of colonists disposed toward a rural and agricultural 
pattern of life. The solidification and development of these 
stock farmers into a separate people drew its blood from common 
language ties, and a harsh environment, in which unity was a 
prerequisite to withstand sporadic attacks and conflict with the 
indigenous populations. The autocratic rule of colonial governors 
and the economic and political monopoly of Company interests 
further polarized officials and colonists. In New France, 
monopolizing Companies exploited the colony for its raw materials, 
particularly with regard to the fur trade. The "habitants" of New 
France were similarly disposed to primary industry including 
hunting and agriculture. They came from the backwoods of rural 
France and soon formed common bonds in their dealings with the 
various Indian tribes. Their sense of being different further found 
cause in their rural isolation from their metropolitan brethren. 
Different etiquette distinguished the French nobility and its 
Company colonial land agent "seigneurs" from the Canayen masses. 
These seigneurs were not unlike the landdrosts in co-ordinating the 
clustering of individuals to be exploited for Company profit. The 
development of farms and parishes in the Cape and New France 
respectively constituting self sufficient economic units gives 
substance to further parallels. Company rigidity of control spurred 
frontiersmen in both cases. In South Africa, the trekboer with his 
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pioneering spirit set out to the interior to evade the clutches of 
his Company brethren. These semi-nomadic pastoralists encountered 
African tribes and indigenous l<hoikoi and San sometimes without 
incident and often in a fierce struggle for land and especially 
cattle. In French Canada, it was the coureur-de-bois who became 
the roving rebel evading Company policy. These bandits took 
readily to aboriginal life-styles venturing among new tribes and 
regions in pursuit of beaver pelts and simultaneously fuelling the 
brandy trade. Though one may perhaps not consider the Company to 
be a "State" in the current sense, it was nevertheless the 
administrative centre of the colony dictating the rules in the 
primitive jural community bounding its inhabitants to a set of laws 
and orders. One may wish to classify French Canadian and Afrikaner 
society as stateless in this historical context. Yet initially, it 
must be regarded as neo-Statal due to the overbearing influence 
exerted by the metropolis in Europe. In this light the trekboer 
and coureur-de-bois in South Africa and Canada respectively can be 
seen as dissent groups, ethnically comprised and disengaging from 
the jural community. These pioneers may further be seen as 
segments of the civil society, albeit small ones, exercising their 
exit options, venting their frustrations and so resisting the 
encroachment of a predatory "State". Serving as a primary form of 
resistance to state growth, their resistance to state servants 
trying to capture society weakened the established authority. All 
this took place in an area of society captured by the state with a 
segment of society partly uncaptured. 
The exploitation, manipulation and partial destruction of the 
indigenes revolved around the cattle trade in South Africa and the 
fur trade in Quebec (New France). Yet it was smallpox which 
eventually crippled the native populations affirming the domination 
of the white man in his newly adopted world. 
Pre-conquest nationalism was without doubt absent. Ethnic 
mobilization based upon a consciousness unique to a self conceived 
ethnic entity was still a far cry away. Collective mobilization 
was in its pioneering stage as clusters formed to deal with a harsh 
new environment. And the rigid and exploitative nature of colonial 
Company agents also began to foster colonist unity based on 
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grievances. Contact with native populations and group competition 
for resources further contributed to the development of pioneering 
group identities. The rural-metropolitan cleavage largely 
correlated with the widening colonist-Company one. The formers' 
interests lay within his new environment while the latter's lay in 
his European homeland. If any identity consciousness did exist, it 
was more of a racial consciousness. The "savage" image given to, 
the "heathen" native populations and the class-like structure which 
placed the Indian and Khoikoi at the bottom of the status ladder 
fuelled by contact between the European and these native groups 
entrenched white supremacy in the histories of both societies. The 
major difference between the Cape settlement and that of New France 
lay in demographics. The importation of black slaves by 1;:he Dutch 
in the Cape and the relatively huge number of migrating black 
population groups vis-a-vis europeans would relegate the position 
of the white man to a threatened minority group for time to come. 
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SECTION II 
EXPANSION AND REBELLION 
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South Africa 
With the first British occupation of 1795 and the return of the 
British in 1806, Afrikanerdom was to undertake a journey which 
would become a focal point of their historical mythology. Unlike 
the German and French immigrants who were absorbed and assimilated, 
the English were incapable of being assimilated. This was due to 
their sheer numbers and the fact that they came out in families. 
English became the language of advancement and except for minor 
mutual assimilation, these two ethnic entities remained separate. 1 
British colonial rule would plant the seed of Afrikaner 
nationalism, it being anti-colonialism. 2 With the closing of the 
frontier and a shortage of land, a crisis developed. This crisis 
was aggravated as the government insisted that the Khoi receive 
equal protection. There were signs in the Cape that the Khoi and 
slaves were no longer prepared to accept European hegemony. This 
threatened the colonists' sense of superiority. Thus prior 
government proclamations which confirmed the racial rather than the 
class order of the Cape became blurred; and though the racial 
nature of the social order was not rigid, this crisis in social 
relationships that was taking place threatened the colonists' group 
po~i tion and security, particularly that of the poor whites. These 
bywoners as they were called derived their rights, protection and 
respect through identification with the white elite social strata. 3 
This crisis prompted the Great Trek. The Great Trek was not a 
direct response to British occupation. In fact, Davenport states 
that the British were cautious so as not to alienate more people 
than necessary. They guaranteed property and the Roman-Dutch legal 
system. They ended torture and monopolies and tried to control 
officials by putting them on a salary basis. They attempted to buy 
the elite with entertainments at the castle yet they do not seem to 
have caught the imagination and support of the ordinary citizen to 
any degree. 4 
Giliomee suggests that the prerequisites for national consciousness 
were present at the start of the 19th century. The Afrikaners 
spoke a distinctive language; they possessed a single religious 
faith, a common historical heritage and a consciousness of 
belonging to a separate ethnic group. They also had special status 
in a slave-holding society. The absence of national consciousness 
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was due to improper or inadequate channels for its expression and 
development. This was a reflection of the educational and church 
facilities which were not oriented to satisfy and propagate this 
type of consciousness. There were furthermore, no intellectual 
leaders to press for and stimulate awareness. In the first half of 
the 19th Century, English became the language of the public service 
and judiciary while pressure on urban Afrikaners to adopt English 
culture and values increased. 5 This resulted in the anglicization 
of some Afrikaans families. Yet it was the equalization policies 
undertaken by the British which spurred the Great Trek. The 
burghers saw such a policy as contrary to the laws of G-d and so 
moved in order to uphold their faith and the Gospel in its pure 
form. 6 The British continued the policies of the Dutch East-India 
Company forcing the eastern frontiersmen to trek away from British 
control. 7 The action of departure, however, could not be 
interpreted in the sense of nationalism. These Afrikaners left due 
to the peculiar circumstances prevailing on the Eastern frontier 
including having to deal with organised Bantus. The eastern 
frontier farmers were in despair. They developed a stronger feeling 
of solidarity as a result of their isolation, common dangers, and 
struggles. 
Van Jaarsveld points out that no cultural awareness was mentioned 
nor was any historical dimension to their self consciousness. They 
did feel, however that equality with the coloured races would lead 
to the destruction of their own race. Thus, the growth and 
development of national self assertion was not a causal factor of 
the Great Trek but rather a consequence. 8 
Shingler cites four general reasons contributing to the Trek. These 
were (1) the anglicization of the Dutch in the Cape Peninsula and 
beyond; (2) the overall problem of control by the central 
governmen_t specifically the collection of taxes and attempts to 
impose order on the hinterland; (3) the emancipation of the slaves 
and the mode of emancipation; and ( 4) the long standing Dutch 
Republican tradition which (including the establishment of 
republics in America and France) spurned the ZAD republic in the 
1880's. These republican orders were not so much territorial as 
ethnic. Citizenship was determined on an ethnic basis rather as 
33 
evidenced by the exclusion of African, 'coloureds' and uitlanders 
in the ZAD republic. 9 This republican zeal will be expanded upon 
later yet it is to be noted as a. crucial and significant 
contributant to nationalist development in South Africa. 
Sheila Patterson looks at the Trek in a more retrospective manner. 
That is she looks at the pre-Trek years in terms of events which 
became part and parcel of Afrikaner nationalist mythology. She 
cites Afrikaner grievances under British rule as prompting the move 
away. One key event was the 1812 Black Circuit which called for 
whites to answer for mistreating their Hottentot servants. This 
involved the introduction of circuit courts aimed at bringing 
justice nearer to the plaintiff on the frontier. This presented an 
affront to an Afrikaner identity which contained a consciousness of 
special status in a slave-holding society. The outcome of 
discontent showed up three years later in what became known as the 
Slagters Nek Rebellion. Frontier Boer F. Bezuidenhout refused to 
answer a court summons on a charge of cruelty to his Hottentot 
servant. A white officer and twelve Hottentot troops were sent to 
his home. A shoot-out followed in which Bezuidenhout was killed. 
His brother then raised a rebellion with the aid of a Xhosa chief. 
' 
It was suppressed and its leaders executed at Slagters Nek. The 
execution which involved rehangings after the gallows broke down 
left bitter scars in the memories of those who witnessed the 
inhumane execution. In the next twenty years, the Boers adapted 
their way of life to a slow rhythm of movement, one of semi-nomadic 
pastoralism. The loan place system of farming caused insecurity of 
tenure resulting in overgrazing and restlessness. The spirit of 
self reliance and independence of the Boer governed his life and 
came from his isolation (self-imposed). Thus when a centralized 
liberal authority began to spread its tentacles to the frontier, 
migration took place. Patterson does, however, assert that 
drought, floods, and kaffir raids on Boer cattle herds on the 
eastern border convinced Boers to trek as they saw the government 
as unprotective of their needs. They wished to be free from the 
government and from taxation. 10 
The Great Trek would determine the demographic nature of white 
South Africa as well as serve as an initial anti-imperialist and 
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anti-modernist event in the history of Afrikaner nationalist 
development. It was a form of rebellion. "Had there been no land 
available outside the Colony there might have been a rebellion ... 
As it was the Boers trekked. Once the movement had begun , it 
gathered speed by its own momentum. 1111 
De Kiewet affirms the demographic significance of the Great Trek. 
He amply states: 
"The Great Trek indissolubly linked the future of all South Africa 
with the Boer race. Within fourteen years a thin layer of Dutch 
settlement had spread over the most desirable parts of the 
interior, leaving no considerable areas vacant which might, like 
Ontario, have become a region of almost exclusive British 
settlement. 1112 
The next stage of Afrikaner history produced a slew of "heroes" as 
ethnic clashes between the pioneering Boers and the colonial 
British set the pattern of separation between the conflicting 
groups for time to come. It was also to bolster a sense of 
national consciousness subjectively perceived by the rebellious 
Boers. Territorial separation of the Boers would eventually be 
transcended as blood ties would wipe away borders and assert a 
brotherhood of Afrikanerdom. 
The British authorities prohibited trade with the Trekkers, banned 
ammunition supplies to them, and established treaties with the 
Basuto and Griqua tribes in 1843 to secure northern borders. This 
created a buffer area in which "Europeans" would find themselves 
under non-white control. 13 British colonial policy was one of 
indirect rule. At the time it was a liberal creed encouraging 
multiplicity and promoting ethnicity. Motivated by a divide and 
rule doctrine, it calculatingly used tribalism as a tactic to 
create division by delegating access to positions of differential 
advantages in ethnic terms. This involved appealing to the loyalty 
of certain people to compete for scarce resources. 14 
Group consciousness and solidarity began to develop among the newly 
established Trekkers in Natal. They had left the country as 
discarded ones hoping to maintain the old republican society in 
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continuity with Swellendam and Graaff-Reinet. They had shared also 
the historical experience of fighting the Matabele and Zulu 
tribes. 15 Maritz and Retief were at the forefront of the newly 
established Natal settlement requesting the government to recognize 
them as free and independent people. Retief and his party were 
murdered in 1838 by Zulu chief Dingane after signing a land 
treatise. Dingane followed this up by destroying most of the 
voortrekker presence in Natal. Andries Pretorius responded with a 
commando of 470 men toppling Dingane on 16 December 1838 in what 
came to be known as the battle of Blood River. Before the battle, 
the Boers had made a vow to treat the occasion as holy if they were 
victorious. 16 This "covenant" or "vow" became a convenient focal 
point in what came to be interpreted as the "sacred" history of the 
Afrikaner. 
French Canada 
The British conquest of New France in 1759 consolidated and 
augmented the place of the Roman Catholic Church as the major 
integrating force in French Canadian society. The military defeat 
of the French meant major comm~rcial interests were discontinued 
and furthermore, prompted the withdrawal of government and economic 
leaders leaving the Church without competing national 
institutions. 17 As in colonial Africa where the British conquered 
central parts of the states recognizing the power and religion of 
the paramount chiefs, so it was in French Canada with regard to the 
Church. In Africa, British rule actually attributed more power to 
the "tribal" chiefs . 18 In French Canada, the British likewise 
manipulated or took advantage of the hierarchical system as 
evidenced in the Quebec Act. Co-optation was the underlying aim. 
Thus British colonial policy attempted to co-opt and utilize 
indigenous authority structures rather than impose alien systems of 
authority upon its colonized subjects. The Quebec Act of 1774 made 
the Catholic Church the cornerstone of the colonial state, gave it 
the right to tax the peasantry and control schools. It also 
restored French civil law and protected French language rights. In 
protecting the cultural autonomy of the French, it also deprived 
the English minority of traditional rights such as trial by jury 
and habeas corpus . 19 Canayen society remained feudal while English 
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merchants moved in to exploit their economic vulnerability; of 
course, English policies restricted the financial advancement and 
power of the religious communities. Political concessions to the 
Church and French Canadian power structures were not a reflection 
of British graciousness. The American Revolution which denounced 
British imperialism threatened to expand northwards. Therefore, 
British colonial policy was aimed at preventing or minimizing 
discontent in Quebec so that influential French Canadian power 
brokers not entertain rebellious notions in co-operation with 
American rebels. Bergeron notes that at the crucial conflict, the 
habitants chose passive resistance,refusing to enlist in the 
militia and denouncing the clergy for actively defending British 
interests. As the American forces made gains and then were 
subsequently pushed back by British forces,the canayens came to 
realize that their liberation could only come from themselves.= 
American freedom would simply replace British colonization with an 
American form. The influx of Loyalists into Canada firmly ensured 
numerical superiority in favour of the Englisp. With the loyalists 
came demands for a separate district where British law and tenure 
have jurisdiction and power. This resulted in the Constitution of 
1791 in which Upper Canada was carved out of Quebec Province thus 
establishing a border between Upper Canada ( later Ontario) and 
Lower Canada (Quebec). The habitants originally hoped and felt 
that it would de-inferiorize their position. Yet the Lieutenant 
governor, executive council and legislative council, all nominated 
in London, entrenched the colonial nature of British rule. 21 
T.R.H. Davenport, in his essay entitled "Nationalism and 
Conciliation: The Bourassa-Hertzog Posture", suggests that because 
historically the coureurs-de-bois failed to gain a foothold on the 
interior as did the voortrekkers, French Canada found itself 
obliged to accept territorial limitations, "which led to a far more 
restricted constitutional status than that eventually enjoyed by 
Afrikanerdom".n Davenport insinuates that diverging developments 
defuse comparative analysis of these two societies. Were my 
analysis to revolve around constitutional development, his 
conclusions would undoubtedly have critical relevance. It does 
not. The coureurs-de-bois and French Canadian exploration or 
expansion did take place. For the reasons put forth by Davenport, 
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French Canadian settlement of Western Canada is not seen in the 
light of a spiritual Trek intertwined and central to a developing 
nationalist fabric spiced with mystical overtones. The Hudson Bay 
Company attempted to extend their interests in the fur trade to the 
West, particularly in what became known as the region of Manitoba. 
The majority of the population was canayen metis and their leader 
was Jean Louis Riel. British Canada, however, had little intention 
of allowing the creation of another French Province, buying and 
annexing the territory from the Company. Riel, however, had other 
ideas setting up a provincial government and demanding recognition. 
Manitoba was created in 1870 and massive repression followed. The 
Metis were persecuted and murdered. 23 Despite the successive re-
election of Riel (up to 1874), he was likewise expelled from the 
House of Commons, and had to seek refuge in Quebec and later the 
United States. The metis retreated westwards before the advancing 
frontier to the valley of Saskatchewan. The metis and Indians 
along the Saskatchewan River combined forces in an uprising known 
as the second Northwest Rebellion in 1885. Louis Riel who led the 
uprising, was captured and sentenced to hang by an English speaking 
judge and jury. Quebec opinion, which had clamoured for a repeal 
for Riel, was neglected falling victim to political expediency. 24 
The rebels were linked by race and creed with French Canada which 
defended them against the hostility of Ontario. The hanging of 
Riel, according to Conservative journal "La Minerve", "wounded a 
whole people". 25 The Riel affair seemed to demonstrate that an 
Anglo-Canadian federal government had little concern for French 
Canadian interests and sentiments. 26 Riel stood as a French 
"martyr", and a "brother" who had been the victim of an unjust 
trial and condemned to an unjust death. 27 Figures like Riel, Dollard 
and Papineau became popularized characters, focal points for a 
hero-worshipping myth transforming nationalism which would develop. 
Louis Joseph Papineau became a hero of sorts to the habitants 
demonstrating perhaps the earliest form of violent reactionary 
nationalism. 
patriotes. 
He orchestrated and commandeered an armed uprising of 
The creation of classical colleges by the clergy 
produced a small class of rising petty bourgeoisie. It was this 
class and a man like Papineau which attempted to change the 
conciliatory attitude of the governor with the colonial oppressor. 
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Through the British parliamentary imposed system, the budget came 
under the control of the Assembly of which Papineau became 
president. His radical approach to the budget forced a split 
within the "Parti Canadien". The duty of the Assembly was aimed at 
restraining British commerce in Lower Canada and limiting the 
profits of English capitalists. Papineau urged the Cana yens to 
boycott English goods and withdraw their deposits from banks 
controlled by these merchants. 28 Though himself a seigneur of 
Montebello and a firm upholder of existing rights of property, 
Papineau was a strong republican and highly anti-clerical. 29 
Papineau prepared 92 resolutions adopted by the Lower Canada 
Assembly in 1834. They included demands for an Executive 
responsible to the people's representatives; reform of the land 
tenure system, and adequate French Canadian representation in 
public off ice. 30 The Patriote leaders held public meetings to 
spread the gospel of economic revolt. Smuggling was encouraged, 
anything to avoid paying duties. Simultaneously, Canada was 
undergoing a terrible depression, the farmers having just weathered 
a crop failure and the financial market in a panic both in London 
and the United States. 31 Though Papineau remained committed to the 
constitutional struggle, the paramilitary wing of the patriotes 
"Fils de la liberte" passed into more extreme hands. Gosford, then 
governor, abandoned hope of conciliation dissolving the last 
assembly of Lower Canada by proclamation. 32 Bishop Latrigue then 
intervened warning against complicity with the rebels. He was met 
with anger, demonstrations and renunciation of the clergy by the 
Patriote Press. La Minerve, the Patriot newspaper fanned the 
flames of rebellion; disorders in the outlying regions of Montreal 
broke out against the English merchants, the seigneurs, and the 
Chouayens (this referred to sell out French Canadians who would not 
join the Patriote movement). Ethnic feeling was aroused by rival 
parades culminating in a street fight. The troops were called in 
and martial law was proclaimed. 33 Warrants were issued for the 
arrest for treason of 26 principal Patriote leaders. Some, 
including Papineau managed to flee. Further skirmishes and a little 
bloodshed ensued. The rebellion ended as the rest of the province 
heeded the voice of the bishops and stayed quiet. 
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An assessment of the 1837-1838 rebellion shows it to be a rural 
phenomenon, localized and divorced from the cities, which provided 
more fertile ground for the seeds of revolution. Yet Groulx viewed 
the uprising as significant. It was an awakening event as the 
French Canadians often accused of political backwardness, "heard 
the call to freedom and political emancipation" sooner than peoples 
in other provinces. 34 Vallieres is more critical of the Patriote 
movement. Eloquence masked the class interests of its leaders. The 
Patriotes, he said, had no intention of creating a popular 
revolution but rather had wanted control of trade. The failure of 
the insurrection and the many sentences of ex-communication handed 
down to the rebels by the submissive turncoat clergy struck ,a 
severe blow to the hopes of the habitants. The failure became to be 
interpreted as a sort of fatalistic resignation to the will of G-d. 
Vallieres reaffirms his class-based explanation of the events. The 
English decided to co-opt the petty bourgeoisie by meeting some of 
the Patriot demands after the rebellion. The French petty 
bourgeoisie reconciled with the clergy as the English granted 
"responsible government" to both Ontario and Quebec. 35 
Concluding Synthesis 
Whether one can really make relevant comparisons on a chronological 
scale is a matter of debate. Yet it is difficult to ignore events 
and the people who play them out. Is there not, when looking 
through a nationalist lens, an undeniable parallel between the 
attributed martyrdom of Dollard des Ormeaux, bloodied at the hands 
of an indigenous Iroquois force on the one hand and Piet Retief 
also thrust into the annals of hero worship by his fatal misfortune 
at the spears of the Zulus on the other? Writing names in the 
pearly book of martyrdom and subscribing to a growing list of folk 
heroes in itself presupposes some primitive form at least of group 
solidarity. And if the writers and subscribers are ethnically 
oriented and if their writings and subscriptions command popular 
appeal, their created myth or folk-like nationalist stories cannot 
be devoid of all truth. It is really not the aim to make Andries 
Pretorius an ideological clone of Joseph Papineau. Their struggles 
need not be seen in a narrow and specific comparison of events; 
rather they should be seen as proud ethnically conscious (perhaps 
latent and subconscious) figures united in a pioneering spirit, 
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grappling to build for themselves a place in a foreign and harsh 
new world. While a confrontation with the colonial British State 
took the form of a rebellion in Lower Canada, disengagement through 
a mass exodus characterised inter-ethnic conflict in the Cape. 
One has to admit to the anti-imperialist factor of a growing 
national sentiment. Perhaps the conquests in both lands merely 
replaced one colonial ruler with another. Yet differing values of 
the two Euro-fragments quite evidently created societal strains. 
Contact between different languages, cultures and values would 
eventually develop into contact between two conscious ethnicities. 
A liberally disposed British strata bent on dominating an isolated 
feudal (in New France) and Calvinist (in South Africa) strata could 
only lead to conflict. And though the nature of constitutional 
development and the structure of these respective societies differ 
in accordance with pioneering developments, there is a common 
theme. Riel, Pretorius or Potgieter. A "half breed deranged" 
French Canadian metis being seen in the same light as a Voortrekker ·. 
pioneer. Stranger comparisons have been made. Fleeing on the 
heels of an encroaching British imperialism, trying to retain an 
independence of spirit and of territory and preaching or declaring 
autonomy can surprisingly demonstrate a brotherhood of purpose in 
the face of a common 'enemy'. 
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CH APTER II: 
THE CHOSEN PEOPLE: 
A Mission Toward Salvation 
The Catholic Church and the Dutch Reformed 
Church in French Canada and South Africa 
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Religious doctrine, customs, beliefs and institutional mechanisms 
are all significantly part and parcel of a developing national 
consciousness in both South Africa and French Canada. This chapter 
seeks to highlight the spiritual elements within both societies in-
so-far as they relate to national development. The ideological 
origins of each society are explored as are driving religious 
influences aimed at strengthening the bonds between Church and 
State. The fragmented nature of these new societies are examined in 
terms of ideological continuity or discontinuity with the 'mother' 
country. One is asked to observe the manner in which religion is 
farced to adapt to the harshness of a new environment. This 
adaptation often takes the form of a civil religion in which 
historical truth is often doctored so as to serve the interests of 
religious conformity. The Afrikaners and French Canadians are 
prone to reinterpretation of their respective histories, goals and 
orientations. The Bible is frequently brought in for support. 
Institutional religion perhaps forms the foundation of both 
societies. This chapter, while limited in scope due to the enormity 
of this subject, seeks to outline the orientation and pervasiveness 
of the Dutch Reformed Church and the Roman Catholic Church in South 
Africa and French Canada respectively. While making certain so as 
not to equate vastly different religious doctrines, this chapter 
does, however, attempt to reveal the similarities in-so-far as 
institutionalized religion has contributed to group enclosure and 
the preservation of each societies' cultural assets. The struggle 
here between Church and State then is undoubtedly +elevant. 
F~rrally, this chapter concentrates upon self conceptions in the 
s~nse that each fragmented group perceived itself to be a product 
I 
of Divine creation, with a calling as a select nation in the midst 
'\ 
of a heathen population. Again the Bible was called in to support 
this consciousness which was innately deterministic in that each 
'nation' saw itself as having to fulfil a predetermined mission. 
In brief, this chapter's main objective is to demonstrate the 
importance of religion in-so-far as it fosters group consciousness 
both ideologically and institutionally. With the movement of 
time, one is asked to extrapolate this consciousness to within the 
parameters of nationalism. 
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South Africa: The Calvinist Mission, The D.R.C. and The Social 
structure of the Rural Dorpe 
When the Voortrekker forces led by Andries Pretorius overcame 
tremendous odds and quashed Dingaan and his Zulu warriors at Blood 
River, the covenant between the Afrikaner people and God came into 
being. It was to become a central focal point in the Afrikaner 
civic religion. It is pointless, however, to analyze the civic 
religion of Christian Nationalism without first examining the 
ideological roots which imbued the Boer pioneers with an 
uncompromising faith. 
The Afrikaner people was born from a Christian society spurred to 
independence by the Reformed Church which possessed considerable 
influence. Church disputes had resulted in Calvinist victory. Yet 
the intolerance of the Church did not carry over to the civil 
authorities. The Dutch Republic became a 'seedbed of the rational 
spirit which was to flower in the European Enlightenment of the 
Eighteenth Century'. The Dutch Reformed Church, however, played a 
more dominant role in the shaping of the Afrikaner people than did 
the civil authorities. Reformed congregations were established 'at 
Cape Town (1665), Stellenbosch (1686), Drakenstein (1691}, 
Roodezand ( 1743), Swartland ( 1745), and Graaff-Reinet ( 1792).' The 
Reformed ministers were company employees while the church council 
presidents were senior company officials. 1 The church estab],ishment 
was, thus, in a sense a branch of the government. The colonial 
churches adhered to primitive Calvinism and to doctrines 
emphasising the Old Testament, predestination, and rejection of 
emotionalism and an embryonic nationalism, particular to the 
harsh environment. The Afrikaners perceived themselves and their 
place in the world, not to mention their relations with others in 
a Calvinist mould. 2 
De Klerk speaks of the isolation of the frontier Boer remarking 
that despite the minimal free intellectual discussion with regard 
to religion, the Calvinist tradition had remained alive. 3 The 
confession of Dort had been reduced to its own basic essentials 
emphasizing the pervasiveness and supremacy in all spheres, of the 
world of God. Calvin believed that 'man's utter dependence on 
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Grace, Divine election and Christian liberty were at the heart of 
human existence'. Calvin did acknowledge the independence and 
governing jurisdiction of civil authority yet the Divine was the 
supreme authority and was not to be opposed. Calvin's insistence, 
therefore, that Church and State each have their fields of 
operation constituting autonomous behaviour was not to imply a 
separation of the two in a sense of their being sealed off from one 
another. It means that each had its own particular function in 
'the wider concept of the Christian religion.' 4 The State had no 
spiritual authority over the Church while the latter had a 
particular political mission. 
Adam interprets Calvinism as making a two class distinction between 
the elect and the damned. He argues that the relatively 
decentralized organisation of the Calvinist churches would be 
expected to be more responsive to new needs as compared to highly 
centralized churches such as the Roman-catholic Church. Yet he 
admits in the same breath that even such rigid organisational 
structures as catholicism have relaxed sacred rules in the light of 
new circumstances. 5 He is here distinguishing between the authority 
of the centralized Roman Catholic Church which gave natives a 
certain protection in law against settler rule absent in Protestant 
settlements. The specific organisational form of religious praxis 
was far more important than the doctrinal content of the religion 
thereby acknowledging that no religion stood immune to changing 
socio-economic processes. Such a realisation makes comparisons far 
less irrelevant. 
O'Meara, Bloomberg and Moodie stress as well the significant 
influence of Dutch theologian Abraham Kuyper in fostering Dutch 
Reformed theology and the Afrikaner civil religion. Kuyper, a 
Reformed Church minister, opposed growing liberalism and pushed for 
Christian education. He viewed the State as the institutional 
embodiment of God's sovereignty. 6 Furthermore, he did not see the 
State in a totalitarian light; rather each sphere of social life 
was to exist independently of the state and of the other spheres 
being subject only to God. Education belonged to the sphere of the 
family and consequently he viewed State denial of the right to 
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teach doctrine in public Schools as a challenge to the authority of 
the family.~ Kuyperian doctrine of God's sovereignty in all spheres 
made it possible for church ministers to take temporary leave of 
absence from the pulpit to serve God in parliament. Furthermore 
the distinction between volkspoli tiek and party-politic facilitated 
the adoption of the full civil faith by volkskerk adherents. 8 
Kuyper proposed an up-dated Calvinism in the form of Christian 
nationalism. He believed that Boer possession of South Africa was 
inevitable if they never abandoned the Reformed faith of their 
fathers. Afrikaners embraced his theology but also a right wing 
legacy. Potchefstroom University was modelled on the Free 
University in Amsterdam founded by Kuyper. 9 Potch. (abbrev.) is 
significant in that it nurtured the Christian nationalist ideology 
and produced a theocratic elite which would later build up the 
Afrikaner Broederbond, an elitist nationalist fraternity. 
Afrikaner nationalist theologists viewed Calvinism as a 'worldly' 
and 'open' doctrine thus permitting it to incorporate valid 
features of other doctrines (ie. nationalism) . 10 These theologians 
proposed the Afrikanerisation of South Africa on Christian 
nationalist lines. By invoking the Old Testament, it was reasoned 
that each nation had its own particular mission. That of the 
Afrikaner was to rule, to Christianise and to civilise. Thus any 
subversion of nationality was deemed a subversion of God. 
Nationalism came to be a religious obligation. This ideal equating 
the maintenance of the volk with accepting God's will and 
disposition came close to revering the nation in place of God. 11 
Afrikaner religious thought married the Bible with race. The 
Church was seen as an organ of nationalist upliftment. Afrikaner 
Calvinists did not subordinate themselves to the state but rather 
attempted to be vanguards in the Nationalist movement. The Church 
attempted to Christianise the nationalist movement. 12 Afrikaner 
Christian Nationalism with its strongly based Kuyperian element 
equated Calvinism with political conservatism. Pragmatically this 
entailed the confessionalization of society by a network of 
Calvinist bodies in the secular area. 13 The Kuyperian notion of 
self isolation was a means of preserving identity and of defending 
a threatened system of values. This is a baseline and one on which 
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parallels with the ecclesiastical institutions of Quebec can be 
made. 
The absolute sovereignty of God in every sphere, as put forth by 
the Gereformeerde Kerk with its Kuyperian theological outlook, 
stressed the organic relationship between 'people' and church. 
This made Afrikaner nationalism synonymous with Christian 
nationalism. 14 Christian nationalism preached Divinely ordained 
national differences. Its strong kultuurpolitiek emphasis 
attempted to confront the intense cultural, class and political 
di visions present within Afrikaner circles. The primordial 
struggle to attain Afrikaner cultural unity and to combat the 
severe poor white problem and its subsequent denationalization of 
urban Afrikaners took root with the formation of the Afrikaner 
Broederbond (AB). This cultural organization cum secret 
brotherhood strove to foster a truly Christian National Society 
defined in culturally exclusive terms, "an exclusivity fired in 
past struggle and destined to be realised in a republican 
nirvana. "15 Al though Christian nationalism had not yet entered the 
popular consciousness at the start of the century, the AB and its 
poli tico-eco-cul tural offshoots would serve the cause of 
'volkseenheid' by infiltrating all aspects of Afrikaner life and 
bonding them 'chemically' into a Christian nationalist organism. 
The activities of the Bond were largely driven by religious 
enthusiasm. Members had to be professing Christians; the 
Afrikaans language was viewed as God-given cultivating a 
distinctive Afrikaner outlook rooted in the religion and the 
history of the people to be attained by an all-embracing programme 
of popular education. 16 Christian National Education aimed to 
restore the influence of the Church over the youth by securing the 
principle of confessional religious instruction in the schools, it 
was also to protect those minds from the dominant Anglo culture. 17 
Turning Afrikaner minds inwards towards their own 'natural' 
traditions and way of life can be seen in the work of s.J. du Toit 
entitled 'Geskiedenis van ons Land in die Taal van ons Volk'. This 
first Afrikaans historical account portrayed the Afrikaner Boer as 
a hero, a romantic folklike pioneer central to the development of 
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the country. It was to serve as a good foundation for a 
nationalist mythology which was to develop with time. Du Toit's 
unpopularity in ecclesiastical circles stemmed from his austere 
neo-Cal vinism together with his support for Afrikaans as the 
language of worship. The former preached predestination and 
proclaimed as a rule of church government the autonomy of the 
individual congregation against the over-riding authority of the 
central synod. This drew the wrath of moderate Calvinists in the 
Cape Dutch Reformed Church who regarded their orthodoxy to have 
been vindicated by their successful opposition to modernist trends. 
For the creators of the Bond, there was a clear connection between 
the idea of decentralized church government and the principle of 
extreme decentralization on which the 'society' was to be based. 18 
Afrikaner civil religion held the Boer nation as an "elect" people. 
Separate nationhood replaced separate race, nations being the 
product of Divine will. 19 The northern republics of the Free state 
and Transvaal had developed a concept of themselves as a chosen 
people using the precepts of the Old Testament. This became 
legislated in the sense that they saw themselves as a separate 
group superior to the non-whites. 20 Mingling with these Canaanites 
(Ham) was forbidden. Interpretation of their historical plight and 
particularly the Great Trek was seen in the light of the ancient 
Israelites fleeing the oppression of their Egyptian masters, 
wandering in the desert and forging a covenant with God as his 
elect. Collective Afrikaner nationalism became directly related to 
a greater interest in the national past. Unity was projected into 
firmly isolated events of history embodied in a national myth. 
History was recruited in the service of nationalism. 21 The Great 
Trek became a central theme depicting the spread of the Afrikaner 
nation. The Trekkers had not left an English colony but rather 
their fatherland emigrating to another corner of their homeland. 22 
The "religious calling" of this "chosen" people idealized Afrikaner 
leaders in the history of the nation. The Afrikaner was to open up 
the interior for civilization and Christianity as well as the 
propagation of the Gospel among the heathens. 23 
The chosen people image of the Boer was expressed by such 
influential and key leaders as Malan. Suggesting that Afrikaner 
history reveals a determination and definiteness of purpose, one 
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can but only feel Afrikanerdom as willed by God. The Divine right 
to be Afrikaners predestined and elected was imbued with a 
Calvinist sense of personal responsibility and discipline. 24 
De Klerk elaborates in the Old Testament and its use in serving to 
justify separation and in particular, national separateness. 
Scripture was called upon the show that as God had given the 
various nations their separate existence, so it was that they 
should remain so. Deuteronomy 32:8 states: 
"When the Most High gave the nations their inheritance 
when he divided the sons of man 
he fixed their bounds according to the numbers of the sons of 
God ... " 
Acts 17:26 states: 
"From one single stock he not only created the whole human 
race so that they could occupy the entire earth, but he 
decreed how long each nation should flourish and what the 
boundaries of its territory should be." 
There was, above all, the building of the Tower of Babel in the 
book of Genesis II which spoke of men attempting to preserve the 
unity and homogeneity of the human race; by confusing the tongues 
of the builders, God sabotaged their sinful plans. Consequently, 
he then ordained the division and distribution of nations over all 
the earth. 25 This is invoked by nationalists in support of 
apartheid signifying, they say, God's desire to preserve a pluri-
racial, pluri-cultural, polyglot world. 
The primitive Calvinism of the Afrikaner became embodied in the 
Heidelberg catechism and the decrees of the Synod of Dort. These 
held that all men were depraved totally and that God had 
unconditionally elected a few to salvation. The atonement of Christ 
was limited to these few. A sovereign God and the intrinsic 
sinfulness of man ( as a result of the falls was emphasized. 
Predestination had ordained the elect to be saved while condemning 
the non-elect to eternal damnation. 26 
John M'Carter, a Calvinist minister, wrote of the Afrikaners in 
1869, 'The Word of God in the Old Testament has been to them not 
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only a means of Grace, but in a sense what it was to the Israelites 
of Old, the means, in times of social dilapidation, of preserving 
and keeping them alive as a people. It had been their bond of 
union, their code of manners, their motive to educate their 
children when none other existed. 27 
The Afrikaners lived on isolated farms in the rural hinterland and 
for them the Bible, the Heidelberg catechism and the Book of Psalms 
served as their sole sources of knowledge. 28 The Boer's struggle 
to survive in a harsh environment and to preserve his identity in 
the face of racial and cultural extinction was interpreted as a way 
of preserving God's kingdom on earth. Of the trekboers and their 
social structure, Crapanzano states, that given their isolation and 
later the isolation of the Voortrekkers, their world view and 
religions outlook may well have 'regressed' to a more primitive 
theological and biblical understanding, 'one in which the dualisms 
of Calvinism, of Christianity itself were given great importance.' 
He goes on to assess that 'such reversions to basic unelaborated 
structural contrasts (of the elect and non-elect, of the order of 
grace and of nature, of the faces of good and evil) are not 
infrequent in isolated areas and among those who live in harsh and 
stressful environments'. To apply this anthropological analysis to 
rural Quebec would not be a leap of any form but rather obviously 
relevant. 29 
The social institutional structure of the Afrikaner in the rural 
hinterland and initially in the Boer Republics consisted of a self-
contained volk living in isolated pockets on their widely scattered 
farms. They would come together infrequently perhaps only at 
quarterly intervals for the Lord's supper (Nagmaal). It was viewed 
as a natural precaution fostering group survival at a time when 
frontiers shifted and state institutions were relatively 
unsettled. 30 The Boer way of life can be seen then as primitive 
patriarchalism; the family heads claimed personal independence and 
arbitrary authority in their 'domestic' affairs. A spirit of 
autocratic self-reliance untempered by a weak government over a far 
flung and sparsely settled colony had conditioned the isolated 
frontier farmers into 'natural anarchists' in their relations with 
the outside world. Distrusting external authority, they often 
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found it difficult to even cooperate with their peers or neighbours 
in projects of common interest. Defense of small scale 
authoritarianism in the 'family' unit was sacrosanct. Constituted 
authority was rejected as ineffective and intrusive upon their 
customary ways of maintaining discipline. 31 
Du Toit recounts the development of small villagers or dorpe mostly 
centred around the DRC containing a few traders, a school and 
occasionally a local bank. The 1840's saw major social 
institutions like the church establishing a more effective presence 
outside the few older towns. By 1850, there were forty-five dorpe 
in the Cape Colony, only a few with a population exceeding a 
thousand. The DRC congregations numbered forty-nine in 1854 as 
compared to fourteen in 1824. 32 
Crapanzano's anthropological analysis of a typical Afrikaner 
community reveals the 'kerk' to be the spiritual, social, cultural, 
in many respects the material, and undoubtedly the symbolic centre 
of the Afrikaner community. Membership in one of the three 
closely related Dutch Reformed Churches was an essential 
prerequisite for membership in the Afrikaner community. Thus, it 
was impossible to separate the Afrikaner from his religion. Ninety 
percent of all white Afrikaans speakers were members of the Dutch 
Reformed Church. 33 
The dominee is the most highly respected and most influential 
member of the community. He sits on the school board and is 
rumoured to be a Breeder aided by twelve deacons who are 
responsible for church collection and by twelve elders responsible 
for the spiritual welfare of designated sections of the parish, 
they conduct weekly prayer meetings. The dominee visits anyone in 
difficulty, and so has a social worker at his disposal. This 
ensures that parishioners not have the opportunity to escape the 
vigilance of the church. Ex-DRC parishioners have complained that 
the minister and the church are too conservatively rigid, critical 
and overly judgemental with regard to individual lifestyle 
preferences. 34 
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The dominating role of religion in the life of the Dutch colonists 
and the high prestige of the clergy painted the Dutch Reformed 
Church as defender and cherisher of Afrikanerdom. Yet in the first 
two centuries after settlement, the church lacked sufficient 
ministers and actually opposed the Trekkers regarding their venture 
as one without a Moses. No minister accompanied the adventurers 
until a decade later. The Dutch Reformed Church, however, was 
instrumental in contributing to the failure of British 
anglicization policies. It stood at the forefront in the fight to 
gain official recognition for the Dutch language in the 1880's 
having already established a Theological College in Stellenbosch 
over two decades earlier. The church did set up schools for the 
training of Dutch teachers yet it did not follow up its "lost 
sheep" until British rule was extended to Natal (1843) and the 
Orange Free State (1848). The Transvaalers, regarded as the more 
unruly elements of the Trekkers, came to see the Cape church as a 
collaborationist institution and therefore rejected its 
jurisdiction. 35 This facilitated the splinter churches, the 
Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika {N.H.K.) and the Dappers 
church (G.K.). Holding the banner of Calvinism high in all spheres 
and standing against alien influences, the G.K. stood as the 
vanguard in the triumph of 17th century orthodoxy over nineteenth 
century liberalism. Like the catholic church in Quebec, the Dutch 
Reformed Church became representative of a society battling to 
preserve its traditions, beliefs and general way of life. By the 
start of the twentieth century, the D.R.C. had become firmly 
entrenched as the leaders of the Boer nation pioneering Dutch 
education and championing the Dutch language. It was only in 1919 
that the N.G.K. finally accepted Afrikaans as its official 
language. 36 The D.R.C.'s political fight for language and group 
survival, its encouragement of old style Boer family life with 
strong paternal authority, its original anti-urbanisation and pro-
land rehabilitation outlook, and its denouncement of trade unions; 37 
this orientation of the church as in French Canada, came to be seen 
as ambiguous with regard to the development of nationalism. 
Despite its cultural orthodoxy and isolationist view, the D.R.C. 
was seen by many particularly ·the new urban proletariat and 
intelligentsia as 
D.R.C's inability 
detrimental to nationalist development. The 
to adapt to the prevailing realities of 
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industrialisation led the Carnegie Poor White Commission (1929-
1932) to blame the church for ultra conservatism which loosened the 
bond between those degenerate poor whites and their church and 
people. Furthermore, there was a tendency of the church to look on 
poverty as "part of God's plan .... state thereafter." It 
encouraged dependency and pauperism. The urban proletariat viewed 
the church as representing only the affluent sectors of society. 
Its opposition to trade unions and its maintenance of the status 
quo approach in the economic sphere by preaching return to an ideal 
past was largely condemned by some sectors of the Afrikaner 
population. 38 
Brady sees the Dutch Reformed Church as having encouraged 
nationalism. He credits the predikant of the D.R.C. with having 
taught and instilled the isolated and conservative platteland 
farmers with a "distrust and fear of British influence; whether 
peaceful or militant, as a force which menaced the entrenched 
customs of their lives and that rugged independence developed when 
their forefathers had trekked and fought northward across the 
coastal mountain ranges. 1139 
French Canada: The Catholic Mission, The R.C.C. and The Social 
Structure of the Rural Parish 
Brady, in his discussion of nationalism and parties, goes on to 
compare the Dutch Reformed Church in the Afrikaner community with 
the Roman Catholic Church in French Canada. Both, he professes, 
"played a distinguished role in sustaining the elements of 
nationality." Though admitting that the D.R.C. was less exclusive 
citing its intimate links with the Protestantism of the English 
speaking world, Brady states that it has been only a little less 
traditionalist than its French Canadian counterparts; it too has 
for generations "exhorted" its congregations to cling to their 
cultural identity and to let the past sustain its grip. Taking 
advantage of a society relatively simple and isolated, clerical 
leadership has been very influential fostering national fidelity. 40 
Throughout the French regime, the Catholic church, though 
independent in doctrinal matters, remained under strict state 
control. Ironically, with the British conquest, the church enjoyed 
far more ihdependence than previously. It also became a rallying 
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point for the defence of French Catholic culture. This involved 
closing ranks, repelling the intrusion of alien ideals and clinging 
to the past so as to stress cultural identity. The conservatism 
and traditionalism of the fragment hardened while concentrating in 
the hands of the clergy the "full force of an authoritarian 
heritage previously shared with secular officials." Thus the 
political, social and religious expansion of the church reaffirmed 
its central stature in French Canada. 41 
The reverberations of their religio-ideological struggles in 17th 
century France may serve to illuminate the ideological nature of 
its fragments. The Catholic Renaissance accompanied the 
proliferation of religious communities. The religious revival gave 
rise to theological-political contests between capital Jansenists 
and Jesuits who opposed one another on the question of grace; the 
Jansenists were close to the followers of Calvin asserting that 
man's state was utterly dependent on the will of God. The Jesuits 
held that it came to man by its own free will to secure salvation. 
The Jansenists rejected the alliance between Catholicism and 
worldly power. The Jesuits accepted these compromises and were 
taken aback by the severe morality of the Jansenists, so much as to 
arrange for their condemnation by the pope and king. 42 The 
Jansenist movement with its mysticism, austerity and proselytism 
attempted a foothold in new France. 
The dominant ideology expressed itself in three main isms: 
absolutism, Gallicanism and mercantilism. The first founded kingly 
legitimacy on divine right despite in practice initiating the 
progressive secularization of the temporal power. Kingly 
absolutism came to be, under Louis XIV, a justification for tyranny 
and arbitrariness in the Rousseauian sense. His sovereignty was 
sacred. The state's interest were of priority and so the clergy 
would be at the king's service. Richelieu attempted to reconcile 
Christian morality and this immunity of government by dressing the 
latter in the cloak of the former. 
For Boussuet, another theoretician of absolute monarchy, "nothing 
was more opposed to genuine Christianity than the spirit of 
revolt." He stressed order and legitimacy of established power as 
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well as the themes of obedience and submission. These themes would 
have a profound influence on the clergy and bishops of New France. 
Boussuet's Gallican doctrine also gained much ground. It held 
that Di vine ordinance dictated that kings were not subject to 
ecclesiastical power in temporal matters; the latter, it added, 
were not exempt from obedience they owed to the monarch. This 
doctrine in effect, aimed to check theocratic tendencies. Opposing 
this outlook were the Ultramontanist who believed in the pope's 
supremacy over princes. The pope had the right to intervene in the 
temporal business of the sovereigns. The clergy must be 
independent of the royal powers. The royal power was an earthly 
institution and not directly Di vine. The Gallicans argued that the 
king was the sovereign master of the church, and only God was his 
superior. This movement led to the creation of "national" churches 
subject to royal authority. 43 These two significant ecclesiastical 
disputes between Jesuit and Jansenists, and the struggle between 
Gallican and Ultramontane were to leave their mark on the colony. 
Wade states that despite the dominance of the Jesuits in New 
France, the ascetic and pietistic influence of Jansen was felt 
through the close connections of the religious in Quebec and 
Montreal with their mother houses in France. Therefore, he sums up, 
"French Canadian Catholicism has ever since had a strain of 
Jansenism in it." 44 
With regard to Gallicanism, two of Boussuet's four fundamentals 
were reversed in the colony. Under the Jesuits and Bishop Laval, 
the spiritual power came close to dominating the civil one while 
the authority of the pope was deemed supreme even over the national 
church. Unlike in France, Ultramontanism triumphed in New France 
and ever since, "French Canada has remained a stronghold of 
clericalism and very conscious of its spiritual dependence upon the 
Holy See. " 45 
The role of the Catholic church in fostering nationalism is a 
matter of contention and debate. There are those that view the 
survival of a French Canadian catholic culture as attributed to 
clerical policies and political power; isolationist and 
traditional, and clerically dominated parishes stressed language 
and religion and the unique cultural mission of the French Canadian 
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people. On the other side, there are those who curse and accuse the 
church for its backward inward looking approach which prevented 
French Canadian progress and so kept them in a state of submission 
and relative inferiority. 
The spiritual authority of the church was unchallenged. Its 
economic resources were considerable and its jurisdiction included 
providing education, health care services, and welfare support. 
Furthermore, its ideological coherence and bureaucratic capacity 
translated into political power. One could say then that it 
contributed to the retardation of Quebec's social, political, and 
economic development. The 1774 Quebec Act which made the Catholic 
church the cornerstone of the colonial state also protected the 
cultural autonomy of the French. The church accommodated the Crown 
as evidenced in its denunciation of the 1837 uprising. However, 
when the Union Act of 1840 was passed creating an Anglo majority of 
seats and forbidding the use of French in the legislative assembly, 
there came strong opposition from the church hierarchy. Thus the 
dual role of the church in supporting the colonial regime in 
exchange for the protection of French cultural integrity 
consolidated clerical dominance over the population. The church 
hierarchy preached "La survivance". Church education prevented 
rather than encouraged education. 46 It reproduced the non-
competitive position of the Francophone vis-a-vis the English. The 
religious agrarian mission of the French Canadian was emphasized. 
The church became a major integrating factor in French Canadian 
society during the period of settlement acting on behalf of the 
state and commercial interests. It exercised a monopoly over 
migration, ran the schools and hospitals, provided welfare 
functions and performed quasi-legal services. The conquest 
actually augmented and consolidated the place of the church. The 
withdrawal of government and economic leaders left the church 
firmly in control. The church projected the nation's missionary 
purpose in a continent hostile to Catholicism. 47 It did serve as 
a bulwark against the forces of anglicization. 
Nevitte proposes conditions whereby the religious factor is 
contributive to nationalism. One such condition is where the 
national minority differs from the dominant state culture by 
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religion. A second is where the national church has the 
institutional capacity to speak for the nation; while the last is 
where religious values make up an important part of the culture in 
question. 48 
Traditional Quebecois society smudged the line between religion and 
politics. State infrastructure was undeveloped, remote and 
unpopular leaving the national churches as one of the few 
ins ti tut ions capable of speaking to the nation. The national 
churches provided the opportunity for social mobility within the 
nation spawning a national clerical elite. The church's strategic 
position linking the dominant state culture to the national 
minority made it dependent on both external links with the state as 
well as internal support from the national community. 49 The Roman 
Catholic Church saw no serious secular challenges. To keep the 
people French was to keep them catholic. The village church became 
a symbol of social unity. 50 
Bergeron is more sceptical with regard to the positive role of the 
church in fostering nationalism. He insinuates that the church is 
merely trying to preserve its monopoly on power by fabricating 
myths hailing the Canayens as a chosen people called upon to 
convert the world. It is predictable then that one of a socialist 
persuasion, as is Bergeron, would interpret an institution 
preaching glorification of the farm and vocations of the Canayens 
(as missionary, civilizer and farmer) as a bourgeois exploiter bent 
on keeping a nation perpetually in a state of medieval darkness. 51 
The church's hold on the people became even more pronounced after 
the failed rebellion of 1837. The clergy, at this time, began to 
realise the power of nationalism and its mobilising (or 
demobilising) value. Contrary to historian Garneau who credits the 
clergy with the preservation and survival of the Canayens, Bergeron 
accuses the clerical elite of national betrayal in an effort to 
retain a monopoly on power. Poet Cremazie also argues along the 
line of Garneau stressing language and religion as the guardians of 
French Canadian nationality. 52 
Bergeron is extremely critical of this clerical nationalism which 
overshadowed and alienated the revolutionary nationalism of the 
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rebellion. He describes it as a conservative, reactionary, 
monarchist nationalism looking to the past; it is the nationalism 
which promoted the myth of a chosen people. The paternalism of the 
clergy was ingrained with the nationalism steeped in reactionary 
catholicism. It attempted furthermore, to awaken an allegiance to 
a mother country long rejected so as to stunt the growth of self-
reliance and Canayens anti-colonial identification. The church 
aristocracy preached obedience and submission to Divine right. 53 
This nationalism laced with Ultramontanism rejected compromise with 
modern freedom and reconciliation with liberalism. For them, the 
religious sphere was bound to the secular so that social 
legislation rested on the precept of the church. They rejected 
everything that had come out of the French Revolution. Bishop 
Bourget saw the advantages for his church, after 1837, of using 
nationalist arguments to win the people's confidence and "gently, 
discreetly, tell them their duty." This Ul tramontanist nationalism 
combining nation and faith was clearly articulated by Bishop 
Lafleche when he stated, "The faith will be the cement of the 
nation." Bourget put forward a cultural nationalism which was 
conservative and defensive; it was guided by the slogan, "our 
institutions, our language, our rights. 11= 
Bishop Lafleche of Trois Rivieres was yet another propagator of 
Ultramontanist nationalism. He saw nations and societies as being 
built and guided by Providence; the family was seen as inherently 
Divine. He states, "the family is but the nation in the seed, writ 
small, and the nation is the family writ large." He reiterated the 
authority of government as being Di vine and so held that the 
government had responsibilities towards the church and could not be 
neutral in the religious sphere. Lafleche condemned modern society 
as well as state education of the children. The government, he 
proposed, should pass laws, "to ensure respect for Divine law, the 
sole interpreter of which would be the church." The state would 
have to be Catholic. The ideological idealisation of the feudal 
past of New France, the assertion that agriculture was a guarantor 
of prosperity, the extolment of French Canadian society as a model 
of civilization and the rejection of industrialization and 
materialistic cosmopolitanism formed the crust of this nationalism. 
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The aim was the creation of a clerical society anchored in a 
Catholic nationality. 55 The clergy elite preached cultural 
nationalism and the defensive nationalism of survival. Religion 
was the primary national characteristic and served as an 
institutional base. Thus, by the development of a system of 
confessionalised schools, the defence of the language became 
secondary to the defence of the faith. 56 
"Every nation must fulfil its own destiny, as set by 
Providence. It must understand its mission fully and strive 
constantly towards the goal Divine Providence has assigned 
it• II 
There is no denying the similarities in religio-nationalist outlook 
between our two societies as one reads the above principle of 
nationalities put forward in 1866 by the renowned Mgr. Lafleche. 
Evoking Holy Texts, Lafleche concludes unequivocally that the 
dispersion of man, and the confusion of his language by God forced 
him to separate into family uni ts and linguistic groups who so 
ventured to found new homelands elsewhere. Thus, nationalities 
were of Divine creation and their journeys and consequent 
settlement of lands were likewise God-sent. According to Lafleche, 
the Divine blueprint had it that each nation fulfil a special 
mission as predetermined. Deviation from this righteous path would 
invoke the anger of the Lord. 57 
The Old Testament is made use of to support the concept of national 
territory suggesting that each nation was led, "as if by an 
invisible hand" towards the country it was meant to live in. The 
vocation of Abram is set out in the Scriptures: 
"And the Lord said to Abram: Go forth out of thy country, and 
from thy kindred, and out of thy father's house, and come into 
the land which I shall show thee. And I will make of thee a 
great nation ... so Abram went out as the Lord had commanded 
him ... into the land of Canaan ... And the Lord appeared to Abram 
and said to him: To thy seed will I give this land ... Lift up 
thine eyes, and look from the place wherein thou art, to the 
North and to the South, to the East and to the West. All the 
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land which thou seest, I will give to thee, and to thy seed 
forever. And I will make thy seed as the dust of the earth; if 
any man be able to number the dust of the earth, he shall be 
able to number thy seed also." 
The judgment of prevaricating races by the Divine and the 
destruction of the Canaanites and the promise of their land to 
Abram reveals that the unrighteous nation will, if unheeding to 
virtue and piety, incur the wrath and punishment of the Almighty. 58 
Each nation had its own particular calling and would succeed if 
remaining so faithful. However restricted to its territory, God 
would protect it even if it be surrounded by more powerful and 
ambitious nations. Thus the fate of the French Canadian nation was 
in its own hands. Those few families who had come to settle on the 
banks of the St. Lawrence were two centuries later to number a 
million souls. Providence had brought the enlightenment of the 
Scriptures and the principles of Christian revival. As it said in 
the Bible: "There I shall make your posterity multiply like the 
stars in the skies, so that the number of your descendants may 
equal that of the sands on the sea-shore." Lafleche attributes the 
noble accomplishment of his forbearer's mission to the heroic and 
glorious accounts of French Canadian history. 59 
Lafleche puts forward a religio-historical account, backward 
looking .and in the service of nationalism. Casting the hand of 
Providence, he traces the settlement, giving "evidence" of the 
sacred mission, the "striking" resemblance between Jacques Cartier 
and Abraham the Patriarch, Divine selection of the first settlers 
as well as the inspirational influence of missionaries at the 
inception of the French Canadian nation. The mission of the French 
Canadian nation, he states, is religious in nature; "It is, namely, 
to convert the unfortunate infidel local population to Catholicism, 
and to expand the Kingdom of God by developing a predominantly 
Catholic nationality. " 60 Mgr. Paquet, in his sermon on the vocation 
of the French race, confirms this religious and civilising mission 
notion. Furthermore, he holds that the mission is less to handle 
capital than to stimulate ideas; less to light the furnaces of 
factories than to maintain and spread the glowing fires of religion 
and thought, and to help them cast their light into the distance. 
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And of his dispersed brethren in Western Canada, Villeneuve speaks 
of French of the Diaspora. 61 The French race of Canada is compared 
to a modern day Israel in the midst of an emerging Babylon. 62 Canon 
Lionel Groulx perhaps best conveys the spiritual calling of the 
race. He recounts the story of an anglicised French Canadian 
lawyer, alienated in lifestyle from his own people, until ceased by 
a desire to play a more important role in life. Awakened by a 
stirring nostalgia for the past deep within him, this lost soul 
began to realise that the loss of his love for the nation had left 
his heart dry and barren. Distressed by the disintegration of his 
moral fibre, he sought the help of one Father Fabien. Aiming to 
reveal the truth, Father Fabien directed him to French culture thus 
restoring his wholeness of being. His nostalgia for his upbringing 
and family surroundings, however, persisted. Returning to his roots 
and village, he came into contact "with the very soul of a very 
fine and sensitive race, governed by spiritual values and drawn by 
higher things." His full recovery of his French soul, however, 
came at the ancient parish cemetery alongside the river banks, 
where h~,rediscovered his forefathers and renewed his allegiance to 
them. Vowing to pursue a Christian future for his children and to 
return them to their first education, this newly enlightened soul 
went on to plead the profound affinity existing between the French 
race and Catholicism.= 
Separate development between ethnic fragments in pre-industrial 
Canada derived its practical existence from the ideological 
traditions and inherited social structures particular to each 
ethnic composition. A seigneurial system in new France formed the 
implanted feudal structure which was to preserve the isolationism 
and traditionalism of French Canadian society. As stressed above, 
the church was directly involved in governing the colony. The 
parish became the social, political as well as religious ~nit at 
the local level. It was governed by an elected council of which 
the parish priest acted as chairman. It consisted of an integrated 
authority, highly paternalistic and non-participatory. It was 
neither tyrannical nor democratic. The parish was free of direct 
confrontation with Anglo-American culture rapidly developing in the 
South. 64 The rural parish had a self-sufficient economy, isolated 
from the urban influences and commerce. The agrarian myth 
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distinguished French Canada as a separate culture. Despite 
economic shifts, farming maintained its dominant role at the 
fulcrum of French Canadian society. The parishional council had an 
aversion to post-elementary education viewing it as corruptive 
towards accepted norms. Tenacious family ties made the family farm 
a physical and symbolic focal point. Furthermore, the strong 
Catholic faith supported the local cure's influential position with 
titles granting him authority over local affairs including 
education. 65 
Vallieres sees the clergy and in particular, the higher clergy as 
a self-complacent nobility, organised into parishes and bent on 
leading a resigned collectivity down the path to "redemption". The 
clergy created elementary schools and classical colleges, defined 
ideology and indoctrinated its followers into submissiveness. Their 
vocation was to bear poverty, hard labour and isolation with 
patience; and soul-saving would be the ever-lasting reward. 66 He 
furthermore, accuses the clergy of falsifying history to idealise 
the life of the habitants under the French regime. The church was 
but a propaganda disseminating institution which through its 
doctrines maintained and propagated the passivity of the masses. It 
was an instrument to give the poor subjugated masses an escape 
instead of preaching action and the up-rooting of the exploitative 
capitalist system. The church preached equality and salvation but 
only a few were chosen; the poor would be the first in heaven. 
Action, he states is not a word which the reactionary nature of the 
church preaches. 67 The liberation theology socialist approach of 
Vallieres displays the roots of a more liberal secular nationalism 
aimed at mobilising the masses according to egalitarian humanist 
ideals rather than retrospective, collective, ethnically-based 
ones. 
Guindon describes the social organisation of Quebec prior to 
massive industrialisation as consisting of subsistence farming by 
land-holding families grouped in parishes. The parish was indeed 
the pivot of rural organisation. As such, Quebec became a complex 
of these localised expanding communities. The economic and social 
relations of the majority of its population existed completely 
within its limits. The parish grouped the local habitants; the 
63 
land-holding families tilled the soil and were settled in the 
rungs of the parish. In the villages, the retired farmers, the 
local small businessmen, a few professionals and the parish priest 
settled near the church together. This local rural bourgeois 
linked the local community with others like it thus strengthening 
supra parochial institutions of business, politics and religion. 
The local bourgeois was clerically created and the avenues of 
social promotion were clerically controlled. Thus politics, with 
its territorial basis for representative governments, strengthened 
the importance of the parishes. Invoking the wrath of God, the 
fear of hell, and the threat of ex-communication, the clergy became 
an indispensable ally to the competing bourgeois cliques vying to 
gain support of the local population. The clerical conception of 
the world was that their control was natural and in accordance with 
God. A healthy society, uncorrupted by the evils of 19th century 
modernism with its doctrine of separation of church and state, 
became their cherished ideals. 68 
Bourassa commenting 
patriotism credits 
Canadian loyalty to 
on the role of the clergy in fostering 
the clerical elite with preserving French 
the faith, language, traditions, love of the 
land, and the spirit of unity and of passive resistance - "the only 
kind then possible". Though admitting to the political and 
variable nature of the clergy with regard to the wars of the Empire 
and the 1837 rebellion to mention just two, he stresses that unless 
history is ignored or read idly, the "clergy's role was at once 
firm, reconciling, well-informed, 
responsibilities and duties of 
and deeply patriotic. 1169 The 
the parish priest included 
preaching, instructing the young, stimulating religious practices, 
exercising control over public morality and matrimonial discipline, 
engendering respect for the confessional, as well as setting a 
personal example of piety and temperance. They were also to ensure 
collection of the tithes as well as co-ordinating and undertaking 
educational tasks.= 
Jaenen concludes that the parish priests were never really able to 
establish themselves as undisputed leaders in the parishes or 
seigneuries. They did speak out on a variety of issues from the 
pulpit yet they were unable to coerce the colonists into obedient 
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submission when the latter were unconvinced or opposed. The rural 
areas were quite different in that the church had a small embryonic 
village growing up about it. It usually was made up of a rectory, 
the school and a few tradesmen's dwellings; yet the majority of the 
censitaires lived on their strip farms far from the church or the 
manor house . 71 
Jaenen goes on to explain accusations reeled against the church in 
New France, accusations of Jansenist rigor ism and puritanical 
tyranny. It is common belief that the clergy wielded an undue 
influence in the everyday aspect of colonial life, prying into the 
private affairs of parishioners and intervening in the economic and 
political life of the province. Heavy-handed clerical control 
"imposed an oppressive conformity on the colonial population and 
created a subservient and closed society." Jaenen holds that 
religious life in New France seemed more intensive and religion 
seemed to play a more prominent role because of the zeal of the 
missionaries and clergy in establishing European forms and 
practices in an alien environment. The church was unable to combat 
brandy trafficking nor to impose standing tithing or provide 
regular religious services to all the inhabitants of the over-
extended colony. The catechetical method of instruction provided 
the habitants with a system of reasoned thought which could be 
applied to non-religious situations. Thus a population which held 
obstinately to its views on tithing and church/rectory construction 
could scarcely be accused of being docile, inarticulate and 
oppressed into civility. 72 
Concluding Synthesis 
It was never my aim to do a comparative analyses of Calvinism and 
catholicism. That would be an absurdity. This is a political 
thesis and, thus, when religion and the church step on to the 
analytical stage, they must be scrutinised in the analytical 
context undertaken. The ref ore, in a context of state-society 
relations and the development of nationalism, the interplay of 
church and state has a significant bearing. Likewise the influence 
of religion and its institutions upon society is of critical value. 
The overlap between religion and ideology must be noted for it is 
not in the scope of this essay to trace ideological thought in 
tandem with history. 
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The coincidence of temporal and heavenly matters and the overlap of 
church and state jurisdictions in our two societies is crucial to 
an understanding of developing nationalism. The decentralised 
super structure and institutional autonomy in Calvinist Afrikaner 
society is theoretical truth, yet it must be qualified by stressing 
the underlying Christian religious foundation. The omni-
pervasiveness of the church facilitated pulpit politics. Thus, 
religious tentacles took hold of the state moulding it along 
Christian nationalist lines. It is clear that religious doctrine 
served to underpin French Canadian society as well. Though it is 
commonly held that the Roman catholic Church be a centralised and 
rigid institution, the disjointed parish developments in French 
Canada and the tight control of individual churches upon their 
respective parishioners illustrates a more decentralised religious 
tradition. 
It cannot be denied that religion rather than religious 
institutions propelled Afrikaner society, while in French Canadian 
society, it was the religious institution clearly dominating the 
scene; therefore, in a sense the Catholic church was more 
centralised. One can then say that due to a more balanced 
interacting and overlap between civic and religious authorities in 
South Africa, religious faith often fell victim to doctrinaire 
political orientations (ie. nationalism). French Canadian clergy, 
however, did not share their power with civic officials in an 
interchangeable manner. That is, even though religious ministers 
were wielding the province's political muscle, the Catholic Church 
and its religious doctrines were not as open to being diluted or 
re-directed to accommodate outside theoretical ideologies (ie. 
nationalism). Thus, though the Catholic Church and the Dutch 
Reformed Church without doubt contributed to the early development 
of nationalism (through their struggle for language, religious 
education and an "unenlightened" approach), the latter was perhaps 
more politically conscious in fostering national unity while the 
former more subconsciously served the interests of nationalism. 
Afrikaner Christian nationalism became the ensuing struggle while 
French Canadian Catholicism and its controlling mechanisms more 
firmly entrenched group solidarity leaving nationalism latent. At 
the core, however, it is evident that religion and its 
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institutional mechanisms served the interests of nationalism in 
both societies by maintaining group enclosure and struggling for 
the survival of the national essence (language, religion, race) in 
its wide political domain. 
It is perhaps presumptuous at present to suggest that amongst the 
Afrikaner and French Canadian community, there is a perception 
which regards that nation as a chosen people with a Divinely 
ordained spiritual mission. Yet, from settlement up until the 
start of the century, both Afrikaner and French Canadian 
nationalist alike viewed his nation as being Divinely instilled 
with a specific and particular culture, sacrosanct and separate. 
The founding of these new lands and the consequent collective 
attachment by its venturing inhabitants similarly drew its 
justification in the notion of a people with a calling and a 
spiritual mission to Christianize and civilize the heathen native 
populations. Pre-industrial nationalist development wielded 
religion as its cementing instrument to co-opt ethnic straddlers 
and authoritatively explain the tide of circumstances which 
repeatedly crashed onto the shores of a trodden on but awakening 
nation. Invoking the Holy Scriptures to fuel ethnocentrism and 
making parallels with the ancient Israelites affected to instil a 
fear of Almighty repercussion should the vacated nation stray from 
the righteous and pious path. Where these two societies di verge is 
in their emphasis. The Afrikaner nationalist myth was to bound the 
volk more intimately with its creator. There was no Day of the 
Covenant in Quebec. Furthermore, the nature of the South African 
state highlighted ethnic conflict thus prompting the Afrikaner to 
actively and aggressively enforce his God-given national 
separateness. The Canadian Federal System and more particularly, 
Confederation conversely diluted French Canadian nationalist 
intensity. While similarly (and perhaps to a greater extent) 
preserving its cultural assets, its emphasis upon patience and 
humility would lead the French Canadian nation down the path of 
inaction, a paralysis which would stunt national development for 
decades to come. 
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C H A P T E R Ill: 
THE BIRTH OF A NATION: 
Post Conquest French Canadian and Afrikaner Society 
Ethnic Schism and the Division of Labour 
Dominion or Domination? 
-----------------------------------------
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This chapter opens refocussing upon the Conquest and British 
imperialist endeavours as they affect the Afrikaner and French 
Canadian fragments respectively. Ethnic relations are assessed 
along various lines of conflict as political, economic and cultural 
cleavages became more pronounced. British arrogance and domination 
in implementing co-optive and confrontational policies toward 
subordinate ethnicities are here examined. This chapter deals with 
encroachment and absorbtion whereby the dominant ethnic group 
attempts to systematically capture that segment of society outside 
its realm of control, this being the subordinate ethnic group. The 
ethnic division of labour supplants the cleavages which had 
previously existed between 'Frenchman' and 'Canadien' on the one 
hand and 'Dutchman' and 'Boer' on the other. This cleavage which 
had also taken on a metropolitan versus rural character now marked 
the divide between Englishman and Afrikaner and Englishman and 
French Canadian in South Africa and Canada respectively. 
Ethnic consciousness is analysed as it develops in reaction to 
Imperialist policies. This chapter looks at national awareness 
from the time of Conquest to that of Dominion. Ethnic conflict 
persists until a modus vivendi is reached. At this stage 
nationalist leaders within the two camps are summoned by a 
perceived need, to build bridges with one another rather than burn 
them. Under British rule, the path to Confederation in French 
Canada and to Union in South Africa is not an easy one. The 
struggle, however, is telling in that the crisis and conflict 
beckon the emergence of a nation. The culmination of this 
sequence hails the birth of a nation, the awakening of a national 
group, bound together in consciousness, itself tied closely to a 
common historical development, culture, language and religious 
zeal. Nationalism is then pitted against imperialism and vice 
versa. This chapter concludes with a legislative union in South 
Africa and a federal union in Canada. These constitutional 
agreements between competing ethno-nationalist fragments are then 
assessed in terms of the viability of the new state entity in 
guaranteeing coexistence and fairness between two adversarial 
segments. 
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South Africa: From Conquest To Dominion 1795-1910 
The rural-urban cleavage which came to exist between Boer and 
Dutchman soon took on an ethnic dimension as British tradesmen and 
officials established Anglo socio-economic dominance in the Cape 
and consequently, the Natal region. This dominant English strata 
with some assimilated Afrikaners administrated the British policy 
of indirect rule. The majority of Afrikaners with some English 
formed the agriculturalist strata of a society vertically separate 
from the Boer Republics and African societies. With their defeat in 
the Boer War, Afrikaners became an increasingly impoverished 
substrata of religious ministers and teachers. While white 
hegemony governing all African societies remained entrenched, the 
Afrikaners found themselves increasingly in competition for jobs 
with skilled coloured workers, Indian service tradesmen and some 
Africans. 1 
Boer-British schism fell along various lines of conflict in the 
political, economic and cultural realms. It is efficacious to 
examine briefly the change in British ideas in the late 18th and 
19th century and the consequences for British policy in South 
Africa. The British were the main slave traders being a focal 
player in the triangular slave trade with West Africa and the 
Americas. Yet Quaker opposition to slavery in the late 17th 
century, the creation of the Negrophiles Aborigines Protection 
Society and the subsequent Christian Reformation stressing 
evangelism and piety spurred the rise of the Missionary movement 
and the abolition of the slave trade and slavery. John Phi~p of 
the London Missionary Society was instrumental in contributing to 
the passage of Ordinance Fifty in 1828 which repealed the previous 
pass law for native agricultural workers. England had by then 
firmly established itself as the industrial and manufacturing 
centre of the global community. The 1832 Reform Bill spearheaded 
a trend of democratization and secularization in ideas (science); 
it also led to a rise in scientific racism moving away from 
Christian racism. "Cape liberalism" described master-servant 
relationships. The native was seen as friendly but also child-like 
and so in need of instruction and upliftment. 2 Paternalism in 
sheep's clothing. 
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The British attempted to modernize the efficiency of the colonial 
administration as well as to further its power in the colonies. 
It involved modernizing the civil service, instituting trial by 
jury and introducing circuit courts to the frontier districts. 3 
Encroachment by the colonial British State upon the frontier 
independence of the Boers coupled with England's refusal to grant 
them a representative assembly affected to sow the seeds of 
resentment within the post-Dutch pioneer society.' The Cape was 
not a base but rather a colony "whose Afrikaner inhabitants' 
loyalty was (to put it mildly) not beyond dispute". In this 
respect there was no parallel with the French in British Canada. 5 
strain and hatred sunk in further as British policy of auctioning 
Crown lands instead of freely granting them came into being. Even 
the system of local administration intensified Afrikaner resentment 
as Dutch landdrosts and local heemraden or council representatives 
of the burghers were supplanted by foreign resident magistrates and 
civil commissioners. 6 
Du Toit holds that the 1840's marked the expansion and 
consolidation of a "more modern State" in the Cape Colony. The 
1820 British Settlers had introduced commercial agriculture in the 
eastern regions thus drawing the economy into "the dynamic new 
imperialism of free trade. 117 
The British attempted to tie the Boer farmers more tightly to their 
land. They wished to modernize the unproductive form of 
agriculture practised by the Boers by replacing the loan farm 
system with one of permanent tenure and commercial farming. This 
was to be achieved by creating greater land scarcity and so making 
the land more valuable. This would facilitate their aim at 
creating an agricultural surplus which would effectively 
incorporate South Africa into the world economy. 8 Needless to say, 
the Boers were resistant to any attempts at controlling their 
migrational freedom and wander-lust. 
The British annexation of the Cape in 1806 claimed what was then 
seen to be a strategic possession for the powerful Empire. There 
were approximately 23000 whites prior to the occupation, most of 
whom were Afrikaans speakers. The British colonial administration 
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set out to promote and encourage immigration so as to imbue the 
colony with an increasingly British character. Despite various 
organized immigration schemes from Britain, the 1820 Settlers 
(approximately 4000) to the eastern Cape and the subsequent 1848-49 
Byrne Byrne settlers to Natal (which failed terribly yet deposited 
3000 men, women and children on poor lands with inadequate water) 
"being the most notable," the flow was gradual and on a much 
smaller scale than in Canada. 9 The emigration of more than 30 000 
Afrikaners during and after the Great Trek did not drain the Cape 
Colony leaving it to develop as a bastion of English settlement. 
The white population in the Colony actually increased to 140 ooo in 
1854 from 66 000 in 1832. Most of these circa 80%, were 
Afrikaners . 10 
While the majority of Afrikaners were farmers, the English were 
primarily craftsmen and labourers (white collar workers) and from 
the outset, urban in orientation. In spite of them being organized 
agricultural immigrants and intended to act as somewhat of a human 
bulwark against the Xhosa, within three years of their arrival less 
than one-third of the 1820 settlers remained on the land. As de 
Kiewiet states, "The lack of intensive cultivation and the 
exceedingly low rates of pay for agricultural labour discouraged 
the crafters and labourers who went so numerously to Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand in the middle of the century. 1111 Between 
1815-70, less than 50 ooo British immigrants settled in 
south Africa . 12 The failure of British immigration policies coupled 
with nativist Boer rural isolationism and the demographic 
significance of the Great Trek ensured continuing numerical 
supremacy of the Afrikaans over the English. Not until the large 
diamond and gold mineral discoveries some decades later, did 
British immigration take place in any substantial number. 
Unlike the Huguenots who were easily absorbed into the native 
Afrikaner population, the English settlers, backed by the 
anglicization policies of the Somerset regime, retained a self 
awareness. It was such policies, (which aimed to, among other 
things, replace Dutch by English "in all spheres of public life") 
that have commonly been credited with the later development of 
Afrikaner nationalism. 13 British commercial endeavours backed by 
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imperial trade preferences carved out a market in which the Briton 
established a dominant position for himself. Not only were 
British institutions able to structure the politico-cultural life 
of the Cape Colony, but they were successful at penetrating the 
interior where British merchants set up shop to cater to Boer basic 
domestic needs ( ie. gunpowder and coffee) • These shops and 
canteens concentrated their activities in those areas which served 
as congregational centres for the pastoralist Boers. These centres 
which developed into the first towns of the interior, soon "became 
outposts of British culture even in the Boer republics. 1114 Growing 
pressures upon Afrikaners in Cape Town to adopt English cultural 
values and the consequent anglicization (or semi anglicization) of 
a number of Afrikaans families prompted other Afrikaners to stress 
nationality in a defensive reaction. Although Dutch remained the 
home language of the majority of Boers, English became the language 
of public life •15 The status of English as the language of commerce 
and industry would eventually entrench and highlight the developing 
urban-rural cleavage which came to exist between Briton and Boer. 
With increasing British encroachment upon Boer settlements in the 
interior, especially after the gold and diamond discoveries, the 
Afrikaners increasingly became disenchanted with the English urban 
culture and its resultant effects upon the nature of their society 
(ie urbanization). 
At the time of the Great Trek, however, there was little cµltural 
awareness amongst the Boers. They had not yet consciously 
perceived the English language and cultural mores as a real threat. 
Anglicization did not really affect the isolated frontier farmers. 
Their solidarity had thus far come as a result of common 
experiences and values within a harsh and dangerous environment on 
the frontier. Therefore, as Van Jaarsveld aptly states, "the 
growth and development of national self-assertion was a result of 
the Great Trek rather than a cause of it. 1116 
The search for "freedom" through rebellious disengagement from 
imperial jurisdiction (by way of the Great Trek) could not be 
interpreted as ethnic national ism, however, it did serve as a 
springboard for national awakening as found in British policy 
toward the politically assertive republican north. While it is not 
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desirable to convolute "self determination", "republicanism", 
"independence" or "secessionism" as synonymous ideals, the historic 
act of leaving a State can be seen to umbrella them. Resistance by 
a neglected periphery against an encroaching centralization is not 
far off the mark here (although one should be aware that the 
emigrant Boers did not disengage uniformly or cohesively but rather 
in a dispersive manner). 
Developing group consciousness and solidarity in Natal prompted 
prominent Voortrekker leaders (Maritz, Retief) to request 
recognition by the colonial government as a free and independent 
people (1837). The attempt to declare a "Republic of Natal" was 
met with disapproval as the emigrants were consequently defeated at 
Congella (1842). While it is true that consciousness of their 
freedom grew (the Trekkers established two independent Boer 
republics north and east of the Cape Province) , sentiments of 
solidarity diminished as a result of geographical factors which 
crippled the struggle for unity on the Highveld and encouraged 
dispersion. 17 
Disengagement from the British sphere of influence coupled with a 
developing republican zeal, rather than fostering greater unity, 
encouraged a laissez-faire attitude thus demagnifying those forces 
which had previously bound them. National or ethnic consciousness 
lay dormant as evidenced by the unreactionary response by Cape 
Afrikaners to Somerset's language law and consequent anglicizing 
influences. While these attempts at "denationalization" had little 
significant impact upon the Afrikaans inhabitants of the Colonial 
South, they did not affirmatively demonstrate support for their 
northern brethren and in spite of moderate sympathy, continued to 
condemn the emigrant withdrawal from the colony. 
Van Jaarsveld reaffirms his interpretation of the disunity of 
Afrikaans-speakers in general and between North and South 
inhabitants. He states that there was no national awakening without 
an external stimulus . 18 This conception of "them" and "us" as 
intensifying ethnic solidarity can be seen when remarking U()On 
those Transvaal Afrikaners compared to those in the Free State. 
While the former were relatively embattled and disunified by party 
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interests along regional lines, the presence of English settlers in 
the latter fostered a greater degree of self-consciousness in the 
sense of maintaining independence. 
The power-play between British interests and various attempts 
within colonial and republican territories pushing for unity or 
federation in varying combinations only affected to cause further 
di vision. Differential maturity between the North and south 
stunted the development of ethnic bonds of solidarity. Independent 
political development in the Northern Republic was a step toward 
realizing nationhood; however, in the absence of a foe against 
which to unite, the disintegrative influences were more pronounced 
than those of nation building. As Van Jaarsveld aptly states, "the 
Emigrants were more a "people" than a "state" . 19 Yet they were not 
a conscious nation. The State had been formed before the nation. 
National self-assertion was soon to draw its impetus from the 
discovery of the Witwatersrand Gold Fields in 1886 and the 
subsequent encroachment of imperial interests and other 
"uitlanders" upon the independence and isolationism of the Boer 
republics. The influx of English development capital and emigrants 
to the previously pastoral setting ignited Afrikaner national self-
assertion. Boer nationalism was soon to come head to head with an 
expanding British imperial combatant. Territorial disputes between 
the Free State and the Basutos became political fodder for imperial 
interests. Yet in spite of opportunistic attempts by the English 
to gain a foothold in Southern Africa by federating the Republics 
with its other colonial acquisitions, the Boers rallied in 
realization of their mutual dependence. Feeling the injustice of 
British aggression, again coupled with a "nationalist" republican 
zeal, the Republics under the unificatory influence and leadership 
of Brand emphatically rejected any vision of a federation under the 
Union Jack. 
At the same time, Cape Afrikaners began to realize their inability 
to assert effective political decision making influence with regard 
to the policies of Imperial Britain. A feeling of downtroddenness 
forced them to appreciate their blood ties with those in the North. 
They realized they could not take up arms against "one section of 
(their) own race". 20 While the Republican North had matured in the 
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political sphere, Cape Afrikaners asserted themselves in the 
cultural sphere. Their self-consciousness grew in relation to what 
was seen as alien. Language, religion and nationality became 
intertwined. Translation of portions of the Bible into Afrikaans, 
the formation of the Genootskap (1975), the Patriot (1876) and the 
Afrikaner Bond heightened self discovery and specifically that of 
their history. Du Toit's publication of "The History of Our 
Country in the Language of Our People", the first Afrikaans history 
book, can perhaps be seen as the culmination of a developing 
premature historical consciousness; it also marked a spiritual 
transcendence of divisive geographical and political boundaries. It 
marked the beginning of the history of a nation. 
Again, Imperial Britain attempted to further its interests by 
concocting the image of a dangerously expansionist Transvaal 
Republic citing attacks upon native populations outside of its 
boundaries. Britain, thus became "forced" to annex the Northern 
Republic. Unable, due to Conventions, of assailing the Free State 
directly, Britain's annexation of the Transvaal in 1877 in support 
of the Briton and uitlander elements there (who were rendered 
politically disenfranchised by Boer President Kruger) attempted tp 
isolate the Free State into resigning itself to a British 
Federation. The Republics had other ideas, however, as 
contingents of commandoes pushed back British aggression. This was 
seen in the First War of Independence. Free State and Cape 
Afrikaner sympathies with their brethren intensified as British 
press villanized the Boers accusing them of betrayal and 
unruliness. Spurning Lord Carnarvon's attempts to unite South 
African states and colonies into a Federation (which had succeeded 
in Canada with the Confederation of 1867), Britain was forced to 
back-off after being routed at Majuba. The Republic was restored. 
The First War of Independence was significant in that Afrikaner 
nationalism came to the front in spiritual brotherhood against a 
common "enemy". It also fired the cultural awakening of the 
Afrikaner as bonds of blood and race (and consciousness of cultural 
characteristics), shared suffering and an urge toward self 
preservation emphasized the dawn of an Afrikaner "nation" united in 
one free fatherland.= 
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The demographics of the Transvaal Republic soon changed in favour 
(numerically) of the Uitlanders who by this time outnumbered the 
Boers by two to one. Yet their frustrations grew in light of their 
disenfranchisement status and heavy taxes imposed upon the mining 
industry by the Kruger regime. The 1895 Jameson raid plotted by 
mining magnate Cecil Rhodes which aimed to oust the Boer order 
ended in failure. It was to, furthermore, poison Boer-Briton 
relations for time to come. 22 
The culmination of this developing feud between two competing 
ethno-nationalist entities was the Anglo-Boer War (1898-1902). Also 
known as the Second War of Independence, the scale of this conflict 
took on international proportions as Britain's imperial forces 
attempted to subdue the smaller numbered Boers and those foreigners 
who enlisted in sympathy with their cause. Boer commandoes, 
realizing they could not take on the mighty Empire on the front, 
embarked on a bush war which lasted until 1902. Memories of the 
26000 women and children who died in concentration camps set up by 
the British inflicted heavy scars on the Afrikaner psyche. 
British hegemony, however, was short-lived in a political sense. 
International furore over British military arrogance and the 
appearance of more moderate faces in the British government gave 
rise to a united Union of South Africa, which came into being in 
1910. English and Dutch were dually recognized as official 
languages. Boer generals Botha and Smuts were key figures in the 
reconstruction process. Yet coming on the heels of concentration 
camps and Kitchener's scorched earth policy, Union was problematic 
from the outset. War and oppression inevitably would become 
mobilizing elements aimed at perpetuating the laager mentality of 
the Boer "minority" group and thus Afrikaner nationalism. The 
Boers perceived themselves as a dispossessed people, their entire 
way of life uprooted by British aggression, and their consequent 
status inferiorized by the dominant English counter-culture. The 
resulting poor white (bywoner) problem would ultimately serve as a 
focal point around which Afrikaner resources would mobilize. The 
Afrikaner, driven off his farmland into the cities found himself in 
economic competition with the black man. 
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The Act of Union which was based upon the notion of political and 
cultural equality between English and Afrikaner was a "bad deal" 
for the latter in the light of Anglo economic and 
industrial/commercial dominance. The bias also took on an urban-
rural character as most cities were primarily English speaking. 
Afrikaner negotiators were no doubt tempered or even restricted by 
this power differential. Thus reconciliation and co-operation with 
the English in a single stream toward achievin~ certain common ends 
was seen to be in the best interests of the Afrikaner nation and 
South Africa as a whole. 
French Canada: From Conquest To Dominion 1759-1867 
The historical development of French Canada, the significance of 
the Conquest and the post-conquest di vision of labour between 
English and French must be seen in the light of a rising French 
Canadian nationalism and the subsequent ascendancy of clerical 
nationalism. Uneven development and a cultural division of labour 
laid the basis for commercial monopolization by the English. Church 
education rather than encouraging competition, prevented it. Thus 
one need not forthrightly interpret the nature of French Canadian 
society as one characterized by ethnic oppression of the metropole. 
Rather, differential patterns of colonization can generally be 
cited. Political concessions to the French aimed to create an 
arena in which French Canadian group interests could be 
articulated. 23 Consequently ethnic conflict was better contained and 
did not flare up into resistance politics to the extent that 
exclusionary measures prompted such action in South Africa. 
Where the similarities are more obvious is on the economic front. 
British colonization was an economic matter which challenged the 
traditional, pre-capitalist social structure of Quebec with a more 
dynamic mercantile capitalism. As noted previously, British 
colonial experience held it more effective to co-opt and manipulate 
indigenous power structures instead of attempting to impose alien 
authority upon colonized subjects. 24 Thus, British augmentation 
of the Roman Catholic Church, which acted on behalf of state and 
commercial interests (in exchange for various jurisdictional 
powers), was a pragmatic course of action. Bergeron passionately 
acknowledges the captive tactics of the English, who through the 
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guaranteeing of French civil law and Church religious power, bound 
the Canayens to feudal structures and simultaneously gave British 
merchants a carte blanche to exploit resources. 25 
McRoberts comments on the agrarian, traditional nature of French 
Canadian society which was to be confronted with a modernization 
trend that surrounded it. With the new export staple, at the end 
of the 19th century, being timber and the development of railroads, 
farming still remained at the fulcrum of French Canadian society. 26 
Compared with farmers of Ontario, those of Quebec were "more 
traditional, more deeply rooted in the soil, less commercial in 
thought, somewhat endowed with goods of this world, finding on the 
land a way of life and not merely an occupation. 11= 
McRoberts attests to the division of labour along class and ethnic 
lines. Though, he admits that they do not coincide perfectly, the 
average income of French Canadians was said to be but one quarter 
of his British counterpart in Montreal . 28 The French Canadian 
ranked very low on the income scale and this was not merely a 
rural-urban cleavage. French Canadian cultural and value systems 
discouraged large scale economic activity which placed risk before 
security and growth before stability. Furthermore, the destruction 
of French Canadian entrepreneurial elements by the Conquest meant 
that essential capital investment was never in the hands of French 
Canadian interests. Lagging political power in the province 
furthermore blocked access to techniques and capital . French 
Canadians were structurally entrenched in labour intensive, lower 
production industries, institutions which supplied and serviced 
Anglo-Canadian investment capital. 29 
Ouellet takes a different perspective suggesting that English 
policies turned out to favour the French segments of the community. 
Bilingualism mainly affected the English minority in Quebec. 
Agriculture was more prosperous after the Conquest (due to 
increased foreign trade) and the peasants at times verged on the 
point of "Anglomania". England had cautiously refrained from 
introducing the parliamentary system until the influx of Loyalists 
and until colonial life became "imbued with capitalism" •30 He goes 
on to suggest that England had errored in giving too much voting 
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power too soon to the population which had given space for the 
airing of extremist views. The consequence was that French 
Canadians could not properly adjust gradually to the new system. 
French Canadian conservative and unenterprising approaches to 
business accounted for their economic positions weakening relative 
to their Anglo conquerors. Ethnic group relations deteriorated as 
the new rising middle class French Canadians, rather than welcoming 
the radical changes implied by the encroachment of capitalism, 
stressed a defensive isolationist nationalism, with the English 
merchant as the villainous "enemy".= 
French Canadian nationalism, which had initially not opposed 
colonialism shifted after 1826. The failings of the colonial 
system and more aggressive British attitudes coupled with a severe 
agricultural crisis ( 1826 - 1837, agriculture in Lower Canada 
produced as surplus only in two years) facilitated the seepage of 
the nationalist message to the peasantry. Traditional structures 
were coming down and the people began to point an accusing finger. 32 
Moniere holds in line with the writings of Brunet. Britain's 
political ambitions were superseded by economic ones, in the Quebec 
context, "to seize the rich commercial empire of the st. Lawrence, 
Great Lakes, and Mississippi basin, and to eliminate the French 
rivals". French Canadian merchants who were supplanted by British 
traders, lost control of the fur trade and were relegated to agent 
status. No longer able to draw on capital and reliable 
distributors, in the light of the Conquest, they were forced to 
vacate the rich fields in favour of others. The Conquest brought 
structural changes to the colony which saw the emergence of a 
double class structure whose classes were differentiated by 
nationality and by their economic bases. While the overall 
capitalist mode continued, the Anglos were predominantly the 
capitalists and the French Canadians were petty producers. The 
former focused upon commerce, the latter on subsistence. The 
masses overall generally withdrew into agriculture increasing their 
dependence on this sector of the economy. From 1760 - 1792, about 
80% of French Canadians were engaged in this sector not by 
inclination but by necessity of circumstances brought about by the 
Conquest. Their social distance from the co-opted clerical 
aristocracy also increased. The class interests of this decaying 
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group, its uncreative economic orientation and a reactive ideology 
would lead the French Canadian nation down the road of subjection 
and subordination.n 
Moniere alludes unintentionally to Hartz's fragmentation thesis in 
his explanatory remarks concerning ideological development in 
Quebec and the effects of the Conquest. He explains that the 
Conquest diverted ideological development in French Canada from 
following the course of its mother country. A democratic ideology 
was able to develop and a mass awareness that was individualistic 
despite the French clerical elites collaborationist ideology. The 
emergence of a local petty bourgeoisie used the democratic ideology 
against both the clergy and the British aristocracy, as well as the 
commercial middle class. In spite of this anomaly, Moniere 
concludes emphatically, "ideological development of (French) 
Canadian society ••. eliminating its dynamic class layer, breaking 
the rhythm of its development, removing it from the intellectual 
sources that were natural to it, and allowing a reactionary, 
regressive ideology to become first entrenched and later dominant." 
Speaking of the backward looking clerical elite, he states that 
they led an "ideological blockade", a "break" occurred and "the 
flo~ of new ideas from the old motherland was choked off, and there 
was a new field of ideological influence from Britain and her 
American colonies. 1134 McRae continues along this line. He suggests 
that many French Canadians wrote not of the Conquest but rather of 
Cession. He states that "there is an almost Freudian transfer of 
a deep resentment from the outsider to the parent." He goes on to 
say that "French Canada was left in 1763 like a lonely and fearful 
child not removed by force from its mother's arms but callously 
abandoned. 1135 
While the British remained a minority, their objectives of 
political control and parliamentary democracy as means of achieving 
hegemony remained in conflict. An important line of cleavage was 
demographic. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 and instructions 
given to then governor Murray implied the rapid assimilation of the 
conquered population. Yet the French Canadians had already formed 
a collectivity, "the members of which were bound together by 
specific ties of cultural homogeneity. 1136 The American independence 
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and the resulting immigration of Loyalists made British Canadian 
aspirations more tangible. The Constitutional Act of 1791 which 
divided the Province of Quebec into two Canadas was, however, not 
conducive to the implementation of assimilative policies. The 
French Canadians were able to control the Legislative Assembly. 
This system of representative government enabled the cultivation of 
new and more responsible French Canadian leaders motivated by 
nationalist ideals. The Act of Union which attempted to remedy the 
situation merely exacerbated ethnic conflict. 
The proponent of this unified arrangement was Lord Durham, an 
Imperial Government despatch assigned to investigate the ethnic 
conflict in the colony. Durham characterized the French in Lower 
Canada as having "clung to ancient prejudices, ancient customs and 
ancient laws, not from any strong sense of their beneficial 
effects, but with the unreasoning tenacity of an uneducated and 
unprogressive people ..• They remain an old stationary society, in 
a new and progressive world".~ 
Durham's recommendations were interpreted by French Canadians as 
being a direct threat to their community. He concluded that the way 
to resolve the situation of "two nations warring within the bosom 
of a single state" was to extinguish the French nation by means of 
assimilation. 38 Durham remarked that "there can hardly be conceived 
a nationality more destitute of all that can invigorate and elevate 
a people than that which is exhibited by the descendants of the 
French in Lower Canada, owing to their retaining their peculiar 
language and manners. They are a people with no history and no 
literature."~ He concluded then that "it is to elevate them from 
that inferiority that I desire to give to the Canadians our English 
character. 1140 
At the time of the Rebellion ( 1837), the French population of 
Quebec (then Lower Canada) numbered 450 000 while the growing 
English population stood at 150 ooo. Ontario (then Upper Canada) 
was entirely English (400 000). Thus Montreal merchants agitated 
for political union of the two Canadas so as to reverse the 
demographic balance in their favour; this would cast the French 
Canadians as a minority in the new assembly so rendering them 
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helpless to the whims of government policy. The 1840 Act of Union 
marked the collapse of French Canadian political power after the 
Rebellion. This implied English institutional domination. 
Furthermore, to put a few nails in the coffin, the use of French in 
Parliament was abolished leaving English as the sole official 
language. French regained its status in 1848. 41 Rioux argues that 
the 1837 Insurrection and the 1840 Act of Union marked an important 
event and turning point in the history of Quebec; for it put the 
ideal of independence on the backburner as French Canadian leaders 
were forced to struggle against assimilation, against 
anglicization. An ideology of conservation by way of the clergy 
would have to supersede any independence ideology. This narrowing 
enclosure was tragic as Quebec could no longer pursue self-
determination in an independent society but instead had to protect 
their culture. The Quebecois were not to be a nation but an ethnic 
group with a particular culture (religion, language, customs). 
They would have to preserve their culture as a sacred heritage. 42 
Therefore I regardless of its actual importance I incidents involving 
cultural differences and/or conflicting interests were magnified to 
the point of distortion. It was at this time, when violence became 
symptomatic of national frustration, that the "wicked stepmother" 
image of England began to fuel nationalist sentiment. Previously I 
the French Canadian middle class, clergy and seigneurs were 
sincerely loyal to England admiring her British liberal values in 
contrast to the revolutionary democracy in France and America which 
was viewed with distrust. The Rebellion marked a shift to 
revolutionary action as a means to achieve and establish a fully 
representative and Parliamentary system in the colonies. It was 
perhaps more a call for major reconstructive surgery on French 
Canadian society which perpetuated the economic inferiority of the 
French Canadian. The failure of the Rebellion and the 1840 Union 
was a direct consequence of an ineffective middle class, and the 
rise of clerico-anti-liberal nationalism ensued. This nationalism 
was conducive to cultural isolationism. Yet Ouellet remarks that by 
this time "the foe was hardly any longer symbolized by "the 
English" 1 but rather by "the liberals" 1 namely those bent on 
converting institutions and society to a broader view of world 
affairs. 1143 
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Brunet holds that the Act of Union actually marked the birth of 
Canadianism. The "Canadiens" (French Canadians) were forced to 
realize that their Anglo conquerors and respective subjects were 
not going to return to the motherland. Lafontaine, the French 
Canadian leader at the time, recognized this and urged the 
"Canadiens" to give up the idea that only they could be Canadians. 
Brunet depicts this historical evolution in a very fatalistic 
light. He views the unevenly based alliance as an acknowledgment 
of the victory of London, that the land was not of the vanquished 
but of their British Canadian masters. He states, "From the 
"Canadiens", who had already lost control of their destiny, even 
their name was taken. 1144 Several years later the demographic 
balance shifted as the population of Upper Canada exceeded that of 
Lower Canada. The "Canadiens" were now to be a conquered minority 
unable to return to the past. 
This evolving noteworthy perception by French Canadians is 
significant in defining the context, that of competing ethnic 
groups or national fragments. The realisation and/or recognition 
of the Anglo fragment as an "indigenous" collectivity with a 
"Canadian" character must all but dispel the notion or image of a 
French Canadian populace struggling to up and out the colonial 
yoke. While it shall be argued later that in both case studies, 
overarching transcendental Canadianisms and south Africanisms have 
fallen by the wayside in the light of intensifying ethnic 
nationalisms, the dualism and the more conciliatory 
collaborationist nature of ethnic politics in Canada has permitted 
such bridging ideologies to flourish in that context. This is not 
to denounce or ignore the significant anti-colonial element which 
undoubtedly fuelled the early growth of nationalism. As history 
has shown in both societies, these nationally inclusive "isms" were 
often spouted by nationalist statesmen in opposition to colonialism 
and the export-oriented loyalties of its settler subjects. 
Needless to say, such sentiments continued to fuel the nationalist 
fires especially with the conscription crises of the Great Wars. 
Ultimately, however, the underlying national"ism" drew its 
nourishment from unflinching strands of ethno-political 
aspirations. A republican/separatist zeal gave power to the rising 
global call for the right of self-determination. Its variant 
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doctrinal programmes accounted (and still account) for the 
respective paths and developments of each society. 
Garneau, in his "Preliminary Discourse to History of 
characterizes this period as one of British domination. 
Canada", 
This, he 
says, takes the form of "parliamentary antagonism of the colonists 
to all infractions of their nationality and designs against their 
religion. ""5 His natural sympathy for minorities struggling against 
foreign oppressors thrust Garneau into the nationalism current 
which was at that time challenging the old order in Europe. 
Garneau became the national historian of French Canada (as S.J. du 
Toi t had been for the Afrikaners) . His history discussed the 
relationship between "our language, our laws, and our customs" and 
also between faith and nationality. These assertions were to 
become "French-Canadian dogmas". 46 
Averting the death sentence pronounced upon the French Canadian 
nationality by Durham and the consequent Act of Union, Lafontaine 
managed to transcend ethnicity temporarily by forging an alliance 
with Robert Baldwin's Upper Canadian Reformers in opposition to 
Britain's refusal to grant the regions responsible government. 
French Canadian constitutional resistance had been successful and 
their political power had increased. As the then governor Bagot 
came to realize, "It is impossible to conceal from oneself that the 
French members of the Assembly possess the power of the country and 
whoever directs that power, backed by the most efficient means of 
controlling it, is in a situation to govern the Province most 
effectually. 1147 
Discarding Durham's opposition to French Canadians sharing in the 
government, Bagot pursued a policy of compromise finding no other 
solution. Tory elements protested vehemently and, upon passage of 
the Lower Canada Rebellion Losses Act ( and particularly, its 
sanctioning on behalf of the empire by Lord Elgin), English mobs 
rioted for several days in Montreal. On June 14, 1849, the 
"British House of Commons proclaimed Canada's full achievement of 
responsible government. 1148 
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In spite of constitutional compromise, ethnic polarization had not 
been more evident as each ethnic group had displayed rebellious 
tendencies actively when dominated by the other. The MacDonald-
Cartier administration which succeeded the Lafontaine-Baldwin 
government was however, able to pacify ethnic nationalism by 
ushering French Canadians to support the Confederation of British 
North America into a Canada which was to be both English and French 
in character. Breaking with Papineau's republican nationalism, 
Cartier believed that French Canadians were "monarchists by 
religion, by custom and by tradition" and thus an English-French 
Canadian modus vivendi was possible. 49 
Wade revealingly gives voice to the "curious mixture of political 
radicalism and economic conservatism" which would for time to come 
characterize French Canadian leaders. He cites the example of 
Papineau, a patriot who claimed to champion the rights of the 
people while simultaneously decrying outdated feudal tenure. Yet 
unsurprisingly in retrospect, this democrat was himself a seigneur, 
an elitist and indeed an aristocrat. It was he, who when the 
question regarding the abolition of 
vehemently defended the wisdom and 
seigneurial tenure 
justice of that 
arose, 
system 
exclaiming that his reformist approach entailed matters where 
political changes were necessary; while on matters regarding the 
preservation of property rights he was a staunch conservative. 50 
,r 
One can remark that nationalism which Papineau put forth was 
squarely in line with American democratic influences and as such 
was foreign to the French Canadian tradition. Such influences can 
be accounted for by his renewed contact with France at this time; 
Yet American democracy never really became grounded in the rigidly 
hierarchical structure of French Canadian society. 
The 1867 British North America Act which united four provinces 
under a single federal government arose from the need to centralize 
and develop the state for economic growth. Under Confederation, 
religious rights were guaranteed but bilingualism was protected 
only in the legislatures and courts and in course, was not 
preserved outside the province of Quebec. The French Canadian 
population were split on the issue of Confederation. The "Rouges" 
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faction saw it as a scheme of annihilation while the "Bleu" faction 
saw it as a means to prevent French Canadians from being absorbed 
by American interests. 51 Federalism, for the French, was viewed as 
a means of preserving their culture in the face of demands by the 
more populated Upper Canada for representation according to 
numbers. This was perceived as an attempt to destroy the dualism 
that existed. From its inception, Confederation had a centralist 
bias with the Canadian Senate unintended to be protective of 
provincial interests. 52 The Federal government became the treasurer 
and executive of all "significant" power particularly in the 
economic realm. It retained the means of financial control (ie. 
Bank of Canada), commercial control, national defence, justice, 
prisons, civil law, population control, foreign relations while the 
provincial powers consisted mainly of local administrative 
functions. 53 Despite these 1 imi ts, Quebec would have certain ppwers 
over its own affairs and it would be a concrete political unit 
protected by the Constitution. While it is true that French 
Canadians were relegated to the position of a minority at the 
federal level, bi-ethnic parties and electoral necessity of winning 
some French Canadian support in national elections tempered their 
dominated position to some extent. 54 While a federal rather than 
a legislative union had ensured the existence of a semi-autonomous 
French Canadian political unit, it simultaneously facilitated the 
eventual assimilation of French Canadian segments located outside 
of the Province. Thus, one can argue that French Canadian ethnic 
consciousness was, in the light of the federal arrangement, to 
undergo a transformation that would shift its regional resource 
base to an increasingly more narrow provincialism. It was to be the 
birth of the "Quebecois" and consequent assertive provincialism 
would mark the prospect of now plausible separatist influences 
infiltrating nationalist thinking. 
Vallieres depicts Confederation as the "institutional domination of 
business". 55 It was. undertaken with indifference to the masses. 
Confederation served the interests of the Anglo Saxon bourgeoisie. 
Suggesting some form of capitalist conspiracy, Vallieres describes 
how American entrepreneurs and financiers invaded Quebec and the 
rest of the country connivingly co-opting and greasing the hands of 
local businessmen and politicians alike (not to mention the 
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collaborationist clergy) in order to pacify and diffuse nationalist 
sentiment. 56 
Assessing Confederation is once again historically dependant and 
needs to be viewed in the light of the successes and failures of 
ethnic co-habitation in Canada. Though of a radically different 
mould, Canon Lionel Groulx is at one with Vallieres in his 
ambivalence towards foreign capitalists and their exploitation of 
local resources. His views, once marginalised, became the 
mobilizing slogan of the later emergent French Canadian new middle 
class which decried "Maitres chez nous" (Masters in our own home) 
in its Liberal party platform. Putting Confederation on probation 
clarifies that it was never seen as something intrinsically 
valuable. Rather it would be judged according to its merits as a 
means to achieving national aspirations. As Brunet records, it has 
for a long time been interpreted as an instrument of British 
Canadian nationalism and the rise of ethnic tensions attests to 
this view. 57 
It must be stressed, however, that liberal approaches and analyses 
were incompatible and divorced from the slant of nationalism which 
at that time leant toward an unswerving conservatism. Clerical 
nationalism aimed at entrenching cultural isolationism, although 
devoid of a strong separatist appeal, continued to disseminate the 
methodological agricultural vocation of French Canadians. In spite 
of the sporadic vitality of the liberal movement and splintering 
separatist movements, it never really gained a foothold amongst the 
masses. 
Confederation must be seen as a compromise between the two ethnic 
groups and the expansion of Canadian economic independence from the 
United states. The fathers of confederation had no doubt felt that 
by constitutionally reaching a formula which implied the acceptance 
of diversity and met the urgent need for a strong central 
government, the ethno-co-signatories would move toward common aims 
for the betterment of the society as a whole and in particular, for 
the gradual realization of national aspirations within a bi-
cultural framework. 
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Demographics, however, cast Confederation in a different light. 
While French Canadians were numerically dominant in their homeland 
(more than 3/4 of the population), they were outnumbered 2:1 in the 
new Dominion of Canada. Furthermore, their actual influence in 
Quebec did not correlate with their numbers. The countryside 
which was occupied by 85% of the population was primarily French 
while the cities were more English than French. The English 
controlled trade and industry while labour was primarily French. 58 
Nationalism, which began to surface more vigorously in response to 
the new situation created by Confederation, often used politics for 
religious ends while at other times, it used religion to achieve 
the separation of Church and State as embedded in their cultural 
tradition. Such antipathy on their part further intensified the 
French Canadian "minority complex" apparent in their acute 
consciousness of being a political minority ( only 30% of the 
Canadian population) and a cultural minority (consisting of less 
than 2% of the neighbouring Anglo-American counter-culture). Wade 
argues that a subconscious inferiority complex forces one to react 
often with "arrogant and aggressive attitudes which are a form of 
defence mechanism, so the minority complex produces similar 
manifestations which intensify the conflict between the majority 
and the minority. 1159 Thus Confederation which attempted to blend 
old loyal ties into a more "modern" one, it being Canadianism, 
witnessed more acute, racial, cultural and religious conflicts in 
the next few decades. 
Concluding Synthesis 
With gratitude to their history, French Canadians and Afrikaners 
alike had confused racist and nationalist ideas with religious 
ones. Striving to deal with an intensifying predicament of a 
dominant imperialist element and its respective cultural influence, 
both were rapidly forced to develop an ethnic consciousness in 
order to preserve their inherent differences. Ethnic conflict was 
the inevitable result at a time when self-determination and 
sovereignty began to challenge and uproot the old world order. It 
was the dawn of nationalism as populations with similar traits and 
values found it prudent to bond in solidarity as a means to protect 
their interests from being "overseen" by perceived foreigners. In 
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both societies, Britain's imperialist ambitions directly encroached 
upon their traditional ways of life. With impudence and of course 
subtle diplomacy not to mention English immigration, Britain was 
able to pursue her economic interests by simultaneously playing her 
foes off one another. 
The contextual framework accounts for varying policies and 
strategies undertaken by the English in South Africa and Canada. 
There was no Quebec Act in the Cape Colony. While careful for the 
most part not to provoke Boer passions and trans-geographical 
solidarity particularly in the light of the Boer's numerical 
supremacy, Britain attempted to absorb the backward people with its 
strong counter culture which it enforced in the political, cultural 
and economic realm. Attempting to stunt growing Boer republicanism 
which came on the heels of the Great Trek became a necessity for 
the British who hoped to forge a federation of territories under 
the banner of the Union Jack. Furthermore, by denying 
representative government to the people, Britain would be able to 
retain a firm hand ensuring and facilitating the exploitation of 
its ethnic counterparts and their conquered land. The Conquest of 
New France and Britain's political and economic ambitions were 
however frustrated not only by a reactionary and for the most part 
localized ethnic entity but by a growing annexationist movement and 
an increasingly powerful southern neighbour still reeling ~rom the 
fervour of its republican democratic revolution. Fear and wisdom 
dictated a more compromising course which aimed to co-opt and 
pacify the French Canadian clerical leadership; by doing this they 
were assured of loyalty against the Americans as well as the 
indirect control over the complacent and backward masses. English 
economic dominance was thus a priori. 
The French Canadian inclination was not uncompromisingly republican 
or separatist in nature. Liberal influences and elements were to 
flare up temporarily yet ~hey were devoid of power in relation to 
the staunchly unbending conservatism and clericalism. While 
cherishing their cultural assets and demanding participation in 
decision making and governing, French Canadians were not vilely 
opposed to sharing their lot with their English counterparts 
provided this was done independently from British exploitive and 
assimilative designs. 
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The Boers too might have opted for compromise and co-existence had 
the British not so aggressively provoked national sentiment by 
breaking Conventions, waging war on disgruntled (and resourcefully 
wealthy) republics and practising cultural oppression against the 
Afrikaners. However, it was blatant imperialism specifically the 
Jameson Raid and the tragic Anglo-Boer War which poisoned relations 
between the ethnic groups to such an extent that an apparent 
compromise in the Act of Union was more of an act of resignation on 
the part of the Boers. 
There was no culmination of ethnic conflict in Canada which could 
historically claim the bitter intensity of the Boer War. French 
Canadian consciousness, though in a sense benign, had already 
developed notably while the more dispersed Boer population (as such 
due to the Great Trek) were still struggling to realize their 
developing ethnic consciousness. The French Canadian masses were 
complacent in their sense of ethnicity while the Boer masses were 
assertive in their quest to realize their ethnicity. Circumstances 
in North America had already started to turn the wheels of French 
Canadian ethnic enclosure. The Boer laager had not yet taken shape 
except on the battlefields of the frontier. 
The French Canadians, in contrast to the Boers, were a more tightly 
knit ethnic group in terms of its cultural assets yet ethnic 
mobilization was the prize of the Boer War, an encounter which 
forced the Afrikaner populace to strive toward the attainment of 
nationhood, to step back from the brink of extinction at the hands 
of their English foes. This is why republicanism became so 
attractive to the numerically superior Boers. By achieving 
statehood, they would be able to consolidate their group structure, 
facilitate enclosure, perhaps develop symbols and so protect their 
rural way of life. The French Canadians were more purposely kept 
to their way of life which was agrarian. With the complicity of 
the clergy, England could capitalize economically by exploiting the 
French Canadian rural labour supply. Confederation was then an 
attempt to constitutionalize economic disparity along ethnic lines 
under the protective and seemingly legitimate guise of compromise. 
A policy of internal colonialism which though perhaps only 
moderately threatening in the cultural realm could have devastating 
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consequences in the economic and political one. Contrary to the 
connotations of the term "Confederation", the deal struck at that 
time was but a quasi federalism evident when noting that the 
federal government frequently resorted to disallowance and 
reservation to curb the growth of provincial powers of self-
government. As many scholars and academics have noted, the 
relationship was much more that of a mother country and colony 
whereby the institutions of control were basically those of 
colonial rule. 
Not dissimilar was the deal struck in South, Africa which riding on 
the wings of an imperialist victory attempted to crush the Boers 
into a shameful co-optation, their farms and livelihoods destroyed 
by the destruction of families and Kitchener's scorched-earth-
policy. The Boers became the dispossessed and soon found 
themselves and particularly their poverty ridden bywoner brethren 
in competition with the natives for underpaid jobs to support 
British capitalist interests. This is where the greatest 
comparisons can be made. The rural/urban cleavage which had 
existed previously between Boer and Dutchman, and "Canadian" and 
Frenchman soon came to take on an ethnic dimension which placed the 
Englishman directly at the helm of commercial and industrial 
affairs in both societies. The vibrant entrepreneurial culture of 
the Englishman stood in stark contrast to the lacklustre of the 
French Canadians and the Afrikaners who were located primarily in 
the rural areas. Ideological disengagement and its resulting 
isolationism reinforced the agrarian "backwardness" of those ethnic 
communities thereby dictating the ethnic nature of the socio-
economic structures within both societies. 
Politically, Britain was able to retain indirect control through 
the given acceptance of its democratic Parliamentary structures. By 
way of selective class co-optation, the English elements were able 
to retain their influence despite their numerical inferiority to 
the Boers. Similarly in Canada, through selective class co-
optation and their numerical preponderancy, Britain was able to 
cast the French Canadian into the role of a permanent minority, 
silenced and disempowered by a quasi-federalism which handed that 
ethnic entity a cosmetic government. 
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The differing variants of nationalism or rather the differing 
course upon which nationalism embarked was to a large degree rooted 
in demographic differentials between the component ethnic groups 
within each society. In South Africa, the Boer War gave impetus to 
a growing nationalism which was able to transcend geographical 
boundaries. The demographic balance which weighted in favo~r of 
the Afrikaners made ethnic mobilization potential!~ politically 
effective within the franchise guaranteed by the Union Constitution 
in vesting power from the dominant English element. Thus, the 
republican dream of the Afrikaners which at the time of Union 
looked unattainable, remained a theoretical possibility. In Canada, 
the federal experiment and the demographic English dominance made 
French Canadian nationalism unable to transcend geographical 
boundaries to a significant degree. Though much o.f the consequent 
ethnic conflict can be attributed to perceived injustices of the 
Anglo majority against the Francophone communities outside of 
Quebec, many of those communities would soon suffocate at the hands 
of a vibrant English and American culture. The centralist bias of 
federalism in favour of the Anglophone population further made 
FrenGh Canadian national power. an impossibility; after-all, the 
French Canadians were at this juncture a permanent minority. Thus 
with their resource base narrowed to a provincial context, 
republicanism too had to be narrowed. Separatism was the only 
theoretical route to political emancipation. 
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CHAPTER IV 
URBANIZATION, INDUSTRIALIZATION, AND COLLECTNE 
MOBILIZATION 
The Movement Toward Nationhood 
crises: WWI, WWII and the Great Depression 
Cracks in the Monolith of Conservative Power 
This chapter opens with 
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two 
constitutionally committed to a 
competing ethnic entities 
new deal geared toward 
reconciliation. When the real exigencies of a modernizing order 
relegate traditional agrarianism out of the realm of fact to that 
of myth, political manoeuvring responsible for the 'compromise' of 
Dominion unveils a harsh environment characterized by an ethnic 
division of labour and one in which ethnic relations may only be 
termed structurally as domination. This is not to suggest that 
political wrangling be only window dressing to serve as 
justification or to legitimize the adversarial bi-ethnic nature of 
each society. This line would follow that political agreements 
would not in fact reflect co-operation but rather would conceal the 
bullying tactics of the dominant group in being successful at 
imposing a settlement upon the subordinate ethnic group. Were one 
to accept this proposition fully, one would have to assume 
paralysis and lack of cohesion and representation in the 
subordinate group. A more balanced approach is needed. 
This chapter provides a framework of competing ethnic nationalisms 
unequal in power as determined by demographics, access to resources 
and longevity. The structural erosion of traditional rural 
patterns of life brought about by industrialization and 
urbanization creates a transitional environment in which 
subordinate ethnicities are forced to adapt to new social arenas 
characterized by conflict. The economic imbalance running along 
ethnic lines makes group enclosure an attractive option for those 
who sense that they are being increasingly marginalised and 
peripheralised from the core mainstream of society. 
Ethnic mobilization and unity is no longer a given in a context 
which emphasizes new forms of social consciousness based upon 
individual economic interests and values determined by capitalist 
economic principles. It is therefore the task of an evolving 
nationalist leadership self appointed to lure ethnic straddlers 
into bonds of ethnic conformity particularly in the subordinate 
group which is more prone to the appeals of class consciousness and 
institutionalized political propaganda masquerading as democratic 
fairness and justice. 
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Not only are Afrikaners and French Canadians vulnerable in their 
economic and political subordination to the more powerful British 
imperialist element but likewise they are susceptible to a vibrant 
Anglo hegemonic culture bent on their cultural dissolution. This 
chapter seeks to outline the terms of ethnic relations as 
determined by a post Dominion changing and modernizing order. The 
social repercussions inflicted upon Afrikaner and French Canadian 
alike in response to these changes and their resulting alienation 
in a new urban environment will be examined. 
Most significantly of course, the evolutionary development of 
nationalist ideology within each society will be scrutinized. 
Moderate pan-Canadian and South African appeals aimed at nation-
building will more often give way to ethno-nationalism its 
parameters moving from a broadly defined inclusiveness to a more 
narrowly defined exclusiveness. The rise of a national bourgeoisie 
struggling to attain national self determination in the face of an 
imperialist 'enemy' and hoping to take command of a new power 
structure would characterize both ethnic entities. Three 
significant crises bring the currents of ethnic antagonism to the 
fore. The First Great War, the Depression and the Second Great War 
highlight the differences and the struggles embarked upon by 
nationalists in French Canada and South Africa respectively. The 
historical similarities are frequently remarkable and the chapter 
concludes with the movement toward and consolidation of an 
intensely reactionary sectional nationalism propelled by a 
republican ideal and a more provincial-cum-separatist one in South 
Africa and French Canada respectively. A consolidated ethnic 
nationalism propped up on the pillars of ideological conservatism 
and supported by traditional clerico-bourgeoise elites demonstrate 
the forcefulness and resolve of an uncompromising nationalism 
imprinted in the foundations of each society. 
South Africa: The Road to Afrikaner Dominance and the Triumph of 
Nationalism 1910-1961 
The persisting cultural division of labour with continued 
Anglophone economic domination marked Afrikaner society in the 
early and mid-twentieth century. Yet the single stream South 
Africanist character of the Union had been ushered in with bloody 
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hands. The trend towards imperial consolidation did not go 
unchallenged as elements within the Dominion resisted active 
participation in the wars waged by Britain. Furthermore, after the 
Union, many struggles were engaged in to secure the language and 
education rights of the Afrikaners. New political parties began to 
break onto the political scene, some of which stressed a more 
extremist ethnic nationalism which opposed the notion of 
reconciliation and common goals in an imperialist context. 
The Afrikaner had been spared in the physical sense but he would 
have to now struggle to prevent his spiritual and cultural 
obliteration. This prompted the rise of the Second Language 
movement and entailed a battle for the minds of the Afrikaners. 
Afrikaans eventually became recognised as an official language of 
the Union in 1925. Just prior to Vereeniging, political and 
financial considerations prevented Christian National education 
from taking root thus causing more rifts within Afrikanerdom. 
Despite various elements ( ie. Doppers) pushing a republican 
ideology in continuity with the Transvaal Republic, Afrikaner 
leaders at the time discouraged such thinking seeing the merits of 
conciliation with the British. 1 
Ultimately, responsible government denigrated republican thinking 
and the sectional promotion of Afrikaner interests. The Imperial 
connection lay at the root of conflict between the Unionist and the 
republican strands within Afrikanerdom. Hertzog was at the 
forefront of the latter strand embarking on a campaign in 1912 to 
assert the Union's "right" to control her own international 
destiny. This was in itself a challenge to the terms of Union 
which basically placed the Union at the beck and call of Britain in 
that respect. This came to a head as war loomed on the 
horizon. General Louis Botha's government had not wished to 
antagonize Imperial elements within the country. A split occurred 
as Hertzog and his nationalist caucus formed a new National Party 
( 1913) on a "platform of South African self sufficiency, dual 
medium education and compulsory bilingualism in the public 
service. 112 The Government sought to gain Unionist rather than 
Nationalist support, and the consequence was a revival of anti-
capitalist sentiments among the Afrikaner masses. 
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With the development of commercial farming, the poor whites known 
as bywoners were driven from the land. A rift developed between 
the wealthy Afrikaner farmers and these bywoners. 3 In the absence 
of a job bar in the agricultural sector, most white workers were 
severely affected by high unemployment and so had to disengage from 
that sector. These landless tenants (bywoners) and failed farmers 
were forced to find work in the towns. 4 Droughts, locusts and 
cattle diseases contributed greatly to this phenomenon as did the 
Anglo-Boer War. 
Historian, de Kiewet, relates the inherent weaknesses of Boer 
agriculture arising from the limited supply of available new 
lands. 5 Boer farming relied on an abundance of cheap black labour 
and was therefore reluctant to incorporate and experiment with new 
and improved acjricul tural technology. It was poor, just above 
subsistence level and the plots were too large to implement 
efficient working. The Act of Union had fixed the boundaries and 
land values soared as a result of growing scarcity and rising gold 
price. 6 This land shortage prevented the rehabilitation of these 
poor whites and "back to land" calls faltered. Furthermore, too 
many lacked sufficient initiative. 7 Poor whiteism increased 
steadily and was estimated to number 150 000 by 1915. They were 
practically all rural people although many had been forced into the 
slums of the towns surviving mainly on charity. The Boer land 
system was to blame for this rural poverty. The Boer had been 
accustomed to leave his land in equal shares to his children. The 
continuous subdivision, generation after generation resulted in 
minimum holdings which could not support a decent living. 
Undivided land jointly run by a family unit was frequently plagued 
by domestic disputes which hindered efficient running of the farm. 
Allocating water rights to each holder further prevented adequate 
cultivation. 8 
Nationalist leaders saw in poor whiteism a divisive condition which 
could potentially prevent ethnic enclosure. These "lost sheep" 
would have to be reclaimed by the flock lest they should pursue 
their interests through socialist labour oriented action 
irrespective of ethnicity. Thus in a sense, poor whi teism 
presented both a severe point of concern in nationalist circles as 
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well as a focal point around which ethnic mobilization could be 
pursued. In any event, poor whiteism had heightened ethnic 
consciousness, and the fact that it had become an ethnic concern in 
the first place demonstrated a level of ethnic consciousness firmly 
entrenched. Class conflict within Afrikanerdom would have to be 
averted. 
While early nationalism had infected a relatively classless society 
consisting of mainly uneducated and industrious farmers and a few 
educated predikante, the intermediate phase saw wide class 
differentials. This period showed class cleavages with Afrikaner 
society comprising educated, semi educated and bywoner elements. 
This gulf would soon narrow as Afrikaner nationalism intensified in 
a concerted effort to rescue the poor whites. 9 
The rapid development of South Africa into an industrial empire 
must be seen to have taken place in conjunction with an early anti-
colonial movement. The struggle between English capital and the 
Afrikaners over state control was for the latter farming group the 
sole avenue to which they could hope to grab a share of the wealth 
generated by foreign mining houses. Political power, however, and 
the substantial Afrikaner economic mobilization was but the 
culmination of a long process of ethnic "activation". "Cultural 
"remoralization" centered around the suppressed Afrikaans language 
and heritage symbols. " 10 
Thus, while recognizing the legitimacy of the South African State, 
Hertzog opposed the single stream compromise of the Union. He was 
of the belief that the Afrikaner retain his unique nationality, 
having an historical claim as the pioneers of South African 
civilization. Furthermore, he was unflinching in his belief that 
South Africa need develop independently from the Empire. Along 
with Dutch Reformed Minister Malan, Hertzog envisioned a two stream 
development whereby English and Afrikaner streams would flow 
separately until the stage when the Afrikaner had reached the level 
of the Englishman. This nationalist outlook came to the fore in 
1914. The Rebellion represented a violent criticism of the Botha 
one stream policy and it came to symbolize the alienation, anxiety 
and insecurity of the Afrikaner in the new order . 11 It also 
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highlighted the divisions within Afrikaner society. When the Union 
entered World War I on the side of Britain, it triggered painful 
memories that had not as yet been healed. Botha and Smuts were 
seen to have defected to the imperialist cause, and although an 
Afrikaner citizen force was eventually to put down the rebellion, 
the retrospective nationalist mythology came to interpret the 
crisis in an anti-imperialist light. Furthermore, one rebel, 
killed by firing squad by order of Smuts came to embody the 
continuing struggle of Afrikanerdom. His name was Japie Fourie. 12 
Hertzog was able to capitalize on the war. He continued to stress 
his then nationalist "South Africa first" policy. At that time it 
must be remembered that the ethnic criterion for an Afrikaner was 
such that it could include both English and Dutch speakers. Dual 
ethnicism and complete ethnic equality, the core of nationalist 
doctrine, was in a broader sense an endorsement of white supremacy. 
The urban migration of unskilled bywoners compounded the situation. 
Faced with mine owner preferences for cheap black labour over 
expensive white labour and the consequent attempts by management to 
promote blacks to skilled positions, the Rand became embroiled in 
a civil war. The 1922 miners strike escalated into a confrontation 
between commandoes and the Defence Force. 13 Two hundred whites met 
their fates. While the Rand Rebellion was at face value a class 
conflict which saw a newly urbanised Afrikaner proletariat join 
with an established English working class, the former viewed it as 
a national struggle against foreign English capital. The 
coincidence of national and class interests must be understood in 
light of the perceptions held by Afrikaners which equated those 
mining magnates with British imperial interests. 14 This psychology 
would perpetuate the oppression complex of the Afrikaner, an 
insecurity which would characterize in some ways the secret appeal 
of nationalism. 
The National Party and the Labour Party defied the 
incompatibilities of their platforms to form an unstable alliance 
which ushered in the Pact government of 1924. Setting aside its 
secessionist aims, the NP coalesced with dissatisfied white labour 
elements as a bulwark against the interests of big finance capital 
which characterised the Smuts regime. "Civilised labour" was the 
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rallying cry as the Nationalists carried the call of farmers and 
labour alike to alleviate poor whi teism and to simultaneously 
transform agriculture by undertaking land settlement schemes aimed 
at arresting the proletarianization of Afrikaners by keeping the 
smaller white farmers on the land. 15 Capital transfers to 
agriculture and industry from the mining sector were enacted 
through taxes levied on the latter. 16 
The victory of Hertzog has been interpreted by various authorities 
in nationalist literature. Moodie states that the NP victory was 
based upon a "primal Afrikaner nationalist feeling combined with 
the fear of black competition and capitalism." While acknowledging 
that it reflected the political exigencies of the day rather than 
the true civil religion, he makes no bones in speaking about the 
"general feeling of Afrikan~rness."v Davenport is less dramatic 
in his interpretation. The historian describes the government as 
one comprising a melange of dissatisfied elements. "As an Afrikaner 
nationalist government", he states, "it was a pale reflection of 
what was to come later." Yet it did cater to the furtherment of 
Afrikaner cultural needs which had previously been neglected. 
After-all, Malan had successfully campaigned for bilingualism in 
the civil service thus advancing the economic and subsequently the 
political opportunities for the Afrikaner. The Afrikaans language 
received official recognition bringing the constitution in line 
with schools and the Dutch Reformed Church which had already 
adopted it. 18 O'Meara rejects any such analysis rooted in ethnic 
mobilization. Pact, he asserts, was the product of unstable class 
alliances. The Afrikaner nationalist alliance underwent many 
changes internally as a result of shifting constituent forces and 
their responses to such changing social conditions. Therefore, 
viewing Afrikaner nationalism as an ideological arena for class 
struggles, O'Meara succinctly analyses Pact as a class alliance 
between sections of agriculture and industrial capital together 
with a segment of organized white labour. 
He cites contradictions, for example, within agriculture itself 
pointing to the regional differences which made Cape farmers export 
oriented and those of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State 
internally market oriented. This accounted for the republicanist 
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sentiments of the latter two and the pro-imperialist interests of 
the former. These regional differences and their divergent 
interests coupled with the devoluted institutional structure of the 
NP itself all the more contributed to the instability of the 
alliance. It also showed that any talk of a monolithic 
Afrikanerdom was but a concoction of class based ideologues. 19 
Bloomberg accredits the Afrikaner Broederbond as having eclipsed 
the National Party as the embodiment of Afrikaner ideals ( and 
therefore representative of Afrikaner nationalism). The purist 
nationalists had opposed the Pact as they were against ethnic co-
operation with the English. Furthermore, the NP had allied with 
Labour, a party "tainted by atheistic Bolshevism." The NP had also 
compromised its republican ideals. The internal debate within the 
Afrikaner Broederbond had ended with the secret society parting 
ways with Hertzog's nationalists. 20 The Afrikaner Broederbond's 
subsequent embrace of Christian Nationalism and its expandatory 
recruitment of Afrikaners cutting across class lines showed that 
ideology and the civil religion in an ethnic context were to serve 
significantly as mobilizing instruments having a transcendant 
appeal irrespective of class. 
Hertzog was indeed to become weary of sectional nationalism run 
amok yet he was by no means neglectful of Afrikaner interests when 
it came to language, education and the Imperial connection. 
Despite envisioning a broader South African patriotism in a 
dualistic sense, he adamantly opposed imperial consolidation prior 
to the Great War. Dominion autonomy was necessary to safeguard 
the interests of the Afrikaners who were a cultural minority 
relative to the empire as a whole. After-all Hertzog had secured 
equal rights for English and Dutch. To him, language was a "medium 
of expression for the people's thoughts ... the form of expression 
whereby a people can maintain and enlarge its cultural 
distinctiveness and yearning for autonomy. 1121 He furthermore felt 
that speaking one's language was to honour one's people. Hertzog 
saw the Afrikaner culture as being in need of protection and as 
such opposed cultural fusion. 
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After the war however, the poor white problem had increased in 
severity and despite Hertzog's "civilised labour policy" some years 
later, there were no signs of the problem going away. By 1929, 
their number hovered around 220 ooo, an affliction experienced by 
1/5 of all Afrikaners. The ensuing great drought from 1929-34 
coupled with the Depression exaggerated the problem. Economic 
degradation had caused social degradation. By 1934 approximately 
1/4 of all Afrikaners had fallen into this category. 23 The stream 
of Afrikaners to the towns in itself posed serious problems for 
their traditional isolationist way of life. The proportion of 
Afrikaners in the cities was increasing rapidly from 10% (1900) to 
29% (1911) to 41% (1926) and 75% (1960). 24 
Disrupting the social milieu of the platteland had not only created 
deepening class rifts but it had also created a situation in which 
rural farm life was passing out of the realm of fact to that of 
myth. Afrikaner nationalist leaders would have to facilitate and 
incorporate that transition. Urbanization entailed the transition 
from a rural subsistence economy to a highly intricate money one in 
which the agents of Imperialism set the standards. The English 
fragment controlled the economy and English was the language of 
business and therefore a crucial key to advancement. 
The rural-urban cleavage between Afrikaner and English began to 
fuel Afrikaner nationalism in the context of industrialization and 
urbanization. The Afrikaners felt embattled by the urban English 
culture and direct economic competition by non-whites. According 
to H.J. and R.E. Simons: "The British had many initial advantages. 
Backed by the imperial State and representing a world-wide culture, 
they behaved with the arrogant assurance of conquerors. They 
dominated mining industry and commerce, controlled banks and 
finance houses, and supplied most technical skills. Their urban 
culture engulfed the Afrikaner, left a permanent imprint on his 
style of life, fostered class divisions, introduced a liberal and 
a socialist radicalism, and undermined the values of his 
traditional agrarian society. 1125 The Afrikaner trek to the cities 
had painted the industrial centres as the new frontier. The 
already developing racial consciousness of the Afrikaner 
intensified as realities of status and class placed his poor 
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brethren in direct competition with the African proletariat in the 
new urban setting. The Afrikaners appeared to be hemmed in by 
English capital and African workers. Welsh aptly relates the 
effects of urbanization in that it "had led directly to a 
diversification of interest groups within Afrikaner nationalism, 
and indirectly to internal conflicts posed by the absorbtion of a 
traditional agrarian-rooted nationalism in a wider scale industrial 
society. 1126 While striving to prevent miscegenation and the 
erosion of racial consciousness, Afrikaner nationalists became 
equally uncompromising with regard to conciliation with their 
English counterparts. Thus, when Hertzog declared that the 1926 
Balfour Declaration had resolved the question of South African 
constitutional freedom (in spite of its continued reference to the 
British Empire), many ardent republicans began to lose faith in his 
nationalist credentials. 27 
Cleavages between rural Boers and the urban English were reflected 
in party politics. Afrikaners were divided into those who favoured 
co-operation with the English and those who sought to dominate or 
even absorb the British fragment. 28 Hertzog's efforts to uplift the 
Afrikaner and give him a feeling of self-respect and equal status 
had given birth to a "Nationalist Frankenstein" who was bent on 
domination in an Afrikaner republic. 29 Feeling alienated and locked 
out of the new urban environment of commerce and industry, national 
minded Afrikaners realised that through political action they could 
regain their independence. Stripped of their land by 
circumstances, politics and public service provided an alternative 
way of life for young Boers. 30 The old Boer way of life had been 
smashed by the great socio-economic revolution. The Nationalists 
remained in power until, in 1933, the Depression ravaged economy 
forced them into a coalition with the South African Party. Two 
years later, these two parties fused into the United Party. To 
some it seemed possible that a single South African nation was on 
the horizon. Hertzog remained prime minister while Smuts was the 
deputy prime minister. 
Hertzog's position was that in light of the Imperial Conference and 
the Westminster Act, "independence" had been achieved. A new 
flag, anthem and equal language status had ensured the dualism of 
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the state. The national integrity of the Afrikaner had been 
restored. The next logical step was to consolidate the Dominion 
and move towards ethnic conciliation. Condemnation of fusion was 
not absent. Most significant was Cape leader and former minister 
of the Dutch Reformed Church. Defending the exclusiveness of the 
Afrikaner, Dr. D.F. Malan seceded from the party with some 
followers to form the Purified Nationalist Party thus emulating the 
Hertzog of 1912. 31 Criticising fusion through journalistic 
instruments Die Burger and Die Volksblad, Malan saw Hertzog's 
leadership of the nationalists as dictatorial. Malan firmly 
supported the British Parliamentary system and believed in 
hereniging (reunion) but viewed this alliance with imperialists and 
capitalists as deplorable. The soul of the Afrikaner was here at 
stake. His staunch republicanism, furthermore, required severing 
the connection with the Empire completely. Fusion, by 
incorporating financial interests on the Rand, would create party 
cleavages on class lines rather than on ethnic lines. Afrikaner 
nationalism would, therefore, be forever destroyed as an effective 
political force.= 
The Cape based purists had come into synchronization on 
republicanism with the Afrikaner Broederbond. The Bond welcomed 
the new party eyeing it as a political front for spreading their 
Christian Nationalist doctrine. Close bonds were formed and, 
although the Bond purported to be a society for the advancement of 
cultural goals, its "senior party" relationship to the PNP, its 
extra-parliamentary offensive and ideological counter-offensive 
coupled with hostile confirmation by Hertzog made its political 
character undeniable. 33 The Afrikaner Broederbond was a driving 
force and reputed by some to be the single most important 
organisational influence on nationalism in the 1930's. 34 
The Afrikaner Broederbond had in effect taken over the reigns of 
Afrikaner nationalism yet this republican strand was primarily 
based in the north. It comprised the northern Afrikaner 
intelligentsia, was elitist and almost exclusively petty bourgeois. 
Al though originally founded by a collection of railway clerks, 
policeman and clergy as a small semi-religious organisation, its 
subsequent recruitment of teachers and academic clergy 
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(particularly from the University of Potchefstroom) soon eclipsed 
the founding leadership. Aggravated by Hertzog's abandonment of 
republicanism and subsequently the fusion crisis, the Bond 
deputized the FAK with its cultural portfolio to assume the role as 
directing body of Afrikaner nationalism. 35 
Fusion had received much support in the rural north from large 
groups of poor whites. Their co-optation and mobilisation by 
working class organisations had to be averted for it would ring the 
death knell of Afrikaner nationalism. The underlying commitment 
of the Bond to unite Afrikaners of all classes was steadfast. 
Imperialism was an economic affliction. The Afrikaners had been 
excluded from all sectors of the economy apart from agriculture. 
The rapid denationalization of the urban Afrikaner was a cause for 
great concern. 
This linkage of class and ethnicity has been echoed by Merle 
Lipton. She asserts that Afrikaner "Militants" who were 
dissatisfied by Fusion had their sentiments rooted both in 
ideological and economic causes. Expanding upon the latter, it is 
argued that Malan's electoral base consisted of the rural Cape and 
small constituencies in the OFS and Transvaal. Drawing on 
economically disadvantaged regions, Malan also drew some support 
from wealthier embittered Cape farmers who felt that imperial 
preference had not born the fruits as it was in reality a one-sided 
trade agreement between Britain and its exported fragment. These 
wine, fruit and wool farmers were furthermore supported by SANLAM, 
the ethnically (Afrikaner) oriented finance and insurance group 
which owned Nasionale Pers and the Cape newspaper, Die Burger. 
Malan's support in the north was more ideologically rooted. 
Gripped by racism and xenophobia, these poorer farmers and the 
rising petty bourgeoisie in the cities and towns rejected Hertzog's 
policies which were geared towards white unity and more amicable 
relations with the coloureds. They were anti-imperialists, anti-
semitic and staunchly anti-African. Social separation and 
tightening of the pass laws and job colour bars was desired. Their 
prejudice also took the form of organized boycotts against the more 
frugal Jewish and Indian merchants. 36 
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The position of the Afrikaner was inferior to the English along the 
lines of education, occupation, income, and capital ownership 
( outside agriculture). Afrikaner workers were the lowest paid and 
were semi-skilled operators working machines. The dominant English 
unions guarded the apprenticeship system. In 1936, Afrikaners were 
27.5% white collar, 31.3% blue collar and 41.2% in agriculture. 
The annual per capita income of Afrikaners was 86 as compared to 
142 for other whites. 37 Afrikaner leaders strived to channel the 
intense resentment felt by Afrikaners in an effort "to conquer the 
cities and the economy, dominated by the English; a goal they 
termed their second Great Trek. " 38 
The Broederbond was at the forefront attempting to pull the ox and 
wagon back into the laager formation. Developing a 
volkskapitalisme was its ultimate aim as it embarked on a campaign 
to promote class breaking exclusive Afrikaans religious, cultural, 
social and economic organizations. The dominant ideology amongst 
the Afrikaner faced two great economic problems: the economic 
inferiority of the Afrikaners themselves, and the broader crisis in 
the capitalist economy. To solve the first problem, they had 
advocated an agriculturist economic philosophy, improvement of the 
educational system with the aim of developing a competent business 
elite, and the practical steps of "buy Afrikaans" and the co-
operative Bond network. To remove some of the warts from 
capitalism, they turned to volkskapitalisme. This was the period 
then which witnessed the awakening of the Afrikaners' interest in 
economic issues. The social supremacy of the church was no longer 
an adequate guarantee of national survival. Survival was also 
dependent upon the emergence of a national bourgeoisie that could 
control economic development. The Bond was the embryonic 
formation. 
The work of the petty bourgeoisie organised in the Bond facilitated 
the ideological transformation of Afrikaner nationalism into 
Christian nationalism. The structure of South African capitalism 
offered few opportunities for Afrikaans speakers. The Afrikaner 
petty bourgeoisie laid the blame on imperialism and monopoly 
capital. The fusion crisis had disorganized and confused the petty 
bourgeoisie as it seemed to imply the recognition by agricultural 
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capital that their interests were no longer irreconcilable with 
those of imperialist mining. Thus, the petty bourgeoisie 
ideological function as the primary class ally of agriculture was 
undergoing erosion. Being displaced by monopoly mining capital in 
this regard called for an overhaul and an ideological redefinition 
of Afrikaner nationalism. 39 The Afrikaans language and culture were 
to serve as the focus for this redefinition. 
Even before Fusion, the Bond had embarked on language projects in 
order to modernise the Afrikaans language and so adapt it to the 
industrial society. The Bond spawned the FAK as the vanguard of a 
growing network of cultural bodies and local language oriented 
organisations. These numbered roughly about 300 in 1937. 40 
Parallel - Afrikaans national cultural organisations in all spheres 
were set up. Subsidiary organisations of the FAK included the 
Afrikaans Language and Cultural Society (ATKV) 1930, the Spoorbond 
(The Rail Bond) 1937, the Institute for Christian National 
Education 1938, the Voortrekker Movement (1931), the Afrikaanse 
Nasionale Studentbond (1933), Noodhulplig (Red Cross) 1935, and the 
Instituut vir Volkswelstand (Institute for People's Welfare) 1938. 41 
Geoff Cronje best spells out the reason behind these community-
oriented efforts: 
"The Boer culture must be carried into the English cosmopolitan 
life of the city ... It is an appalling struggle and more than one 
Boer has already been demolished in this difficult transition 
period in our ethnic life. But our hope is that the organised 
Afrikaner action in the city will day by day become more purposeful 
and more irresistible .•• We must not allow the urbanisation of the 
Afrikaner to divide our people. We must not allow our city 
Afrikaner to become a different kind of Afrikaner from the fellow 
on the farm. 1142 
Probably the most significant cultural achievement of the FAK was 
the Voortrekker Centenary Celebrations of 1938 in which Christian 
Nationalism was linked to the Voortrekker ethos thus attaining 
historical legitimacy. The popular re-enactment of 
the Trek furthermore revived Afrikaner nationalism in an urban 
context. The new economic inner trek was also highlighted as was 
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republican sentiment. Paying homage to now almost mythological 
heroes created an up-surge of national sentiment and these militant 
energies were craftily channelled by a slew of prominent orators. 
Christian nationalism had at last penetrated the popular Afrikaner 
consciousness and it was to be seen as the logical outgrowth of 
their historical emancipation. 43 
The renewed cultural awareness and the heightened message of 
volkseenheid which would override the real and potential splits of 
party politics and regionalism and those inspired by British 
imperial interests gave new impetus to Afrikaner economic 
nationalism. The ever present poor white problem was an even 
greater cause for concern in the midst of the industrial 
revolution. 
The 1934 "Poor White" Conference and a number of related studies 
showed the urgency with which Afrikaner leaders regarded this 
problem. Firmly believing that only ethnic mobilization could 
hope to relieve their poor brethren, they encouraged businessmen to 
be "innovators" in their own communities with consumers being asked 
to support Afrikaans business interests. Such contributions were 
reasoned as a demonstration of the moral worth of such 
individuals. 44 The 1930's saw the first successful ventures of the 
new Afrikaner capitalists. They were in the banking sphere and 
included Boere Saamwerk, Volkskas and Uniewinkels. The year 1939 
marked the First Afrikaans Peoples' Economic Congress which 
committed itself to promoting the interests of the middle class. 
A Reddingsdaadbond fund ("act of rescue" fund) was set up and its 
purpose was the investment of capital in Afrikaner business 
ventures and particularly in Federale Volksbeleggings, a new 
investment house. Only 10% was allocated to poor relief. 45 The 
executive of the FVB spelled out the organisations' principles at 
a meeting on September 27, 1940; "Federale Volksbeleggings BPK 
operates on the principle that it is a people's institution, 
established on the mandate of the Ekonomises Volkskongress of 1939, 
to serve as means of furthering the Afrikaners' drive for economic 
independence. But the company is nevertheless a business 
undertaking which wishes to pay its shareholders in clinking silver 
and not just in sentiment. 1146 
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A notable threat to ethnic unity lay in the trade unions and their 
socialist orientation. Thus, a primary task and necessity was to 
prevent the independent class development of Afrikaner labour. 
Albert Hertzog's Reform League launched an offensive against the 
English dominated unions particularly the Mine Workers Union. The 
underlying aim was to heighten Afrikaner consciousness and create 
exclusive Afrikaans Christian national unions so as to enhance 
their bargaining position versus English capitalists. These 
efforts bore fruit as the Reformers were successful in wrestling 
control of the MWU, fomenting splits in other union bodies and 
establishing some new ones (ie. Spoorbond). Lipton argues 
convincingly that Afrikaner nationalism here was not merely 
"drummed up" by ambitious leaders but had deep grass roots support. 
Competing liberal and radical challenges to Christian national 
trade unions tempered their optimism realising the difficulties in 
weaning Afrikaners into unions with English and black workers. 
Their shared affinity for "their own" with whom they shared a 
common language, culture and history was not a negligible barrier 
to say the least. Lipton is, however, quick to acknowledge that in 
spite of a core of "militant" nationalists whose commitments were 
both emotionally and economically based, there were nationalist 
elements who were unreliable in the sense that economic interests 
prevailed over ethnic loyalties. It was these elements that took 
some of the beat out of the ethnic drum on the march to political 
victory. 47 
Afrikaner business power received a boost as businessmen organized 
themselves into a separate association, the Afrikaanse 
Handelsinstituut (Commercial Institute) 1942 as distinct from the 
English dominated Chamber of Commerce. Afrikaner private 
businesses had begun to accumulate weal th merely by exploiting 
Afrikaner sentiments. Furthermore, state favouritism for white 
business ventures and particularly for Afrikaner entrepreneurs 
after the Second World War was supported by well controlled and 
large reserves of cheap black labour. The rapid economic 
development of South Africa since 1939 and the capital accumulated 
by the Afrikaner controlled farming sector set off a flow of funds 
through Afrikaner banks to Afrikaner businesses. 48 In 1943 Saambou, 
a young Afrikaans building society was established to set up and 
found numerous companies. 
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O'Meara asserts with regard to the economic movement that 
north/south differences were pervasively hidden beneath the 
rhetoric of Afrikaner nationalism. Furthermore, poor whiteism was 
not of primary concern and was subordinate to the creation of 
Afrikaner entrepreneurship and profit. Rather than solely 
attempting to Afrikanerise commerce and industry and win over more 
Afrikaner workers, the economic movement aimed to develop Afrikaner 
capitalists. Therefore, while condemning the capitalist 
"Hoggenheimer" image, the Afrikaner alliance of farming capital, 
worker savings and the petty bourgeoisie employed such techniques 
of capitalism to form co-operatives under the guise of nationalism. 
The southern based Sanlam group had developed a rapport with the 
Bond in the north to undertake a joint business venture. While the 
former capitalist oriented Cape enterprise needed the Bond to 
mobilise potential resource capital to facilitate its growth and 
expansion, the latter anti-capitalist petty bourgeoisie Bond camp 
lacked the business experience and capital to pursue its 
ideological and economic initiatives and hoped to off-set growing 
fear of economic and political domination by established interests 
in the Cape. The co-operatives were seen to be an appropriate 
form of volks-capitalisme as they did not entail monopoly practices 
or individualism but rather drew on all groups for mutual support. 
The redefined relation between classes was significant in that it 
redefined Afrikaner nationalism itself through the advent of an 
economic consciousness. 49 There was then a symbolic shift from the 
old outlook on Hoggenheimer to an enthusiastic embrace of the new 
"People's Capitalism" without in any way casting off their 
traditional civil religion. Afrikaners were urged to cultivate the 
virtues of an urban industrial society. 50 
Magubane asserts that "Afrikaner Nationalism then is a product of 
bourgeoisie society which manifested itself as a means to advance 
sectional economic interests. 1151 He reasons that the Afrikaner 
petty bourgeoisie erred in adopting a strategy of capital 
accumulation which was dependent upon holding state power. In its 
absence, the very basis of its economic power would be destroyed. 
Control of the state by the nationalists enabled them to accumulate 
capital at the expense of other groups. 52 
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Welsh, however contests this class based theory of Afrikaner 
nationalism holding that economic motivations do not underlie 
nationalism. This assumption merely "infers causes from 
consequences. " Convincingly refuting Marxist interpretations, 
Welsh argues that individual ambitions are not solely pumped by 
material ambitions but also by status, prestige, power and 
idealism. Class is rather woven into a racial and ethnic fabric. 
Therefore, Afrikaner nationalism provided the impetus and served as 
a foundation for economic motivations. At the very least it 
defined the parameters in which these class variables could act. 53 
H. Lawson highlights the weaknesses of Afrikaner capital and the 
significance of state control: "The overwhelming strength of the 
established capitalist groups made it impossible to force them by 
purely economic means to share the fruits of exploitation. Thus 
the further progress of Afrikaner capitalism had of necessity to 
depend on the use of political means for economic ends. The two 
political trump cards in the game were the numerical superiority of 
the Afrikaner and the corrosion of his political consciousness by 
the poison of racialism. Together, they could be used to give the 
Afrikaner capitalist a position of power in the country which its 
economic position alone never could give him. 11= 
The PNP was the only political instrument capable of expressing the 
true Afrikaner will. Its aim was to gain control over every aspect 
of life in South Africa, to again establish a new Republic and to 
sever the imperialist tie. Hitler's invasion of Poland and the 
outbreak of the Second World War gave the necessary impetus and 
created the circumstances which would realign Afrikaner class 
alliances into a hegemonic "monolith". 
When Smuts carried South Africa into the war pushing aside 
Hertzog's parliamentary "petition" for neutrality, it was 
interpreted by many as a reassertion of British imperialism. The 
pro-war Smuts group had settled the split in the Cabinet and House 
of Assembly by passing an amendment to break off relations with 
Germany by 80 votes to 67. Hertzog immediately resigned signalling 
the demise and failure of fusion. Taking his followers across the 
floor, he renegotiated with the Malanite nationalists only to again 
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resign in disarray over a Federal Council's (NP) programme which 
denied the English equality of status and political rights. 55 
Although Hertzog had entered into a reunion with the republican 
nationalists and had even accepted a republican formula with 
safeguards, his dominion nationalism could not be reconciled with 
the nee-nationalism of the PNP.= The instability of the nationalist 
alliance was clearly evident as the new Smuts government won a 
landslide victory in the elections of 1943. The quick resurgence 
of Afrikaner nationalism after the outbreak of war had given 
republicanism renewed emphasis and made it an enduring theme of 
debate. 57 
The NP did not go unchallenged, however, even within nationalist 
circles. The vast ideological forces that were on the move 
throughout the world soon touched down on South African shores. 
The mobilizing republicanism and heightened expectations arising 
from the Ossewatrek, and the subsequent intensification of 
Afrikaner nationalism in reaction to the imperialist war created 
again an arena for broedertwig. Anti-British sentiments led to the 
development of sympathies for the axis powers amongst Afrikaners. 
Furthermore, the constitutional form of parliamentary democracy 
(exclusive of Africans) was, among some, felt to be a relic of 
foreign imposition. Thus, republicanism and Afrikaner nationalism 
more broadly became tainted by national socialist doctrines and the 
spirit of Nazism. Afrikaner nationalist variants attempted to 
capitalize on the volatile instability and emotional frustration 
caused by urbanization and the wartime industrial boom. The 
incorporation by Afrikaner nationalism of wartime ideologies would 
throw up rigorous debates and disrupt the limited enclosure 
achieved by bourgeois ideologues and political leaders. 
Pro-German attitudes were widespread amongst Afrikaners in the 
years preceding the war and the first years of the war. The 
Ossewabrandwag (Ox Wagon Sentinel), a "cultural" organisation born 
from the centenary trek attempted to channel these pro-Nazi 
sentiments. Its founder Colonel J.c.c. Laas was soon eclipsed by 
Dr. J F J van Rensburg an admirer of Hitler. Professing to 
perpetuate the ox-wagon spirit, the movement was nationalistic, 
militaristic, sympathetic to National Socialism and fascism, 
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dedicated to a unified Afrikanerdom and a South Africa purified of 
English and Jewish influence, and not averse to sabotage and 
terrorism. " 58 Its membership reached in excess of 300 000 by the 
turn of the decade and it had a strong anti-semitic philosophical 
bent. The radicalism of the movement, however, prompted many of 
its followers to switch allegiance to Malan and the National Party. 
While Malan had at times flirted with the organisation, the looming 
allied victory and the threat posed to the NP from within led him 
to sever the connection.= 
Inter-ethnic antagonism flared up as imperialist symbols deepened 
the rifts. Not only was the heightened political consciousness of 
the English an affront to the "autonomy" of the dominion but the 
requirement that all South Africans rally to the glorified 
imperialist cause reignited the suppressed anger within the 
Afrikaner rank and file. Butler, in his liberal historiography, 
exclaims that this "new Imperialism" had utterly alienated 
Afrikanerdom at a crucial moment, driving it back into a volk 
ethnicity, and away from a convergence with the liberal forces of 
modernity in South Africa. 1160 
Afrikanerdom had not yet consolidated itself on the political 
front. There arose a number of organisations and parties which 
challenged the PNP as the torchbearer of Afrikaner nationalism. 
Aside from the Ossewabrandwag, the anti-semitic Greyshirts and 
Oswald Pirow's New Order emerged as did the post-Hertzogite 
Afrikaner Party committed to the outdated "dual stream" 
conciliatory policy with Havenga as its leader. The former three 
exemplified expressions of the mimetic stage of nationalism, 
preaching variants of national socialism and sometimes the 
dissolution or destructi"on of parliamentary government. The 
prevalence of a number of rival groups steadfastly retaining their 
own identities rather than combining in oppositional unity created 
a major organisational problem for Malan. Attempting to eclipse 
the NP by professing to be a transpolitical Afrikaner organisation, 
the Osserwabrandwag threw down the gauntlet at Malan i~ violation 
of the Cradock Agreement. This agreement had relegated the O. B. to 
the non-political realm and restricted its subversive activities 
against friendly political movements. Malan countered by purging 
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the O.B. members from NP ranks. 61 He also publicly declared war on 
the movement for its subversive activities. O'Meara argues that 
Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd had decided to destroy the O.B. as its 
socialist component had alienated agricultural capital. It had 
also caused concern and lacked appeal to the businessmen of the 
reddingsdaadbond movement. Portraying the PNP-OB conflict as an 
inter petty bourgeoisie struggle, O'Meara reasons that NP leaders 
recognised their need to form an alliance with agricultural capital 
especially in the north. 62 Malan had similarly dealt, a few years 
prior, with the New Order "caucus" by banning the formation of 
groups within its own ranks. The 1943 general election attested 
to the dominant PNP position as the political mouthpiece of 
Afrikanerdom. By 1945, Malan had become the undisputed volkleier. 
Most Afrikaner nationalists saw national socialism as conflicting 
with traditional Afrikaner values. 63 Naziism was disenchanting to 
Malan. Afrikaner sympathies for Nazism and fascism were in part 
the outgrowth of historical and common ancestral ties with their 
Nordic "brethren". The Kaiser had offered moral support to Kruger, 
Krupps and supplied Staats artill~ry, and imperial Germany was a 
rival of the British Empire. Furthermore, many Afrikaners viewed 
Germany as a victim of British imperialism and likened the treaty 
of Versailles to that of Vereeniging. The Blackshirts and the 
Greyshirts espoused a common anti-semitism. Young nationalists had 
been invited to attend the anti-Comintern school in Berlin and 
nationalist youth movements enjoyed some Nazi organisational 
techniques. Ideologically, the elitism, aristocracy and 
authoritarianism of Calvinism had been magnified in black-white 
racial relations. Nazism and Christian Nationalism deified the 
nation as a collective organism to which its individual members 
were subordinate. Liberalism was villainized as an alien ideology. 
Both creeds saw the state as an instrument to achieve national or 
racial ends. Both repudiated the French Revolution and idealized 
an absolute state or a totalitarian volk. 64 
Bloomberg argues that the Afrikaner Broederbond had been attracted 
to totalitarianism as an alternative to the parliamentarianism 
which had eased the nationalists into coalition and in turn 
betrayed their principles. Smuts had in fact accused the Bond in 
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parliament of being "a kind of Gestapo" and others had concurred 
that the organisation had at times been "a dangerous, cunning, 
political Fascist organisation" intent on perpetuating Afrikaner 
domination in all spheres. 65 Liberal Anglo-Saxon constitutional 
concepts should be swept aside and all parties should be abolished. 
Such breeders as Meyer, du Plessis, Diedrichs and Eloff had sought 
to incorporate Nazi ideas yet the notion of a volk state was 
equally as foreign as the Westminster system. Corporatism was 
juggled around but it soon waned until its revival by the O.B. less 
than a decade later.~ 
Nazi eugenics had also lent support to those of an anti-semitic 
persuasion. Despite Afrikaner pre-Nazi sympathies with Jews, the 
Nazis and the likes of du Plessis, Verwoerd and Donges introduced 
anti-semitism based on religious, political and racial foundations. 
Jewish liberalism and capitalism tied to imperialism served as a 
convenient scapegoat for a mobilizing fascism. The Jews were 
accused of non-assimilability and were painted as economic threats 
to Afrikanerdom. Jewish competitiveness and economic success 
prompted accusations that they had robbed the population of its 
heritage. This appealed to the new Afrikaner business class and 
the poor whites. Jews were also portrayed as cultural carriers of 
internationalism, non-racialism, liberalism and socialism. 67 
While the anti-semitic credentials of key nationalist personalities 
had been obvious and while Hitler had been praised by many elements 
within Afrikaner ranks, Afrikaner nationalism cannot be equated 
with Nazism. Afrikaner Calvinism rejected any glorification of 
leaders, race, blood and nation. While the lines separating Divine 
worship and nation worship are often smudged, Afrikaner Calvinism 
did not subordinate itself to the state. Instead these religious 
elements sought to guide and Christianize the nationalist movement. 
Even inf 1 uential figures outwardly anti-semi tic ( ie. H.F. Verwoerd) 
acknowledged that while Naziism and fascism were perhaps good 
recipes for the Wehrmacht Republic, they were a fatal import to the 
Afrikaner context. 68 It seems plausible to argue that heightened 
xenophobia stemming from the war and indu~trialisation often 
expressed its frustration in an anti-semitic mode. Imported Nazi 
doctrines for reasons discussed managed to penetrate the Afrikaner 
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consciousness feeding off a latent and suppressed anti-imperialism. 
While perhaps not vehemently anti-semitic but rather pro-German, 
Afrikaner leaders saw in scapegoating a means to mobilize the rank 
and file, particularly those rural platteland elements. Naziism, 
while bearing some similarities to Christian Nationalism was not a 
real option for the Afrikaners. The political wrangling or 
broedertwig was a contest for nationalist leadership, and support 
by some factions for Nazism was but a warped outgrowth of pro-
German (and more precisely anti-British) sentiment. The looming 
demise of the axis forces and the proportional decline of fascist 
inclined movements provides confirmation. The voice of 
Afrikanerdom was a parliamentarianist party which had, after 
initial flirtation, scorned political bodies with fascist and Nazi 
predispositions. 
World War II had witnessed a 116% increase in the development of 
the manufacturing sector and a real gain of 65% in manufacturing 
output. The arms industry developed into a highly profitable 
industry and was based upon a labour force of non-whites and white 
women during the war. The proportion of white males in the South 
African army was particularly high so as not to arm the black 
population. As a result the social structure underwent a change 
as white women entered the labour force. Furthermore, non-white 
jobs were better during the war temporarily due to the need for 
more labour. The white/non-white wage differential in the 
manufacturing sector (skilled) stood at 5:1 which was not so great 
compared to the huge wage gap in the mining sector. This prompted 
mass black migration to South Africa. After the war, people were 
perturbed at the increasingly black face of the cities. White 
nationalists were fearful and this led to an anti-liberal backlash. 
This paved the way for the purist white nationalist party to take 
power. 
Apartheid or separate development which had previously connoted the 
separation of Afrikaans from English now came to be termed as a 
separation from non-white races. This horizontal separation or 
segregation marked the end of a slow, liberal veneer and of the 
rhetoric of democratic liberalism which characterized Smuts' U.P. 
government. What followed the Nationalist electoral victory would 
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come to be known as the most racially oppressive set of legislation 
ever unleashed. Apartheid legislation entailed the 
institutionalization of racism to harden the lines of horizontal 
segregation. It, furthermore, enforced the lopsidedness of the 
South African economy which was characterized by backward 
agriculture, management-labour relations and wage scales all based 
on race. Afrikaner nationalism had been propped up on the dual 
pillars of racial segregation ("separate and unequal") and anti-
liberalism. The Nationalist victory in the 1948 election may be 
seen as the triumph of Afrikaner nationalism. With the mainstream 
political orientation of the NP and the underpinning reparative 
unity efforts of the AB network, postwar difficulties highlighted 
the inefficiency of the Smuts UP government. The political 
environment in nationalist terms was a far cry from the disastrous 
schism of 1941. Moodie attributes the NP's marginal electoral 
victory to the civil religion encompassing the Christian National 
ideology and practical assistance from the AB. He further argues 
that the civil religion was dealt a significant blow by the 
unexpected political triumph. Its theme of righteous suffering 
fought strain to accommodate this new power. Furthermore, 
practical priorities and the need to develop a bureaucratic party 
machine detracted from the civil religion. The long awaited 
republic had still not been realised and the Broederbond lapsed 
into a maternal role securing the xenophobic enclosure of its 
members. Afrikaner exclusi vism would soon be supplanted by an 
ideological fervour around which the policy of separate development 
("apartheid") would gain notoriety. 69 
Wilson and Thompson attribute the Nationalist victory to the 
rallying cry of Malan which called for the "bring[ ing] together 
[of] all who, from inner conviction, belong together". The 
disunity and frustration of pre-war and the war years facilitated 
the amalgamation of th,e National Party and Afrikaner Party on 
nationalist principles. While one-third of Afrikaners still 
remained outside the nationalist kraal. Afrikaner Nationalism had 
come to power without extraneous assistance and could rule alone. 70 
O'Meara interprets the election in terms of the changing political 
economy of the Union. The twofold movement towards the H. N. P. 
firstly involved the Transvaal farmers who deserted the U. P. ; 
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protesting against the Smuts government for not attending to their 
needs for a cheap black labour supply. The influx of Africans into 
the cities during the war years was facilitated through the 
relaxing of controls on black urbanisation. The paralysis of State 
policy after the war was apparent in the UP government's inability 
to defuse strident African demands for change and to restore 
stability through reform. The ideological bankruptcy of the U.P. 
heightened its control vacuum. Rejecting the conclusions of the 
U. P. appointed Fagan Commission which catered to commerce and 
industry in holding that African urbanization was irreversible, the 
NP policy of apartheid was designed to secure labour for 
agriculture thus insisting that natives in the urban areas be 
regarded as migrants. O'Meara furthermore argues that the 
Marketing Act of 1937 as passed by the government undermined the 
financial interests of the farmers by interfering with producer 
control in holding down food prices. The HNP moved to promote the 
sound and profitable marketing of agricultural products. 71 
The drift of white workers towards the H.N.P was given impetus by 
a number of incursions into the rights of white labour made in the 
name of war. The Labour Party had entered into a close wartime 
alliance with the U.P. Mechanisation had rendered some skilled 
labour redundant, real wages fell and African wages increased. 
White workers perceived that their jobs were being threatened by 
the large scale movement of Africans into operative positions. 
Furthermore, their traditional trade unions were targeted by 
Christian National agencies who waged an ideological struggle 
against the labour movement. The ethnic division of labour served 
as "political fodder to advance the interests of Afrikaner unity 
and prevent Afrikaner proletarianisation. 72 
Edward Tiryakian argues that the political slogan of "apartheid" 
had won the elections so upsetting the pre-election odds. Van den 
Berghe too acknowledges the primacy of ideology in South Africa as 
self-evident. Stultz views the 1948 alliance partners' triumph as 
a repetition of the electoral success of Hertzog and the NP 
nineteen years earlier. The traditional ethnic political 
alignment last manifest in 1929, had been restored. The HNP-AP 
alliance stood for a policy of racial exclusion in contrast to the 
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liberalizing race policies of the UP. and playing on the "Black 
Peril" and the rising cost of living after the war ousted the 
helpless Smuts government. 73 Either way, it is clear that 1948 did 
not hail the rebirth of the Afrikaner monolith. In spite of the 
"landslide" victory, the AP-PNP alliance polled 140 000 fewer votes 
than the opposition due tot he rural vote loading or over-
representation. The Afrikaner Broederbond had to now broaden 
Afrikaner unity to include the 250 ooo Afrikaners who had voted for 
Smuts. Ethnic enclosure remained incomplete. 
Afrikaner exclusivism was no more an untradeable commodity as the 
ideological fervour of Afrikaner intellectuals in the following 
decade conni vingly redressed stark racism under the banner of 
separate development and Christian nationalism. 74 While apartheid 
had certainly not represented a break from traditional paternalism 
and overt racism, it did attempt to somehow justify and legitimize 
white supremacy in response to the 1 iberal challenge and the 
context of decolonisation. Classic apartheid was clearly an 
intensification of the policy of segregation. 75 Afrikaner 
nationalism had been radically transformed from the humanistic 
expressivism evident in the struggle against British imperialism to 
a policy which was reactionary and chauvinistic 
While the Nationalists had refrained from 
in character. 76 
halting the 
industrialization process as many liberals and businessmen had 
feared, they had attempted to control and adapt it to the 
traditional hierarchical race structure so as to preserve the white 
(particularly Afrikaner) identity. They, therefore, proceeded to 
rigidify the lines of cleavage between the white and non-white 
races resorting to further legal intervention. 77 The Prohibition 
of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949, the Population Registration Act of 
1950 and the Immorality Act not to mention the Group Areas Bill 
undertook to categorize and prevent mixing between biologically 
defined population groups. Afrikaner social engineers, 
furthermore, legislated the South African Citizenship Bill of 1949 
which restricted immigrant acquisition of citizenship making it 
more difficult and expensive to do so just as it had been in 
Kruger's Republic between 1890 and 1899. This, therefore, reversed 
the advantages previously enjoyed by British subjects over aliens 
so disenchanting English-speakers further. 78 
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However, while the Afrikaner Nationalists had political control, 
the British owned the diamond and gold mining industry, the latter 
serving as the fulcrum of South Africa's political economy. That 
is to say, South Africa's capitalist development has revolved 
around gold mining and was seen after 1910 as an appendage of 
Britain and the world economy. The struggle for control of the 
gold mines pitted English speaking mining magnates against the 
rising Afrikaans speaking petty bourgeoisie. Industrialization 
came to be more and more a function of the state as the Afrikaner 
political elite continued to threaten nationalising the gold mines 
so as to exact profits and subsidies with which to consolidate 
their control. State directed industrialization also managed to 
exact severe criticism from mine owners who lambasted the regime's 
increasingly protectionist policies. Most of the profits from gold 
mining, however, still went overseas and most of the huge mining 
corporations were London based. This prompted the Nationalist 
Party to launch an offensive against British capital dominance. 
Attempting to "restore the economic heart to its political body", 
the Nationalist capitalists made a takeover bid for Central Mining, 
a huge international group constituting the second largest holding 
in the South African mining industry. The bid was eventually 
defeated and the threat put down with British and American help. 
Nevertheless, in order to preserve British capital interests, 
prominent Afrikaner financiers were incorporated into the Chamber 
of Mines. 79 
Thus, one can say that O'Meara is not altogether mistaken when 
suggesting that apartheid is more than a policy to advance the 
interests of NP supporters but in fact secures the interests of the 
entire capita list class enabling all capitalists to intensify 
exploitation of African workers and so raise general rates of 
profits. 80 
Lipton succinctly outlines the effects of political apartheid upon 
the mining industry. After 1948, some mine owners supported the 
campaign against apartheid and even helped to foster the liberal 
PFP. Yet, most mine owners tacitly supported many racist policies 
and were not altogether out of step with the regime's repressive 
measures particularly with regard to black trade unions. Apartheid 
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measures which had a direct impact upon the industry were 
restrictions on mobility (influx control), the job colour bar and 
closed compounds. The mine owners were resistant to these measures 
in part, because they were deprived of additional labour to the 
benefit of agricultural farming sector. Thus, their need for 
compounds was closely connected to the existence of the job bar and 
dependence on foreign labour which in turn was a function of 
political preference for farmers. 81 
One can, therefore, note that while the Afrikaner political elite 
had attempted to make inroads into British capital, it had not 
carried out threatened nationalisation schemes opting instead to 
empower nationalist capitalists within the current framework. 
Furthermore, while state policies were frequently criticized by 
predominantly English capital, they were not resisted as such. 
Political apartheid was not economically neutral as it changed in 
accordance with the changing interest of the white oligarchy. 
English capital became dependent upon repressive legislation in 
response to state directed apartheid policies which garnered 
support for specific economic interests to the detriment of others. 
Therefore, state and capital were mutually interdependent, the 
former relying on the latter to create weal th with which to 
industrialize and diversify the economy in conjunction with the 
changing interest of the white oligarchy; Likewise, capital was 
somewhat dependent upon the state power structure which guaranteed 
a pool of cheap black labour and a decapitated black trade union 
movement. 
Yudelman discusses the relationship between state and capital with 
regard to resolving the tension between legitimation and 
accumulation. The state needed to legitimate itself vis a vis the 
white population by mobilizing political constituencies so as to 
gain minimal acceptability. Simultaneously, the state had to 
protect the accumulation process so as to ensure continued economic 
growth. Private enterprise would optimize the accumulation 
function while the state would perform the legitimation function. 
He refers to this relationship as a symbiotic one whereby state and 
capital are mutually reinforcing, not necessarily equal, and 
· susceptible to even radical changes within each and in the balance 
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of their relationship. As Yudelman states, " .... when a 
relationship between mining capital and the Afrikaner government 
was characterized by fairly regular public threats of 
nationalisation, particularly in the 1950's, a solid structural 
relationship of symbiosis between state and capital persisted. 1182 
To carry this argument further, it is clear that Afrikaner capital 
has been more politically significant in its efforts to achieve 
increasing prosperity amongst its ethnic brethren, the Afrikaners 
being the most important political constituency for the state. 
Conversely, English capital has been more significant economically, 
being larger and better placed on the international circuit. 
Therefore, while Afrikaner capitalists were more responsive to the 
state's legitimation imperatives, English capital was more so to 
the state's accumulation imperatives. Conflicting policy 
differences saw a greater toleration within Afrikaner capital for 
state intervention in the economy. 83 Conditions for the greater 
growth of Afrikaner capitalism had to be ensured. 
The Afrikaners' economic advance between 1939 and 1950 was most 
significant in trade and commerce where small English and Jewish 
shop-merchants were displaced from the rural areas. Furthermore, 
the political and educational advances amongst Afrikaners forced 
businesses to employ more of them. While the Reddingsdaadbond was 
unable to achieve its financial objectives and was subsequently 
abolished in 1946, the Afrikaner economic movement had succeeded in 
promoting Afrikaner enterprises not to mention the opportunities it 
created for an up-coming business elite. With state initiated 
corporations designed to improve secondary industry and the 
progressive Afrikanerisation of the expanding public sector, 
Afrikaners were able to make headway in narrowing the English-
Afrikaner gap although the former continued to occupy the higher 
categories.of employment influentially in the private sector. The 
strict enforcement of bilingualism in the public sector worked to 
the advantage of the Afrikaners as the English moved more and more 
to the private sector. From 1946 to 1973, the share of the private 
sector decreased from 63,5% to 53%. The increasing role of the 
state in the economy and the deliberate appointment by the 
government of Afrikaners reveals that the growth of state capital 
meant in essence the growth of Afrikaner capital. 84 
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Afrikaner economic advance in this period has been the result of 
ethnic mobilisation, political control (after 1948) and rapid 
economic development which benefited both English and Afrikaner 
businessmen alike. The relaxing influence of the Nationalist 
political victory and economic prosperity soon led to intergroup 
differences, growing extremism and exclusiveness. 85 Post-war 
developments were to re-focus attention upon racial consciousness 
and apartheid rather than Afrikaner exclusivism. H.F. Verwoerd, 
heralded by many as the architect of apartheid, was seen to have 
sacrificed the ideal of Afrikaner dominance to the exigencies of 
racial politics. 86 While the threat of anglicization had receded, 
Africans were growing increasingly important in a fast 
industrializing economy. Afrikaner nationalism was seen to be 
incompatible with the economic integration of the Africans. 
Furthermore, the growth of black nationalism prompted the 
nationalists to divide the African population along ethnic lines. 
Building upon the Lagden Commission, the Thomlinson Commission 
assessed the policy of "separate development" which had 
increasingly become a more humanistic euphemism for crude 
apartheid. Vigorous capitalist investments, mass removals and 
relocations were all to be part and parcel of a policy to stem 
growing African urbanization. The Native Areas would be 
rehabilitated and its social structure designed so as to conform 
with the particular native culture. Africans were to be migrant 
labourers in white South Africa just as the Gastarbeit in 
Germany.Eventually and ideally the African population in the white 
areas would decline and urbanisation would be reversed. The 
Bantustan System would sustain the population but in reality would 
serve as reserves of cheap black labour. Border industries were 
promoted so as to facilitate this arrangement. Verwoerd and Eiselen 
were the key proponents. 
It soon became clear to all that the predictions were but a 
laughing stock as South Africa moved towards a common social and 
economic order. Against a background of increasing tension which 
reached a climax at Sharpeville, Verwoerd pressed ahead submitting 
the republican issue to a referendum of white voters. 52,14% of 
the votes cast were favourable. The Union became the Republic of 
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South Africa on May 31st, 1961 ceasing to be a member of the 
British Commonweal th. 87 
In the years preceding the referendum, a rift between left wings 
and right wings within the National Party had become more evident. 
While liberals were easy targets for the right wing, simultaneously 
the seeds of non-racial ideas drew wider currency among middle and 
upper class Afrikaners. A number of Afrikaner intellectuals moved 
even further left of the UP and even Verwoerd had shifted to the 
left choosing not to flaunt racist policies as the NP had 
previously. Even a rift developed between the church and state to 
some extent. 88 
Munger interprets the referendum as a watershed in English-
Afrikaner relations. Afrikaner nationalism had mellowed making 
conciliatory gestures towards the English. The Afrikaner 
Broederbond promoted cultural and institutional ties with the 
English. 89 The growing business sophistication of the Afrikaners 
and the bringing in of English economists to government advisory 
positions marked the trend towards greater unity of the English 
economic elite and the Afrikaner political elite. The Afrikaners 
split as businessmen began to side with the English against pre-
industrial apartheid practices. The mutual inter-penetration 
between economic and political elites marked their convergence 
within a broader white meritocracy. 90 As Moodie states, the 
Republic seemed to herald a new Afrikaner-English rapprochement. 
Verwoerd realised that a narrow ethnic appeal was no longer 
appropriate. The winds of change were sweeping across the globe 
making the African a more imposing threat to the Afrikaners' 
survival. The sought after exclusive Afrikaner Republic would be 
supplanted by an exclusive white republic in which the English 
would be regarded as junior allies. White unity would only be 
achieved through a Republic thereby severing the British connection 
which had always divided the English from Afrikaans speakers. 
Many Afrikaners found it difficult if not impossible to mitigate 
that xenophobic introversion which had largely been responsible for 
their political success as a people. 91 Afrikaner nationalism could 
no longer flourish on exclusivism. The monolith had begun to 
crack. 
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French Canada: Nationalism, Ethnic Integration and Provincial 
Autonomy 1867-1960 
While the "compromise" of confederation had not been born from a 
bloody battlefield, it had given political legitimacy to and 
institutionally entrenched the persisting cultural division of 
labour. The Conquest and the continuing Imperial connection had 
made Anglophone economic domination a rigidity that could not 
easily be transformed. Mercantile capitalism had challenged the 
traditional, pre-capitalist, social structure of Quebec and the 
French Canadian nationalist notion of "La survi vance" embodied 
continual threats facing the Quebec national culture. This would 
take the form of infringements by the Federal and other Provincial 
Governments on the rights and privileges of French Canadians 
outside Quebec; The forces of industrialization would challenge 
traditional anti-materialism and the rural ideal. Furthermore, 
the participation of French Canadians in Imperial campaigns became 
an emotional issue as did the economic penetration of Quebec by 
foreign interests which resulted in the exclusion of the Quebecois 
from increasingly powerful economic institutions. French Canadian 
minority status had made it a culture under siege. 
Modernizationist trends, urbanization and industrialization would 
create structural changes thereby altering the nature and 
historical sequences of inter-group contact and consequent patterns 
of stratification and interaction between class and ethnicity. 
In spite of the fact that Montreal was the epicentre of financial 
and industrial power, French Canadian church education had 
encouraged the rejection of urban-capitalist endeavours and instead 
concentrated its efforts towards the legal and political realms. An 
1871 census showed that of the one million people in Quebec, 
approximately three-quarters were French Canadian. Furthermore, 
85% of the population were rural dwellers and most of those were 
Francophones. French Canadians were employed in poorly paid jobs 
in the English dominated cities. While most were on the farm, 
agricultural development was relatively insignificant in Quebec 
Province. 92 
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The family propriety system which had emerged by 1867 employed 
minimum labour from outside the family, domestic crafts continued 
to thrive, and mechanisation had not really taken hold. As Brady 
notes, "the habitants resemble [ d J a European peasantry in deep 
attachment to the soil, in loyalty to a traditional life, and in 
the simple but impressive cohesions of their parishes." While this 
rugged traditionalism remained, innovations were able to penetrate 
and gradually transform the agrarian system in Quebec. 93 Productive 
land was very small indeed and they were soon unable to support an 
expanding population. 
The Riel affair in Manitoba Province led to heightened ethnic 
tension and a political backlash in Quebec. Bishop Lafleche' s 
response was to compare the newly created Confederation to a house 
of cards awaiting collapse. Evoking nationalist appeals, Honore 
Mercier came to power in 1887 in Quebec, and his Parti National was 
ethnically based riding high on the coalition which the Riel crisis 
had forged between French Canadian Liberals and Conservatives. 94 
Perpetuating the agrarian calling of the French Canadian nation, 
Mercier created the Ministry of Agriculture and Colonization which 
encouraged high fertility rates by awarding plots of land to large 
families. Political corruption soon marked the end of the Parti 
National thus ushering the Conservatives back into power. Despite 
occasional impetuosity, Mercier had reaffirmed Quebec's French and 
Catholic tradition. He had been politically astute in channelling 
the deepest current of French Canadian national sentiment, and his 
eloquent appeals for French Canadian solidarity could be heard in 
his rallying cry "Let us cease our fratricidal strife and unite. 1195 
Mercier and his Parti National were significant to the development 
of French Canadian nationalism. Firstly, his objectives and his 
continued reference to "autonomy" envisioned the development of a 
French Canadian state on the banks of the st. Lawrence, with the 
French Canadians of Quebec reinforced by the exiled Franco-
Americans of New England. A separatist ethnic nationalism had been 
voiced. Secondly, it was to highlight two different concepts, that 
might be called the provincial and the national, or the French 
Canadian and the Canadian. These two ideas of nationalism would 
stand in opposition throughout the history of the French Canadians. 
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One attempted to bind together state and nation while the other 
wished to place state above nationalities. 
Counter-imposed on this dichotomy was the inter-play of two great 
opposing forces, those of Canadian nationalism and British 
imperialism. The ethnic division which flowed from the Riel affair 
and continuing bitter disputes surrounding the rights of the French 
language outside Quebec had the effect of aligning English 
Canadians primarily in the Imperialist camp and French Canadians 
largely in the Nationalist one. Yet in the post-confederation era, 
Canadian nationalism was more English in origin while French 
Canadians wavered between reliance on the British connection (as it 
provided a certain security to their minority group status) and an 
ethnic French Canadian nationalism which increasingly became 
provincial in focus.% 
The accession to power of Wilfred Laurier and his Liberal Party in 
the 1896 Federal election received overwhelming support by a margin 
of 3:1 in Quebec. Laurier was a parliamentarian who attempted to 
fuse liberal ideas with catholicism rather than stressing an 
unpopular securlarist and anti-catholic republicanism. 97 He was a 
Canadian nationalist in a single stream sense as Louis Botha had 
been in South Africa. While initially acknowledging the desired 
"inevitability" of cessation of relations with Britain "as the 
relations of colonies with the mother country do cease, by 
independence, just as a child becomes a man," he later moderated 
his position firmly stating that any such course of disengagements 
from the Empire would be folly and a crime. 98 Laurier set a pan-
Canadian idea against an autonomist and exclusively French Canadian 
concept of nationalism. 
Laurier's premiership (1896 - 1911) once again testified to the 
ability and right of French Canadian leadership in Canada. Yet one 
could better point to his democratic credentials rather than his 
French Canadian nationalist ones. His Canadianism encouraged 
political independence from clericalism, insisted on the state's 
autonomy within the empire, and envisioned the single stream 
progression of unified French and English Canadian. Advocating the 
end of rural isolationism, universal suffrage, the abolition of 
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feudalism, the separation of church and state, and French Canadian 
autonomy within the democratic Confederationist framework, Laurier 
and the young French Canadian democrats of the Dorion school were 
voicing the aspirations of the growing French Canadian industrial 
bourgeoisie. 99 
The political ramifications of this ensuing challenge were hard-
felt. The program of the democratic "Parti Rouge" liberals was a 
blatant attack on the clerical elite; The pillars of semi-feudal 
privilege with their strong support for English Canadian banks and 
railway power had to consolidate their rule and avert the 
disturbing effects of the democratic revolution. An 
Ul tramontanist revival which attempted to invoke papal intervention 
coupled with a fierce denouncement of "Catholic liberalism" as an 
"impious document" met a resounding defeat with the accession to 
power of the Liberals. The struggle for political independence 
from clerical control had gained much ground in spite of the 
controversy surrounding the issue of the Manitoba separate schools. 
The Provincial Liberal administration in that Province had passed 
an Act which abolished denominational control in education thereby 
doing away with French instruction in the schools of the French 
Canadian minority. Laurier, prior to his ascendancy to power, had 
called for negotiations with the Manitoba government, himself 
placing provincial autonomy above claims of clerical educational 
control. While upholding the right of French instruction in the 
spirit pledged at the time of Confederation, Laurier firmly 
rejected a clergy supported Conservative "remedial Bill" which 
aimed to nullify the Manitoba Act. The negotiated provision for 
religious instructions after school hours was met with furious 
criticism on the part of the clericals but the Liberal compromise 
and Laurier's "refusal to submit" had called forth a massive wave 
of French Canadian popular support . 100 
Despite gaining a majority of Canadian votes under the Liberal 
banner, Quebec nationalism remained conservative in essence. 
Conservative nationalism, as Dion points out, flourished in three 
different "cultural contexts". That is, it transgressed class 
divisions. It had held sway within the political culture of the 
higher elite who had supported its essential tenets, those being 
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Catholicism, Messianism, anti-liberalism, agrarianism and political 
autonomism. This had become intermingled with Anglo-cultural 
patterns. Conservative nationalism had also gained a strong 
foothold amongst the lower elite or men who were prominent 
regionally or locally. These included doctors, notaries, parish 
priests, college professors and many small businessmen. Most 
significantly, conservative nationalism had pervaded the political 
culture of the masses. Their basic training and socialisation had 
prepared them for simple lives as farmers, unskilled labourers, 
factory workers and craftsmen. Their lower socio-economic status 
and subservience had been ingrained at an early age. Thus, Dion 
entertains the notion that perhaps conservative nationalism, in 
upholding the status quo, had in fact been responsible for the 
survival of French Canada in spite of that survival involving the 
betrayal of the masses by the upper elites. Dion conclusively 
remarks that conservative nationalism had been consistently 
manipulated by both Federal and Provincial Governments, and 
although French Canadian leadership had consequently been forced to 
adjust to the institutions of Anglo-dominance (so limiting their. 
own historical contribution to any full test of conservative 
nationalism), former solidarities re-emerging could not be 
discounted in the future. 101 Thus, while liberal nationalism had 
made some headway, it was still to draw inspiration from the 
Christian and Catholic tradition and remain faithful to ideas of 
autonomism. 
The 1896 Federal Liberal electoral victory had challenged the 
church hegemony, yet the secularisation and de-ethnicization of 
Canadian politics became short-circuited by Federal immigration 
policies, the effects of industrialization, and imperial policy on 
the Quebec economy. 
Ryerson outlines the retardation of capitalist development in 
Quebec agriculture. He attributes this legacy of rural 
backwardness to persistent feudal relationships over three and a 
quarter centuries. Furthermore, this backwardness in agricultural 
development had hampered progress in the whole of French Canada and 
not merely in the rural milieu. Citing feudalist obstacles (which 
disrupts the social division of labour, commodity circulation and 
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"free" wage-labour) as hindering the development of industrial 
capitalism, Ryerson goes on to explain various legal obstacles 
preventing the "censitaire" from adapting to changing 
circumstances. 
The seigneurial concession-deeds prevented the censitaire from 
"selling marketable timber, sawing deals, or creating any 
industrial establishment." These restrictions were intended to 
keep the habitants tethered to the soil and confined to a backward 
agriculture. This agriculture in turn, itself constituted a major 
obstacle to the creation of a market for such industry as was able 
to develop. 102 
The problem is compounded when one notes that the primitive rural 
economy based on co-operative family labour was undergoing from 
generation to generation, a peculiar system of sub-division (as had 
been the case within the Afrikaner rural milieu). The rectangular 
seigneuries were sub-divided amongst the children of large families 
discouraging rotation of crops and making this form of land 
division uneconomical from a perspective of effort; it furthermore, 
hindered technical progress.Large families continued to be raised 
for the self-contained agrarian economy, and the clergy did its 
utmost to keep the population on the land so as to maintain their 
influence not to mention the tithe. The result was an increasing 
surplus population stranded on unproductive land with nowhere to 
go. Settlement outside the seigneuries had been restricted by the 
land monopoly and colonization of other parts were subject to 
strict clerical control. Soil in the north was inferior and 
farmers were often forced to supplement their produce with wage 
labour in the camps and mills. Urban industry had not yet received 
the financial impetus and so was incapable of absorbing the surplus 
of landless habitants. The crisis of feudal backwardness had 
spawned an immigrant French Canadian population in the United 
states estimated at roughly two million. It was not until the 
advent of large scale industrial expansion in the Twentieth Century 
that the task of absorbing the surplus landless French Canadians 
fell to English Canadian industrialism.=3 
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Brady comments on the rural-urban population movement which 
generally accompanies industrialism. While the urban population of 
Quebec had increased six-fold from 1881-1931, the rural population 
had remained stagnant. Urban industrialism had received a boost 
with the developments of hydro-power and metals. Structural 
changes contributed to the erosion of traditionalism, a declining 
birth-rate and adaptation to popular haQit and thought prevalent on 
the continent. It also disrupted the working of Canadian democracy 
by creating "urban masses responsive to nationalist as well as 
proletarian agitations. 11 = 4 
The depopulation of the rural areas concerned the clergy and petty 
bourgeoisie who viewed it as the erosion of their support base. The 
rural milieu was seen as the true nation and these classes 
disseminated "return to land" ideology citing it as the redemptive 
avenue for self-preservation. Colonization of the vast undeveloped 
regions of Quebec was encouraged by both French and English 
Canadian bourgeoisies. Business and government financing of such 
colonization projects and the creation of an infra-structure was 
motivated by self-enrichment irregardless of the non-viability of 
such reform initiatives.=5 
Vallieres describes how foreign American and British economic 
imperial interests were to buy up local businessmen and politicians 
and with complicity of the clergy and the press "lull the masses to 
sleep." The French Canadian petty bourgeoisie had developed rural 
trading centres and thousands of small family manufacturing 
enterprises had sprung up. These continued to be characterised by 
low wages in the guise of patriotism. Furthermore, imperialist and 
capitalist interests had bought up seigneuries and drove the 
farmers out. They proceeded to exploit the rich forest of Quebec 
for export and the textile industry for cheap labour. Thousands 
of these "colonists" became lumberjacks as lumbering and mining 
concessions were granted by the Provincial Government. Farmers 
sold their labour to lumber companies and the French Canadian 
peasants were characterized as "a people of hewers of wood and 
drawers of water." It appeared as though the proletarianization 
and urbanization of the French Canadians had become irreversible. 
While the clergy preached "buy at home" and "call of the race", 
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American and English imperial interests continue to vie for 
economic control and entrenchment of economic domination . 106 
Guindon argues that the impact of industrialisation on the rural 
society, rather than displacing traditional clerical elites, in 
fact contributed to their rejuvenation by providing structural 
relief. While "the structural pivot of power" shifted from the 
rural land-holding class towards the urban centres, the 
"structurally significant" group was not the urban workers but the 
new middle class. It was made up of salaried white-collar workers 
who staffed the developing bureaucracies of government, business 
and church; these individuals possessed no collective ideology. 
While profit-seeking capitalists facilitated change which gave a 
surplus population something to do, local power elites in exchange 
for undisrupted political power let the capitalists dictate the 
industrial guidelines (which shunned unionism). In turn, the new 
middle class engaged in operating the administrative revolution for 
the benefit of traditional elites. 
The clergy, fearfully drawing upon the European experience of 
crumbling bourgeois Catholic institutions and the consequent de-
Christianization of the masses, were psychologically prepared to 
ward off similar perils perceived to be embodied in 
industrialization. Aggressively embarking on an administrative 
revolution, it began rapidly building and investing in a variety 
of large scale institutions. They became "bureaucratic overlords" 
bent on establishing clerical bureaucracies within the world of 
business. Its growing para-religious institutional holdings were 
financed and supplemented with a privately operated taxation system 
and continuing weekly contributions from the "faithful". Its 
centralized administrative and financial holdings attested to the 
phenomenal growth of its bureaucracies, and the parishes became de 
facto administrative units accountable to the "corporation 
episcopale." The church, realising that it had to branch out and 
specialize to maintain its institutional roles began to open its 
own channels of social promotion. Industrialization had prompted 
an administrative revolution. 107 
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One may then conclude that the traditional power elite was forced 
to transform its institutions into large scale bureaucracies in 
order to service the needs and wield influence over the newly 
urbanized French Canadian population. This process was to spawn a 
new middle class acting as administrative agents within traditional 
institutions headed by the clerical elite. These institutions were 
also to undergo fundamental changes to meet the demographic needs 
of the urban population. The social hegemony of the church was no 
longer an adequate guarantee of national survival. Survival was 
now also dependent upon the emergence of a new national middle 
class which could act as episcopal agents for economic development. 
From the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie class came one Henri 
Bourassa, a deeply religious, idealistic and independent-minded 
individual who attempted to reconcile liberalism with 
Ultramontanism. Bourassa was very critical of party politics 
although he had campaigned for Mercier in 1887 and had supported 
Laurier at a later stage. Bourassa may be likened to General 
Hertzog in that they had both stressed Dominion autonomy while 
holding firm in their opposition to imperial consolidation. 
Bourassa was a Canadian nationalist who was anathema to an 
encroaching imperialist movement which was increasingly anti-
French. Heightened ethnic conflict had stimulated. a more enclosed 
group awareness in French Canada; Bourassa was at the forefront of 
this raised consciousness.ws 
The Boer War had marked the battleground between nationalism and 
imperialism and its symbolic implications were to have far reaching 
effects. Imperial encroachment had come head to head with an 
enclosed anti-colonial/anti-imperialist national resistance 
movement. Fragile nation-building had received a tumultuous blow 
as ethnic antagonism deepened the cleft between French and English 
Canadians. A request for a Canadian contingent to fight the Boers 
had sparked off a wave of British sentiment in Ontario while Quebec 
had remained unmoved. The independent "La Presse" had then 
articulated the deep held French Canadian attitude toward foreign 
wars stating: "We French Canadians belong to one country, Canada; 
Canada is for us the whole world; but the English Canadians have 
two countries one here and one across the sea". Attempting to 
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diffuse a sensitive situation, Laurier bowed to a compromise side 
stepping authorization of an official contingent while 
simultaneously undertaking to equip and transport up to 1000 
volunteers . 109 Bourassa' s consequent resignation from Liberal Party 
ranks and ensuing street fights between Anglophone and Francophone 
students in Montreal beckoned the question as to whether the people 
of Quebec had received due consideration. Laurier's response was 
telling:"My dear Henri, the Province of Quebec has no opinions, it 
has only sentiments. 11110 And he was not mistaken although he may 
have underestimated the political power that those nationalist 
sentiments were to wield. Attempting to convey his own personal 
sentiments on the South African war issue, Bourassa said in June 
1900, " ... as a representative of the French Canadians, remembering 
the past, remembering the nefarious policy that sent to the gallows 
free men asking for their countrymen the rights of British 
subjects, I protest against the same policy which today those who 
happen to be in power are trying to impose on South Africa." 
Bourassa's parliamentary speech had not provoked understanding nor 
· sensitivity; rather it was met with an arrogantly aggressive 
response as members of the House summoned applause for the Queen 
and then proceeded to sing "God Save the Queen." British fanaticism 
was prevalent in the press as well. Bourassa and French Canadians 
. in general were lambasted facing accusations of disloyalty and 
being parochial. 111 Bourassa began to take more solace in French 
Canadian customs and institutions. He had recognized the 
similarities between the French Canadians and the Boers. Both had 
had their culture trampled upon and were denied rights guaranteed 
to them in their Constitutions. Disillusionment with imperial 
policies prompted the founding of the Ligue Nationaliste. 
Unofficially headed by Bourassa, the group platform envisioned 
maximum autonomy for Canada inside the Empire and maximum autonomy 
for Quebec inside federal Canada. They demanded an independent 
immigration policy, independence in trade, the right to make 
bilateral commercial treaties, the right to representation at 
international congresses, and Canadian non-participation in 
imperial wars outside its borders. 112 
While the Ligue Nationaliste was essentially Canadian, expressing 
a nationalism which incorporated both English and French cultures 
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and languages in a staunch anti-imperialist union, it had little 
influence in English Canadian circles. Its newspaper, Le 
Nationaliste, further proved to be source of embarrassment for 
Laurier. Bourassa saw the anglicization of Laurier as a further 
indication of his acceptance of imperial Britain. Bourassa's dual 
stream approach moved him to warn against French Canadian contact 
with "English elements" in Parliament. He cited the dangers that 
would leave French Canadians paralysed by splitting them into 
contesting factions. He also fores aw their increasing isolation in 
opening themselves up to the racial hatreds of the English 
Canadians. 113 
1903 also marked the formation of another nationalist student 
group. "L'Association catholique de la jeunesse Canadienne 
fran9aise" (A.C.J .c.), under the guidance of the newly ordained 
Abbe Lionel Groulx. Groulx offered a nationalism that was "more 
Quebecois" and so differed to the "more Canadian" nationalism of 
Bourassa and his disciples. While Bourassa had stressed cultural 
duality he had scorned political separatism, his messianistic 
nationalism had perhaps excluded Quebec as "too small a stage for 
God's plan". Moniere further reasons that Bourassa had fallen prey 
to the retarding French Canadian complex of "hereditary 
powerlessness. " 114 Groulx diverged from Bourassa in that while the 
latter had attempted to keep language separate from faith, Groulx 
consciously strove toward the formulation of a nationalist doctrine 
which emphasized collective cultural homogeneity. The homogeneity 
of the French Canadian nation implied a classless society driven by 
catholicism and underpinned by culture, history, territory and 
race. His Ultramontanist outlook married nationalism with 
religion; and he saw language as the protector of the faith: "We 
have remained Catholic because we have remained French."115 
The A.C.J.C. called for "Piety, study and Action". This prompted 
public demonstrations, large scale nationalist action and a 
popularization of the historical destiny of the French Canadians in 
which figures such as Dollard, Papineau and Riel took their places 
as national heroes, defenders or martyrs. Although non-political 
in orientation, the political campaigns of Bourassa had inspired 
them to action. Many provincial leaders soon began 
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opportunistically siding themselves with the nationalists sensing 
their political muscle and hoping to use it against Laurier. 116 
One can acknowledge the significant contribution that Bourassa and 
his anti-imperial campaigns made if not to nationalism then to the 
1911 electoral defeat of Laurier. By opposing Dominion 
contributions to the imperial navy in 1910 to 1911 (as Hertzog had 
done in South Africa) and by asserting Dominion non-participation 
in imperial wars, nationalist leaders had capitalised on war-time 
sentiments so forging an alliance with the Federal Conservatives. 
While this golden alliance was soon forgotten by the new 
Government, the dethroning of the patriarch of Canadian liberalism 
marked an uncompromising nationalist exercise aimed at wielding 
political might within the imbalanced federal structure. The 
Nationalist Movement was a political organisation which Bourassa 
refused to organise into a viable third party in Quebec. He stated, 
"Canadian Nationalism is neither a party, a racial organisation nor 
a separatist movement. Its apparent weaknesses and real strength 
come largely from the fact that its leaders and the exponents of 
its principles have run all sorts of risks rather than let it 
become a mere political faction or the machine tool of existing 
parties. 11117 
World War I and the consequent conscription crisi~ further deepened 
the cleavages between the two ethnic fragments. English Canadian 
loyalty to the British Empire led them to impose compulsory 
military service upon the French Canadians who in turn did not feel 
that their interests were best served in this regard. George Grant 
was to point out that English speaking Canadians in not having had 
broken with their Western European origins demonstrated that they 
were perhaps more a colony than a nation. But he does acknowledge 
that there were important figures who believed in the British 
connection as a means of preserving religious, educational, 
political and social forms of living which distinguish Canada from 
the United States •118 Yet former Prime Minister Trudeau would 
readily admit that "the French Canadian denizens of a Quebec ghetto 
stripped of power by centralization were expected to recognise 
themselves in a national image which had hardly any French traits, 
and were asked to have the utmost confidence in a central state 
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where French Canada's influence was mainly measured by its (not 
inconsiderable) nuisance value. 11119 
Al though Trudeau's criticism was directed more at the trend towards 
centralisation which alienated French Canadians outside of Quebec 
than at all visions of Canadian Nationalism, he acknowledged that 
a Canadian Nationalism sporting Union Jacks, loading immigration 
laws in favour of The British Isles, and parading Royalty would 
never be able to provide the basis for a lasting consensus. This 
would prompt counter nationalist movements in Quebec, many of which 
would be separatist in orientation. 
Bonenfant argues that the people of Quebec were historically 
preoccupied with autonomy and were therefore prone to frustration 
and feeling helpless whenever they were marginalised in the 
functioning of the federal system. The formation of the Union 
government and the imposition of conscription in 1917 was one such 
instance. The official reaction in Quebec came to be expressed one 
year later in a motion presented to the Quebec Legislative Assembly 
by a Government supporter, J-N. Francoeur: 
"This house is of the opinion that the Province of Quebec 
would be ready to accept the dissolution of the federal pact 
of 1867, if, in the opinion of the other Provinces, Quebec is 
considered as an obstacle to the union, to the progress and to 
the developments of Canada. 11120 
Fran9ois-Albert Anger's article entitled, "Why We Shall Never 
Accept Conscription for Overseas Service" suggests that conflict 
arises when the basically uncommitted French Canadians are bullied 
by demanding, tactless and obtrusive English Canadians who are 
imperialist at heart in the sense of national defense or 
international relations. Many French Canadians wer,e, furthermore, 
of the opinion that the war was not really a fight for democracy or 
Christianity as it had been presented but was rather a conflict of 
imperial interests. Quite simply French Canadians were unwilling 
to play the imperialist game as it was felt to be contrary to the 
national interests of Canada. Besides they would never agree to be 
forced into compliance of this policy, which even if successful, 
would undoubtedly benefit English Canadians more so than the French 
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Canadians. Stopping short of painting French Canadians as 
isolationists, Anger reasons that "Our Freedom to develop according 
to our nature and in a way we ourselves determine" has been 
inhibited relative to the English Canadians. The French Canadians 
need focus their energies on the home front so as to guard against 
a numerically stronger and more powerful competitor who would not 
hesitate to exploit unprotected vulnerabilities. On the battle 
front, the "equality of sacrifice" demanded by conscription would, 
in light of English Canadian economic dominance and conversely 
French Canadian high fertility rates, mean a depletion of the 
latter fragment. 121 
The adoption of conscription in 1917 by the Union Government of 
Borden instilled fear within the hearts of the bourgeois 
nationalist leadership. Thus, when street fighting broke out the 
following year in Quebec City, the anti-imperialist movement of the 
French Canadians withered in the absence of firm leadership and 
organised support . 122 Venom-spitting English Canadian and French 
Canadian Press clashed over the conscription issue so popularising 
and magnifying ethnic antagonism. Within French Canada, the lower 
clergy situated in the country side parishes reflected the anti-war 
sentiments of the French Canadian masses so taking the lead in 
defiance of the pro-war city based upper clergy. Contravening the 
tenet of strict discipline embodied in the Church demonstrated the 
intensity and sincerity of their anti-war feelings. The ensuing 
sporadic violence, verbal and otherwise in Montreal ended with the 
arrest of four of the leaders. Arrested after a public meeting, 
Villeneuve had called for annexation or independence saying: "We 
have had enough of the Union Jack. 11123 
Although the Federal Government had consequently suspended habeas 
corpus and issued a decree for the immediate enlistment of all the 
rebels, Borden was somewhat conciliatory in conceding to the 
formation of an entirely French Canadian brigade. Approximately 
19 500 Canayens were persuaded or forced into joining while another 
18 827 managed to evade the draft. The end of the war in 1918 had 
seen 15 000 French Canadians having had fought at the front, 5000 
in the navy and 15 ooo still in training. 124 
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War and the conscription crisis had once again highlighted the 
problems of federal cohabitation for English and French Canadians 
just as it had between Afrikaner and English segments within the 
legislative Union. The squabbling of the period lent credibility to 
autonomous and even separatist options in Quebec. A new 
nationalism emerged out of the rubble of attacks upon the French 
language in 1905 and 1912. L'Action frangaise was its chief organ 
and under the editorship of Omer Heroux, the new magazine was 
launched by the "Ligue des Droi ts de Frangais." The growth in 
Quebec of a narrow nationalism which was increasingly economic 
rather than political was evident as members of this group 
committed themselves "to use French in business relations, even 
with English firms and to give preference to firms which recognise 
the rights of the French language. 11125 
The movement had its foundations in the A.C.J.C. movement and soon 
Abbe Groulx supplanted Heroux as editor of L'Action frangaise. Like 
Hertzog who had fallen prey to the more republicanist sectional 
nationalism of the Malanites so it was with Bourassa. His Canadian 
nationalism was also to be eclipsed py a narrower variant which 
sought to divide French Canadians from the English Canadians. 
Groulx led the attack building upon the provocative article, the 
Jesuit Pere Louis Lalande's "La revanche des bergeaux" (Revenge of 
the Cradles). Its tone was one of vengeance vowing that the French 
Canadians would retaliate from their oppressed and inferior 
position in that period by their eventual numerical dominance in 
Canada due to their higher birth rate. The "revenge of the cradle" 
idea armed English Canadian racists whose paranoia envisioned an 
expansionist and cancerous French Canadian entity overflowing in 
all directions to gain dominance in Eastern Canada. L' Action 
frangaise's publication in 1920 of Emile Bruesi's "Si la 
Confederation disparaissait" which spoke of an Eastern Canadian 
republic in which Quebec dominated did not alleviate racist fears. 
Groulx's nationalism had been influenced by the doctrines of 19th 
century French racist, the Comte de Gobineau; Groulx was also 
greatly influenced and incorporated many of the ideas of anti-
democratic, romantic nationalist literature. His nationalism was 
founded upon "a cult of the homeland and of the French language, 
folk hero worship, Catholicism as a national unifying force, a 
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tendency towards Caesarism or monarchism, and corporatism." An 
emphasis upon history was a crucial element. 126 
The anti-imperialist struggle had diverted French Canadian 
attention from the changing nature of society and the problems 
arising from urbanisation and industrialisation. The proportion of 
French Canadians in the cities was increasing rapidly from 12% 
(1825) to 23% (1871) to 48% (1911) and 60% {1921). The 
proletarianisation of the French Canadians had inadvertently 
created a situation in which rural farm life was passing out of the 
realm of fact to that of myth. The habitant became an unskilled 
worker in the cities. This once semi-autonomous producer lived in 
dwellings he did not own and found himself subjected to the 
conditions of constant competition that tended to lower his worth. 
His psychological make-up was to undergo a transformation as 
community homogeneity dissolved away in proportion to the 
increasingly weakened influence exercised by the parishes. The 
erosion of the family unit, inadequate housing, lax urban morals 
and no technical instruction placed the newcomer at the mercy of a 
powerful capi talism. 127 
The post-war economic consciousness of French Canadians was still 
only partially developed; rapid industrialisation marked by the 
construction of hydro-electric plants, mines and pulp and paper 
mills revealed the economic weakness of the French fragment as 
British and American capital flooded into the Province. Not only 
did the French Canadians lack the technical expertise and the 
required teams of capitalists and scientists to facilitate their 
playing an active part in such development but "lack of initiative, 
narrow individualism, a preference for strictly safe investments, 
an aversion to long-term planning, along with love of routine and 
extravagant taste, were the typical characteristics of most of 
[their] business executives.""8 
The economy of Quebec was for the most part controlled by English 
Canadians and Americans further advancing the image of the Province 
as an economic satellite. The laissez-faire orientation of the 
Quebec Government did not discourage this trend. With the 
challenge of modernization, the inability of French Canadians to 
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exercise control over their economy meant they would not possess 
the means to secure their cultural autonomy. Perhaps attributable 
to agrarianist unenterprising clerical education and the stigma 
attached to the vagaries of urban materialism and big business, 
French Canadians were not quick to "exchange the security of the 
liberal professions and public administration for the alien and 
socially intimidating world of big business." Even if they had 
wished to venture out into the entrepreneurial Anglo-Saxon world, 
they lacked both the technical expertise and capital necessary to 
compete with the wealthier and more powerful American and English 
Canadian interests . 129 As Patterson had rightfully acknowledged 
with regard to both Boer and French Canadian, each had respectively 
been locked out of the new urban environment of commerce and 
industry so realising that only through political action could they 
regain their independence. Stripped of their land by 
circumstances, politics and public service provided an alternative 
way of life for young French Canadians."0 The traditional French 
Canadian way of life had been severely upset by the great 
Industrial Revolution. 
French Canadians soon came to deplore the system introduced and 
controlled by an alien population. The economic invasion produced 
an economic nationalism with the nationalist press as the vanguard. 
The press protested against "foreign exploitation of our natural 
resources" and conversely agitated in favour of home grown French 
Canadian business and industry. Traditional hatred of English 
Canadians peaked and a new anti-Americanism took root. The ethnic 
division between capital and labour was heightened prompting the 
new economic nationalists to form "exclusively French Canadian 
labour unions, credit unions, farmers and fisherman's co-
operatives," and other such efforts to promote provincial economic 
self-sufficiency."1 
While there is an automatic inclination to analogise the down-
troddeness of both Afrikaner and French Canadian segment 
populations, there are those who would be quick to point out the 
discrepancies. A Marxist would most probably consider such a 
comparison ironic and would more likely be inclined to focus upon 
the proletarianisation of the African population rather than the 
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increasingly dominant Afrikaner segment. Even one-time 
insurrectionary Pierre Vallieres would toe this line as evidenced 
in his work entitled "White Niggers of America" decrying the 
"colonial" third world status of the French Canadians. It is 
however problematic to conflate ethnic nationalism with its 
powerful anti-imperialist element and the third world variant of 
nation building. The overlap though is interesting and 
enlightening. While it has been argued that positions of economic 
and socio-political inequality and inferiority have somewhat 
similarly affected and contributed to the evolving nationalism of 
both Afrikaner and French Canadian, one need be sensitive to the 
plight of the oppressed African population in the Union as it bears 
upon the changing shape of Afrikaner nationalism. While it is true 
that Quebec's determination to end English domination over the 
economy of the Province had been unconsciously fuelled by the 
American example of Africans rebelling against their economic 
conditions, the French were hesitant to accept a vision of 
themselves as "les negres blancs d'Amerique" and did not wish t9 
equate their status with Africans, Puerto Ricans, or women. 
McLeod Arnopolous and Clift give air to the sentiment by suggesting 
that in spite of the temptation to adopt affirmative action 
legislation, successive Quebec governments have opted for 
francization programmes in business and restriction of access to 
English schools. Al though both ethnic segments had to contend with 
the image of being likened to an oppressed African population with 
all its racial baggage, this image was grounded in the realities of 
a racially diverse economic realm which characterised the Union. 
While the French Canadian occupied the lower ranks of a bi-class 
structure as a somewhat homogeneous ethnic entity, the Afrikaner 
found himself spread thin in a sandwich between English capital and 
African workers. Thus, unlike the French Canadians, the Afrikaners 
found themselves embattled on two fronts and their continuing 
struggle to prevent miscegenation exacerbated their racial 
consciousness and intensified their enclosure. 
The marginalisation in nationalist academia of contributions made 
to the furtherment of nationalism by secret societies in Quebec 
reflects their limited role. One cannot compare the tentacled 
pervasiveness of the Afrikaner Broederbond within the Union to the 
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more limited influence of the secret "Order of Jacques Cartier". 
Perhaps their differential effectiveness need not reflect successes 
or failures of organisational structure as much as the necessity of 
each society for such a covert network to promote nationalism in 
the social, political and economic realm. It might be argued that 
the more homogeneous nature of the French Canadian segment and the 
more inclusive and conciliatory tone of Confederation made 
recruitment to the ranks of a secret nationalist fraternity less 
appealing. One could likewise reason that the Confederationist 
"pact" between the two founding nations had off-set nationalist 
sentiment to some degree especially in the light of the growing 
tendency towards Quebec Provincialism and the majoritarian security 
attached to it. No matter which way you look at it, secret 
societies existed within both societies and their nationalist 
programmes, while surrounded in controversy, did anything but 
shrivel with impotence. 
The secret Order of Jacques Cartier was no exception. Founded in 
1928 and head-quartered in Ottawa, this hierarchically organised 
society had been given full endorsement from the Church •132 Its 
strategy was to infiltrate most influential decision-making bodies 
within the Province so as to create greater employment for French 
Canadians in the public service. It also set out to restrain 
foreign investments in "local" trade and was staunchly anti-semitic 
in this regard. By destroying Jewish small businesses which had 
sprung up throughout the Provinces, the Order hoped to return small 
business to the French Canadian domain "where it belonged. 11133 The 
thirties movement "Achat chez-nous" (buy at home) was initiated by 
the Order. 
The arm of the O.J.C. extended to politics, government, nearly all 
the st. Jean Baptiste societies, Catholic syndicates, city school 
commissions, municipal councils, and junior boards of trade. The 
secret society was furthermore not without its media organs. La 
Boussole was its open organ while l'Emerillon was its secret 
publication. The secret Order envisioned as its final goal an 
independent French and Catholic state."' 
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Milner and Milner (1973; 159-160) in their discussion on O.J.C. 
recruitment signify that society membership only consisted of 
middle-class men in positions of influence. Thus, while it is 
difficult to estimate the effectiveness of the O.J.C., membership 
estimates of 11000 and 18000 in the thirties and forties 
respectively and l'Emerillon's recognition of 30 ooo members in 
1956 is significant "given the class nature of its membership and 
its stringent recruitment policy." 
The influence wielded by the o. J. c. would frequently come into 
question. Public debate surrounded a blistering attack unleashed by 
one provincial Liberal Party Senator T. D. Bouchard against the 
organisation. His scathing attack painted the o. J. c. to be a 
fascist inclined nationalist society bent on exploiting the 
divisive national situation for its own ends. This implied the 
eventual disbandonment of Confederation and a reversion to a view 
in which nation-states exclusively hostile to one another would 
supplant the fragile expanded plural and multicultural "nation". 
Bouchard cited the Bloc Populaire as "The open political tool of 
the Jacques Cartier Order. n1.35 While Bouchard had not minced words 
in articulating his political slant, the intensity of the protest 
generated and his subsequent dismissal could well demonstrate the 
near-accuracy of his accusations. 
The resurgence of French Canadian nationalism after a brief period 
of relative decline surrounding divisive separatist proponents and 
the formation of the British Commonweal th came on the heels of 
economic turmoil. The 1930 Depression was to refocus attention 
upon the uneven development between French and English Canada. The 
lower standard of living in Quebec afforded it less of a margin for 
subsistence and thus made the intensity of economic woes much more 
hard-felt there relative to its neighbouring provinces. 
Corporatism was put forth as a viable economic alternative to 
laissez-faire capitalism, which was interpreted by nationalist 
critics particularly during the Depression, as being responsible 
for social anarchy not to mention moral decadence. Business was 
frowned upon as an alien venture bent on the destruction of French 
Canadian society while some reformists stressed agriculturalism, 
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others endorsed the co-operative movement and called for a "Buy 
Quebec" policy in support of local Quebecois businessmen. These 
proponents desired the preservation of French Canada's agricultural 
vocation while simultaneously planning its entry into the stream of 
industrialisation. This would appease the Church by ensuring the 
place of religious power in Quebec society. Furthermore, the 
petty bourgeoisie could hope to retain political power in the sense 
that the state would be required to exercise control in the 
economic sphere restricting the power of monopolies and putting a 
stop to immigration. 1.36 
Among the proponents of economic nationalism were Asselin, 
Montpetit and Edras Minville. They envisioned an economy in which 
industrialisation would proceed as a function of agricultural 
growth. Through the control of natural resources, economic 
solidarity for French Canadians, improving management education, 
capital accumulation in family businesses and co-operatives, and of 
course, support for the farmers, industrialisation could be taken 
to the rural areas. Efforts would be concentrated on the 
upliftment of the French Canadian lower middle and middle class as 
well as minimizing greater dependence upon Anglo-American capital. 
The shortage of capital and credit sources amongst French Canadians 
made it virtually impossible for them to compete with outside 
capitalists. co-operativism emerged as an attempt to merge within 
the capitalist system for the economic liberation of French Canada. 
Savings Banks or Credit unions marked the movement of "Caisses 
Populaires" (not unlike Volkskas). This co-operative was parish 
based and provided low interest loans to members consisting 
primarily of farmers and small businessmen. Other co-operatives 
cropped up with Church influence and guardianship. L'Ordre Jacques 
Cartier was instrumental in setting up the farmers co-operative.1.37 
Christian morality and the social doctrine of the Church attempted 
to engender French Canadians as to the virtue of savings and 
sacrifice. The national goals of the co-operative movement were 
that through capital accumulation and the development of an 
administration and financial elite, the "caisses" could supply 
French Canadians with the means to economic emancipation so 
promoting national survival. 1.3 s 
150 
Minville, in his discussion on corporatism and national concerns, 
proposes a programme combining national education and social 
education whereby destructive individualism would give way to 
organisations which recognise ethnic and cultural particularities. 
Powerful business interests would be regulated by political 
authorities mandated by the majority. The corporative re-
organisation of society would involve transforming the agricultural 
population, the working class, professional associations and trade 
unions into corporations. Rural based small businesses, small and 
middle-sized urban industries, the liberal professions and 
considerable rural and even urban land-holdings were in the French 
Canadian domain and many pre-corporative organisations (ie. College 
of Physicians, the Bar, Farmers' associations, trade unions) 
already existed in the Province so facilitating the incorporation 
of corporatism.=9 Societies would comprise professional bodies or 
guilds rather than classes perpetually in conflict. One would be 
defined and grouped not according to his/her position in the labour 
market but according to his/her social activity. The Jesuit "Ecole 
Sociale Populaire" attempted to fuse Church and corporatist 
doctrines, stressing the organic national character and the 
integration of individuals into guilds. Corporatism criticised the 
centralising tendency of the state as well as urbanisation which 
was the product of outside economic interests. 140 The Ecole Sociale 
Populaire were to present a "programme of social restoration" in 
which corporative institutions figured prominently. This project 
was intended to counter-act political theories being then put 
forward by Social Reconstructionists. 141 
Corporatism as an ideology had few tangible results. The anti-
statist ruling ideology prevented a movement towards a stronger 
government with regard to economic difficulties. Corp9rate 
political power, arguably never envisioned, was limited by a degree 
of political pluralism within the corporate community. Thus, one 
may argue that a monolithic business political force was unable to 
develop in light of the differences in values of the corporate 
elite. This guaranteed the existence of pluralism within the 
economic system. 142 Corporatism was however able to impede the 
development of class consciousness by sabotaging the work of labour 
unions. It furthermore, heightened opposition towards foreign 
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enterprises, and its organic theory which connected society and 
nation reasserted a sense of national consciousness and self-
preservation .143 
It is poignant to note that although Quebec and its intelligentsia 
had clung to agrarian traditional values in the face of industrial 
development, this "submersion of the real world in a dominant 
ideological stream" did not prevent the emergence of a social 
awareness reflecting the real exigencies and structural changes 
then taking place. Yet socialism remained marginalised failing to 
attract and co-opt petty bourgeoisie elements. Nevertheless, an 
authentic working class consciousness had taken root ever so 
slightly. Catholic unionism was aimed at countering the dangerous 
influence exerted by neutral unions affiliated with United States 
based internationals: 
"T~e C.T.C.C. (Conf~d~ration des travailleurs catholiques du 
Canada) expressed a largely negative, anti-socialist, anti-
communist, anti-international, anti-American, anti-English, 
anti-Protestant, and anti-foreign-capital point of view. In a 
positive sense, the C.T.c.c. supported the nationalist ideas 
of the time: Corporativism, the return to land, and provincial 
autonomy. 11144 
The Church (using the same logic which had prompted the creation of 
exclusive C.N. Unions) saw the advent of unions as a means for 
slowing down the advance of socialism, recognising the right to 
unionise if unions be guided by principles of Christian morality 
and faith. The Church of Quebec furthermore, prescribed a 
complementary non-hostile relationship between capital and labour. 
The c.T.c.c. not only emphasised its Catholic nature but also its 
national one. That is the C.T.C.C. proclaimed the necessity for 
Canadian organised labour to remain independent from its American 
counter-parts in light of differences in laws, customs, attitudes 
and related problems. Thus unions were to resist the presence of 
foreigners rather than the capitalist system so as to remain in 
line with the "genius of their own race." The Catholic labour 
movement was then an anti-revolutionary one headed by a clerical 
bourgeoisie elite rather than a movement generated by aware members 
of the Quebec working class. As Moniere sums up, "··· the Church 
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social doctrine that lay behind the movement was a hoax: its 
picture of the world was the opposite of reality. It presented an 
upside down uni verse as the truth. Here was ideological alienation 
pushed to the limit. 11145 
The Depression exacerbated a situation in which class distinctions 
were super-imposed by ethnic ones. The class-struggle became a 
French-English one in which the former's precarious economic 
situation made it the worst hit. The Depression, furthermore gave 
rise to a number of nationalist political organisation hoping to 
capitalise on the sagging political fortunes and economic woes of 
the Taschereau Government. 
The Depression had paralysed Quebec as 394 American companies were 
forced to lay off Quebecois workers. The year 1932 saw a 
staggering unemployment rate reaching 30%. The previous year 
witnessed 20% unemployment of unionised workers alone. This 
prompted the government to again propose a "back to farm" scheme to 
alleviate this problem. Disgusted with the corruption of the 
Taschereau government, Paul Gouin founded l'Action liberale 
nationale stressing the economic and social emancipation of Quebec. 
Conservative Party leader Maurice Duplessis forged an alliance with 
Gouin hoping to defeat the Liberals in the 1935 election. 
Taschereau, however, managed to preserve his power with a weakened 
majority. The Gouin and Duplessis alliance broke down with the 
latter exploiting the situation to attract most of Gouin's 
supporters. Rebaptising his party the Union Nationale, Duplessis 
was victorious one year later as elections were called in response 
to a corruption scandal. Foregoing nationalisation policies in 
favour of private enterprise, Duplessis endorsed the Padlock Law 
(1937) outlawing insurrectionaries. A Communist paper was closed 
down while the Christian National Socialist Party, a fascist 
organization commandeered by Adrien Arcand, was left unrestricted. 
Lionel Groulx's Action Fran9aise was revitalized working closely 
with "Les Jeunes Patriotes" a right wing nationalist movement of 
university students who demanded provincial control over industry 
and a proportionate share of federal jobs for Francophones. 
"Jewish liberalism" felt the brunt of their attacks. Vague 
allusions to separatism were made and they urged the adoption of 
the Carillon flag . 146 
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The Canadian government declaration of war on Nazi Germany in 1939 
once again set off the sparks of ethnic tension in Quebec. While 
the majority of Quebecois were not opposed to military service in 
defence of their country, they strongly resisted pressures towards 
conscription in service of imperial interests. In 1942 Plebiscite 
for conscription met a resounding "no" vote in Quebec. The 71,2% 
response was actually 85% if the English factor be discounted. The 
disaster at Dieppe in which 6100 soldiers were slaughtered at the 
French coast by the Germans merely contributed to popular 
impressions of the colonised serving as cannon fodder for 
imperialism. Of the 4963 Canadians who fought there, only 2211 
survived the ordeal. 147 
World War II marked the economic revitalisation of Quebec as 120000 
French Canadians managed to escape unemployment through the armed 
forces. The Quebec interior also opened up as its resources were 
exploited to finance the industrial boom in war production so 
creating an expansion in secondary and tertiary activities. 148 
Quebec, however, continued to play the role of an occupied country 
not only with regard to its deepening economic dependence upon the 
United states but also as a result of a federal plebescite which 
predictably came out in favour of conscription. Quebec 
nationalists under the spokesmanship of Maxime Raymond had proved 
successful in mobilising the Francophone masses against 
conscription. Ironically attempting to mobilise Canadian 
nationalism in the Bourassian sense, George Pelletier and Andre 
Laurendeau organised the League for the Defence of Canada 
campaigning for the "no" vote and asking Canadians to "put country 
ahead of race. 11149 Lambasting ethnicity certainly appealed to 
French Canadian nationalists. Separatist platforms again gained 
strength on the heels of anti-conscriptionism. 
With the Canadian majority voting in favour of overseas service, 
resistance now meant desertion and demonstration. Prime Minister 
McKenzie King's endorsement of a Bill calling for limited 
conscription induced demonstrations in which 2000 people raced 
through the financial district smashing windows of the Bank of 
Montreal. In Chicoutimi and Rimouski~ union jacks were burned to 
the ground. 150 Once again French Canadian bitterness and resistance 
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although mild in comparison to the first conscription crisis came 
to be interpreted by English Canadians as a testament to and 
affirmation of the French Canadian traitor's heart. French 
Canada's military record was cited as evidence. It showed that 
Quebec had the lowest rate of volunteering and that Quebec's 
military districts had the greatest number of deserters together 
numbering 11513 out of a total of 18943 for all of Canada . 151 
While separatism had not yet received its popular calling, 
Provincial autonomy had in response to resurgent war feverous 
British loyalism. French Canadian nationalist leaders, while not 
sharing an ancestral brotherhood with Germany as did the 
Afrikaners, were not immune nor unreceptive to the influence of 
fascism and national socialist doctrine. 
Vallieres ( 1971: 40) attributes the "exacerbated nationalism" of 
Bourassa a:hd Groulx as stemming from their sympathies with Hitler, 
Mussolini, anti-semites and racists. The anti-conscriptionist, 
corporatist, Bloc Populaire viewed socialism as an international 
conspiracy against the people of Quebec. The virulent resurgency 
of anti-semitism and the scapegoating of Jews in French Canada may 
be explained as an ideological reflex to power and class structures 
in which French Canadians were dominated. The consequent French 
Canadian inferiority complex was not directed at the real causes of 
their situation but rather at a weaker group, the Jews, who were 
simultaneously the object of envy for having survived and prospered 
through solidarity. Stereotypical accusations levelled against Jews 
reflected deeply ingrained anti-semitic currents within both French 
Canadian and Afrikaner societies, ironic when noting that both 
ethnic groups had adapted their respective historical mythologies 
to the tenets of the Old Testament. Jews were portrayed as 
permanent conspirators, anti-nationalists for not assimilating and 
responsible for the death of Christ. Their economic 
"appropriation" of a considerable portion of the economy's vitality 
and wealth complemented the ominous accusation that Jews were bent 
on ruling the world and destroying Christian society . 152 Jews were 
vilified and their businesses targeted. Yet according to Bergeron 
(1971: 185) it was in reality English and American interests which 
sought to attach a fascist stigma on to Quebec by playing off Jews 
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versus French Canadians. One cannot, however, contest the Bloc 
Populaire's flirtation with national socialism as determined by its 
state-centric programme favouring the nationalisation of resources. 
Sympathetic tendencies towards fascist syndicalism fired by 
opposition to Britain's imperial war and the conscription issue 
attest to this claim . 153 
Ryerson is much more assertive in his depiction of the Bloc 
Populaire and the Union Nationale as part and parcel of the 
"Fascist Fifth Column. 11154 He speaks of a "coalition" of all the 
fascists and semi-fascists organisations in Quebec which had 
crystallised around the conservative Union Nationale. Prominent 
amongst them was the National Socialist Party of Adrien Arcand 
linked directly with Berlin. Arcand furthermore acted as publicity 
chief for the Duplessis administration editing the government 
organ, L'Illustration. Linked closely with Italian fascist 
organisations were a number of separatists and clericalist youth 
movements including the Party Autonomiste, the Jeunesse Patriotes, 
Jeunes Canada and Jeunesses Laurentiennes. A number of these had 
also had ties with various fascist elements within the leadership 
of popular Church youth organisations. 155 
Discussing the character of Quebec fascism, Ryerson distinguishes 
between four central components contributing to Duplessis's 
accession to power. The first, he calls "reactionary Big-Business 
circles" who contributed financially to Union Nationale electoral 
drives and supported politically conservative organisations through 
the press (particularly the Montreal Gazette). The second, he 
attributes to political clericalism bent on strengthening the 
fusion of Church and state in Quebec by way of a conservative 
nationalist revival. Such elements viewed corporatism as a bulwark 
against the growth of radicalist and progressive trends among the 
French Canadian masses. The third he describes as "a foreign 
fascist network, centred in Berlin and Rome" attempting to exploit 
national friction so as to establish a base of operation in its 
fight against democracy. The last component centres around French 
Canadian petty bourgeoisie nationalism which had rejected a 
democratic alliance with labour. It consequently became co-opted 
by reactionary class forces and the interests of monopoly and all 
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its agencies. The fascist ideology had been buttressed and 
similarly defined by sympathy toward the Axis powers, "pathological 
hatred of the Soviet Union, Loyalist Spain, France of the People's 
Front; anti-English Canadian, anti-semitic chauvinist nationalism 
... [which had] all entered into the theory and practice of the 
Union Nationale coalition. 11156 
The Quebec variant, however, found it necessary to irtcorporate the 
traditionalism of Quebec life so as to pacify the masses into 
accepting "their peasant destiny" while halting the development of 
a post-industrial social consciousness. Middle class complacency 
had been bought with promises of power in a future national state. 
A leadership cult was to ensure this. An ethnic capitalism aimed 
at dislodging "foreigners" from influential posts by investing 
capital and directing purchasing power toward French Canadian 
enterprises exclusively complemented and utilised an hysterical 
anti-semitism. The Union Nationale clamped down on civil liberties 
and labour rights under the banner of anti-Communism. The Padlock 
Law empowered the regime in its curtailment of individual 
liberties, search and seizures, house raids and book-burnings. 
Storm troop detachments were trained and prepared for an assault 
upon Canadian democracy . 157 These included various separatist-
fascist groups such as the Greyshirts. 
Furthermore, Duplessis used "anti-Communism" as a cloak to artfully 
enact legislation aimed at breaking the neck of labour with the 
eventual elimination of trade unions and the entrenchment of low 
wage levels for workers. Bill 19 and 20 provided for the 
imposition of wage decrees as well as the virtual annulment of any 
collective agreements. Yet resurgent democratic, anti-Duplessis 
sentiment and the consolidation of various trade union movements 
coupled with the outbreak of the war lent to the defeat of the 
Union Nationale administration in 1939 and the consequent 
disruption of the fascist offensive in Quebec. The capitalist 
class, realising that ultimately their survival was at stake, chose 
to support the war effort so withdrawing financial backing 
previously aligned to "the fascists". Furthermore, Church 
spokesman Cardinal Villeneuve also put his lot behind the war . 158 
The Cardinal's decision had probably come as quite a surprise to 
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many Protestants, who previously, at a time when relations between 
England and Italy had been strained not to mention on-going 
separatist activities in the Province, had frantically seen the 
beginning of a Church-State. Cardinal Villeneuve himself had been 
opened to the accusation of favouring a fascist form of government 
two years earlier when he declared his support for "full 
corporatism. 11159 In retrospect the volatile political environment 
had lent itself to misconceptions. 
Despite a setback, Duplessis and his Union Nationale were not to be 
outmanoeuvred by the opposition. Focusing primarily on the vote-
loaded rural districts, his opposition to conscription, and 
criticising the provincial Liberals under Godbout for nationalising 
Montreal Light, Heat and Power led to a resurgence of traditional 
nationalist sentiment and the re-inauguration of the Duplessis 
regime. Duplessis followed the trend of consecutive Quebec 
provincial governments, retaining a relatively passive character 
and refusing to regulate the behaviour of private corporate 
interests. One major exception was with regard to unions of which 
the government attempted to stifle their independent action. 
Government lacklustre rested on the premise that economic 
initiatives were the responsibility of private corporations. This 
attitude was not much different with regard to education, health 
and welfare services in which clerical control remained 
unchallenged. Coupled with a relatively small and poorly developed 
bureaucracy, the Union Nationale government had merely retrenched 
and reinforced the ethnic di vision of labour and the stunted 
political development of Quebec province. Nationalist leaders 
chose not to focus upon the economic well-being of French Canadians 
in the urban areas but rather remained complacent in their 
continued reliance upon autonomous traditional French Canadian 
institutions . 160 Not all nationalist organisations, however, 
remained closed to the idea of using the state to deal with socio-
economic difficulties in the urban areas. Among them, already 
noted, was the Bloc Populaire and L'Action liberale nationale who 
to varying degrees advocated increased state intervention in the 
economy. Yet it soon became clear at that stage that only a 
minority of the French Canadian intelligentsia supported programs 
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of state intervention. According to Posgate however, French 
Canadians remained attached to the traditional belief system upon 
which New France was founded as they lacked the cultural resources 
necessary to develop new models of the French Canadian nation. 
Furthermore, they were isolated by the Conquest from ideological 
development in France •161 
Brunet reasons that in fact traditional ideology was not the result 
of a fragmented culture but was a direct consequence of the 
Conquest. He argues that agrarianism served to compensate French 
Canadians for their inability to succeed economically as a result 
of economic domination by the British. French Canadians were forced 
to seek refuge in an agrarianist mythology and so succumbed to 
clerical anti-etatisme . 162 
Duplessis' bases of electoral support comprised of small 
businessmen and farmers. Rural dwellers benefitted from Union 
Nationale policies which offered easier credit systems, rural 
infra-structure and the apportioning of new settlement areas. His 
agrarian reforms, furthermore, greatly pleased the Church 
hierarchy. Duplessis demanded respect for his power. With regard 
to the English economic elite, its job was to develop the province 
and create employment. The traditional elite saw the world of big 
business as being the exclusive domain of the Protestant 
industrialists. They were, therefore ( aided by the language 
barrier which gave them a virtual monopoly on the flow of ideas and 
information within the Francophone community) able to create an 
ideological barrier between the masses and the foreign economic 
elite . 163 
The Union Nationale had cultivated a network of patron-client 
relations in rural Quebec, which was grossly over-represented as 
compared to the cities. surprisingly, the party was also able to 
attract the support of urban French Canadian ridings. The working 
class French Canadians, despite Duplessis' opposition and hostility 
to unions, voted for the Union Nationale seemingly against their 
own interests. This may be explained in part as that French 
Canadians shared nationalist suspicions of the federal government. 
Furthermore, Maurice Duplessis concocted an image of himself as 
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being a man close to the people. Again various issues namely 
conscription and provincial autonomy to varying degrees succeeded 
in politicising urban dwellers along ethnic lines . 164 Thus, 
Duplessis' electoral advantage came with his ability to politicize 
class divisions among urban French Canadians while maintaining a 
solid base among rural French Canadians. 
The Union Nationale regime came to symbolize conservative.feudalism 
and a petty chauvinism. Duplessis' sixteen year reign was an 
affirmation of Quebec autonomy at the cost of yielding, for 
virtually nothing to American capitalists, the natural resources of 
his country (provincially defined). Rioux cites an example whereby 
at the start of the 1950's, Duplessis granted an iron mine 
concession in Northern Quebec to an American enterprise for an 
average fee of one cent per ton of mineral extract. In that same 
period, the Province of Newfoundland was receiving thirty-three 
cents per ton for a similar venture in the same region. Supporting 
the rural areas at the expense of the cities, Duplessis had adopted 
progressive agricultural measures including electrification and 
agricultural credit. Simultaneously, he conducted a merciless 
policy against the government in Ottawa reproaching its excessive 
centralisation and stressing the greater autonomy of Quebec. 165 
Duplessis was able to neutralise opposition with the moral backing 
of the Church. The Padlock Law gave legal justification to the 
suppression of opposition. The C.C.F., the Communist Party and the 
international unions were accordingly marginalised. The Action 
Liberale Nationale was co-opted and its support channelled into the 
ranks of the Union Nationale. The Bloc Populaire lapsed into 
submission, the end of the war and a return to prosperity 
signalling its progressive decline. Too strongly associated with 
the conscription crisis and the war, its party image could not cut 
into the old traditional loyalties. These radical nationalist 
groups, while supportive of the governments autonomist policy, had 
criticized its conservative economics. Thus, the Action Liberale 
Nationale, the Bloc Populaire and the paper "Action Nationale" had 
in fact served as vehicles for the movement to modernise. 166 
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The repressive Duplessis regime and the disproportionate benefits 
which continued to flow the way of the rich and the political elite 
soon gave rise to a tide of discontent. An anti-Union Nationale 
coalition comprising of intellectuals, organised labour, some 
elements of the church and even some industrialists who were weary 
of patronage politics began to organise. These manifestations of 
revolutionary forces were not indiscriminately checked by the once 
seemingly omni powerful state apparatus. Revolt had first expressed 
itself during the 1949 Asbestos strike whereby members of the 
church hierarchy broke with tradition and came out in support of 
the striking miners •167 These clerical opponents called for the 
democratisation of Quebec's institutions with a social policy which 
would reflect the desires and interests of the working class. The 
old ruling ideology was seen to be breaking apart "and a process of 
ideological diversification was at work. 11168 A strike settlement 
was eventually reached, however, the lay leaders of the strike were 
not left unpunished. The Catholic syndicates were, however, 
resilient in pressing their demands for better working conditions 
and higher wages. The 1957 Murdochville strike in the new Gaspe 
copper mines signalled a movement toward the consolidation of 
labour movements and the popular repudiation of the regime. 169 
The secularization of Quebec intellectuals in the 1950's lent 
itself to growing support for political modernization, not within 
the Union Nationale but rather within the Liberal Party. Cite 
Libre was a magazine which served as a vehicle for intellectual 
comment attacking the traditional conception of political authority 
and proclaiming a liberal democratic government. 170 While 
continuing to revere religious values, Cite Libre was critical of 
Catholicism particularly its fatalistic conservatism which it saw 
as increasingly obsolete within a modernizing order. Cite Libre 
put forth a federalist vision stressing education and individual 
liberty with state intervention in the economy limited to specific 
social areas. The provincial government would continue to be 
limited by the federal division of powers. A mixed economy was 
proposed and labour was hailed as a progressive force. Cite Libre, 
therefore, took a hard line against Bills 19 and 20 legislated by 
the Duplessis regime to curb freedom of association. 171 
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Although Cite Libre championed the cause of third world colonies 
struggling to achieve independence, it rejected the view that 
French Canada too was somehow similar. Nationalism was, therefore, 
scoffed at, and was seen to be a nonsensical diversionary tactic 
propagated by reactionary forces. A separatist formula would never 
sustain the French Canadian nation as it lacked the necessary 
socio-cultural and economic tools to overcome its hereditary 
conservatism alone. French Canadians needed to strengthen their 
bonds of association with English Canada so making Quebec an 
indispensable partner. Argumentatively, despite the apparent 
naivety of this perception, a spirit of pragmatism was an appealing 
alternative to a regime which promoted only continued stagnation. 
The monolith had begun to crack. 
Concluding Synthesis 
Quebec and Afrikaner society in the first decade of the 20th 
century were marked by stunted 
relation to structural changes 
ideologies, underdeveloped in 
theri taking place. A non-
antagonistic inconsistency existed between the dominant ideology 
and the role of the state. On the one hand, the state's role was 
forced to accommodate and cater to traditionalists clerico-
religious sentiment particularly the church. On the other hand, 
capital used the state in order to ensure an abundance of cheap 
labour and resources. This assertion is perhaps somewhat 
understated in the South African context in which capital and state 
had a more symbiotic relationship. Both state and capital to 
varying degrees and depending upon the circumstances exercised 
influence one over the next. The underlying difference was that 
here the cheap labour force was to be racially homogeneous; that 
is, the state undertook to restrict capital insofar as it would 
proletarianize the Afrikaner segment in conjunction with the black 
African population. Legislation was therefore enacted by the state 
to enforce and consequently rigidify the horizontal segregation 
endorsed by the ideology of white supremacy. 
The absence of a secularly assertive ethnic bourgeoisie worked to 
the benefit of a relatively autonomous ethnically exclusive state 
apparatus and its enlistment by "foreign" economic interests whose 
objectives were in contradiction to the prevailing ideology of the 
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traditional dominant political elite. This elite class subscribed 
to a pre-capitalist social model as a means of its own affirmation 
and protection against the arrival of an industrial society brought 
about by "outside" forces. 
The manner in which these contradictions were expressed gave 
impetus to the ascendancy of corporatism and nationalism in Quebec, 
similarly to that of Christian nationalism in South Africa. The 
clerical elite promoted corporatism and Christian nationalism so as 
to direct organised labour and employer groups. The petty 
bourgeoisie stressed a nationalist doctrine which highlighted an 
ethnic awareness and emphasized mobilization around core values 
those being race, religion and the struggle for survival. These 
ideological orientations were to off-set and impede the development 
of class-consciousness. 
Anti-capitalism had meaning in both societies in so far as it was 
a critique and a form of resistance to imperialism. It was not per 
sea direct attack upon the capitalist system but rather it was an 
alien system brought in by external forces so disrupting the 
hegemonic position of the traditional ethnic elite and inevitably 
the monolithic structure of a xenophobic once exclusively rural 
populatidn. Thus, these ideological movements called for a 
lessening of class antagonism, and ethnic enclosure. 
The rise to power of the Union Nationale marked somewhat the 
triumph of clerico-bourgeois conservative nationalism. While the 
ascension to power of the National Party had hailed the triumph of 
Afrikaner nationalism within the framework of a legislative union 
in South Africa, the Union Nationale could perhaps be similarly 
interpreted as having been an institutionalised expression of 
Quebec nationalism within the context of a Federal Canada. There 
are sharp differences, however. While the National Party had 
restructured the economy so as to alleviate poverty in the white 
(particularly Afrikaans-speaking) sector at the expense of the 
black African population, the Union Nationale saw little need for 
drastic economic adjustment in the absence of a prominent and 
discriminated sub-strata in that Province. 
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Both the Union Nationale and the National Party saw the merits in 
retaining the capitalist structure of the economy. Both had 
denounced big business once upon a time, yet they soon realised 
that their political fortune were not untied to economic growth and 
development. A compromise or even a pact with big business would 
ensure prosperity even at the expense of foregoing the interests of 
the working class. 
In the absence of a sub-strata which could serve the needs of 
capitalism in providing a cheap labour force, the Union Nationale 
was in essence more pressed to address the ethnic di vision of 
labour in which French Canadians continued to overwhelmingly occupy 
an exploited position. No "black" population existed which could 
serve as labour fodder for French Canadian economic upliftment. 
Furthermore, the confederal structure of the Canadian state imposed 
significant restraint upon the Provincial governments. The Union 
Nationale perhaps can be seen as a strongest expression to date of 
autonomy in Quebec Province yet the Party was not separatist in 
orientation so implying that this institutionalisation of Quebec 
nationalism was miniscule in comparison to what would eventually be 
proposed. 
While the differences are indeed significant, both the National 
Party and the Union Nationale had come to power with the aid of 
traditional rural support ethnically comprised and vulnerable to 
nationalist appeals. The longevity of the National Party as 
compared to the eventual decline of the Union Nationale may be 
explained by the lack of innovation in the latter. Anglo economic 
dominance had basically received tacit support from the Duplessis 
administration which backed away from state intervention. The 
National Party conversely enacted apartheid legislation to the 
detriment of the black African population. The symbiotic 
relationship between capitalism and apartheid in South Africa also, 
as in French Canada, created a "co-operation-in-conflict" 
relationship between political elites and economic ones. In South 
Africa, the political complacency on the part of the Anglo economic 
elites was underpinned by the fear of a change in the status quo 
which ensured the continuity of a cheap black labour supply. 
Relative to the ideological back waters which characterized a 
164 
French Canadian society bullied into submission and resignation, 
Apartheid may be seen, at its inception, as a rather innovative 
ideology attempting to deal with diversity through an aggressive 
nationalist program albeit unsuccessfully. 
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While the curtain opens revealing the triumphant nationalist regime 
wielding power in accordance with traditional and rural support, 
the stage is set for the break-up of the conservative monolith. 
Propelled by the forces of industrialisation and modernisation, 
French Canadian and Afrikaner nationalist regimes alike are forced 
to realise that although traditional nationalist sentiment can be 
an invaluable commodity in the electoral market, status quo 
politics can no longer hold back the hands of time. The choices 
are either to adapt or die. 
This chapter argues the parallel historical decline of Afrikaner 
and French Canadian nationalism up until its recent resurgence, yet 
· it does not neglect to focus attention upon their divergence, it 
being more marked in this period. 
seeks to outline the catching 
This chapter, furthermore, 
up phase, whereby strongly 
nationalist and traditionally reactionary regimes are confronted by 
the realities of global politics. It covers the period starting 
from 1960 up until the present day. Equating Afrikaner nationalism 
with domination and Quebec provincialism with stagnation must be 
addressed taking into account the demographic nature of each state. 
Could it be that in a transitional global order, separatism may 
indeed prove to be desirable to some degree in both societies? Or 
for that matter, could one not foresee a failed federalism in 
Canada collapse into an uncertain separatism while a destructive 
separatism (in the form of apartheid) in South Africa sinks into 
the fabric of a new federalist equation? With nationalism once 
again pitted against internationalism, who will be the victor this 
time? 
As suggested above, the differences with regard to the development 
of Afrikaner and Quebec nationalism are more pronounced in this 
period. While both ethnicities had achieved ethnic enclosure in 
the traditional sense, their differing frameworks of operation had 
actually created variance in terms of nationalist intensity. The 
racial construction of the Republic and the pigmentocracy which had 
been established permitted the Nationalist regime and its 
ideologues the space to enforce far reaching policies. Nationhood 
had been fully reached in its political sense within this context 
of domination. Thus, barring the possibility of an increasingly 
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global context which would endorse the status quo, nationalists 
would have the opportunity to embark upon the road of conflict or 
that of reform. Logically it would seem that in order to respect 
democratic principles and heed the global call to democratisation, 
the nature of the regime and the system for that matter would have 
to undergo radical change. That is, in so far as a nation or group 
valued membership in an increasingly interdependent world of 
nations, it would prerequisite a government deemed to be legitimate 
internationally-speaking. One would, in this scenario, foresee the 
necessary decline of an Afrikaner nationalism resting on the 
pillars of racial prejudice. This, however, is not to discount a 
new variant and the growth of Afrikaner nationalism according to 
accepted standards of fairness and justice. 
The federal construction of Canada, however, too is subject to the 
alternatives of conflict or reform. The centralist bias of the 
system does not negate or off-set the continued growth of Quebec 
nationalism in so far as a distinct ethnic group strives to realise 
the national essence of self-determination. In fact, multi-
culturalism within an imbalanced "bilingual" framework seems rather 
to potentially encourage this development, nationhood for Quebec 
not as yet being a reality. Nevertheless, the perceived legitimacy 
of Canadian federalism lends itself to finding more compromising 
solutions particularly when one notes the historical record on 
separatism with its chaotic consequences. Thus, unlike South 
Africa, Canada already possesses the framework and superstructure 
for nation-building. Yet again, this theory is not as clear cut 
when one is asked to decide whether or not Canada is but one nation 
or in fact two. Therefore, this chapter notes the decline of 
Quebec nationalism but simultaneously recognises that it has not 
yet achieved nationhood, it being a viable alternative to the 
present set of circumstances. While political manoeuvring between 
collaborative bureaucracies in an increasingly global environment 
lends itself to status quo politics in Canada (and perhaps limited 
reform) , the continuing adversarial relationship between Quebec and 
English Canada and the seemingly viable separatist option makes the 
scope for compromise that much narrower. Quebec nationalism must 
necessarily struggle to achieve independence. What form that 
independence will take is another question for debate. 
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While the non-viability of Grand Apartheid beckons the forces of 
radical reform, the seemingly viable federal system makes reform 
less pressing. The irony is that while conflict in South Africa 
has been the norm, compromise is now all that bars the way to full 
scale civil war. Conversely, while compromise has marked Canadian 
politics, that option seems less attractive and conflict ( not 
necessarily violent) is now more probable lest that society 
suffocate from constitutional complacency. Whil'e it is certain 
that most reasonable political players in South Africa will seek a 
compromise recognising the unacceptable cost of the alternatives, 
the participants in the Canadian political arena are not as united 
in this goal, some in Quebec arguing that the costs of remaining 
within Confederation far outweigh the benefits. 
South Africa: Post 1960 Epilogue 
Confronted by the realities of the Cold War, decolonisation and a 
growing black "nationalism", the Nationalist regime opted for Grand 
Apartheid, a Maccarthyistic-style anti-communism and severe 




Verwoerd's new vision no longer mimicked his 
in· their "ladida" approach to black politics. 
outrage against the horrors of apartheid and 
particularly then in reaction to the Sharpeville massacre, had to 
be considered. The winds of change in Africa would not easily be 
weathered particularly if the white segments were to remain at odds 
with one another. As such, Verwoerd had undertaken to broaden 
Afrikaner nationalism to include English speaking whites as well. 
The republican referendum and South Africa's departure from the 
commonweal th were consistent with this strategy to ensure the 
survival of the white race at the foot of the "dark" continent. In 
response to the growth of political opposition, laws were enacted 
to administer a system of censorship. This permitted the agents of 
the state the legal capacity to wield co-ercive power as well as to 
use draconian measures to repress political dissidence. The 
politics of the early sixties was that of conflict whereby 
bannings, arrests and brutal repression crushed all opposition as 
a blanket of silence fell over South Africa. 
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The startling economic recovery following Sharpeville was not 
conducive to testing whether Afrikaners were primarily ethnically 
motivated or class motivated in light of their advancing 
entrepreneurial gains. What was apparent, however, was a 
definitive shift toward recognising and supporting the economic 
interests of industry. Apartheid economic predictions and theories 
were partially shattered as the pressure from industry for mass 
recruitment took precedence. The Nationalist regime became 
increasingly aware of economic matters as evidenced by the Second 
Economic Development Programme ( 1966) which concentrated more 
seriously upon African labour. Furthermore, increasing Afrikaner 
economic strength and the perceived longevity of the National Party 
by many English businessman made it psychologically possible for 
the nationalists to break out of their original constituencies and 
canvass English support. Quite predictively, this rapprochement 
particularly between once villainized English-Jewish capitalists, 
notably Harry Oppenheimer, and Afrikaner capitalists forged 
widening divisions between left and right flanks within the 
National Party itself. It seemed likely that with the broadening 
of white society within the Republic, considerations of class would 
increase in importance barring a major crisis. 1 
Divisions within nationalist ranks and class disparities within 
Afrikanerdom did not, however, signal the demise of the party or 
the submergence of Afrikaner nationalism in the white nation. 
Although the regime had increasingly become the spokesman for a 
white South African nationalism, it never stopped being the 
spokesman for Afrikaner nationalism above all. The English were to 
be welcomed in as junior allies yet with the understanding that 
Afrikaner values would have primacy in the Republic. Kenny is 
aptly sensitive to the inherent contradictions which afflicted 
nationalists with this broadening white South Africanism. The 
xenophobic exclusivity which characterized Afrikaner nationalism 
could not easily be discarded and reconciled with this broader 
white nationalism. 2 Enthusiasm was lacking to say the least. 
The Verwoerdian era was characterised by an uncompromising 
authoritarianism. The quintessential ideologue possessed an 
incredible energy and was a driving ideological and intellectual 
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force. Yet economic realities increasingly dispelled the widely 
believed rhetoric which held that apartheid would surely achieve 
harmony of separate freedoms. Verwoerd's untimely death at the 
hands of a "deranged" parliamentary messenger in 1966 left no 
apparent political vacuum, nor did it seemingly disrupt the 
fluidity of government policy. Verwoerd had, however, created a 
swollen apartheid bureaucracy, a state within a state so to speak. 
Within the state structure lay a stronghold of defenders of 
separate development, an entrenched civil service reenforced by a 
biassed bureaucratic system of recruitment for cabinet ministers. 
Ideological orientation underpinned employment and status within 
the increasingly centralised decision-making civil service 
structure. 3 As such, when the party passed into the hands of 
successor B.J. Vorster, he was soon forced to contend with party 
members "who were so caught up in the Verwoerdian slipstream" that 
they were staunchly opposed to any modification of his designs. 4 
Vorster's accession to power and his more pragmatic Chairman-of-
the-Board-type approach sharply contrasted Verwoerd's more rigidly 
authoritarian and charismatic one. It also made little ground in 
diffusing mounting tensions surrounding the new "nee-conciliatory" 
doctrine and its related value substitutions; those being white 
nationalism for Afrikaner nationalism, white unity for Afrikaner 
unity, and anti-communism for Afrikaner ethno-centricism. 5 This 
prompted what would come to be known as the verligte-verkrampte 
dichotomy within Afrikanerdom; the former advocating greater white 
unity and more harmonious race relations through the abolition of 
petty apartheid with the latter proposing undiluted Afrikaner 
domination and racial exclusiveness. 6 While Vorster had initially 
been regarded as verkrampte, it soon became evident that he was 
better placed in the verligte camp. His cosmetic compromises and 
reforms, which included the admission of black ambassadors from 
foreign states as well as overtones encouraging Anglophones to join 
the National Party, were looked upon by party verkrampte elements 
with mistrust. The outcome was a split whereby a verkrampte 
faction within the party decided to pull out and reconstitute 
themselves as the Herstigste (Restored) National Party. The 
Broederbond opted to remain in the National Party's corner behind 
Vorster. 7 
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The verligte/verkrampte struggle need not be seen merely as the 
realignment of economic interests. status and symbolic issues 
figured significantly, notably those which had prompted the 1.969 
split. The conflict remained within the arena of Afrikaner 
nationalism itself and dealt with issues surrounding the purpose of 
the state and about the goals of Afrikaner nationalism. 8 
The electoral contest one year later witnessed the NP and HNP 
locked in a struggle for the right to represent the Afrikaner soul. 
The National Party was victorious gaining 54,4% of the vote just 
down a mere 4, 2% from 1966. The HNP received but 3, 6% of all 
votes. Stultz reasons that dominant Afrikaner values within the 
Republic had all but erased the former sense of social deprivation 
amongst Afrikaners which had been crucial to the growth of 
Afrikaner nationalism. Apter is cited to confirm the hypothesis 
which correlates material prosperity with increasing secularization 
and a weakening of ideology. The politics of security which 
characterised this era was flawed and vulnerable as maintenance and 
protection of a social order had been valued above the creation of 
one. The entrenchment of Afrikaner values in South African society 
led the new generations of Afrikaners to take them for granted. 9 
Coupled with low levels of information, political cynicism, a 
declining ideology and the progressive loss of legitimacy by the 
Nationalist government, the prospects for a reinvigorated 
nationalism looked bleak indeed. 
The swelling of the apartheid bureaucracy itself fell victim to 
internal struggles as various departmental ministries within the 
National Party government began vying for power and influence. 
Much of this power play was but an extension of the verligte-
verkrampte dichotomy. For example, the Department of Foreign 
Affairs in the verligte sphere of influence clashed continuously 
with the Department of Information, a verkrampte ministry under the 
control of Dr. Connie P. Mulder. Thus, a shift occurred whereby 
the interests of contending departmental bureaucracies replaced 
former support bases which had run primarily along provincial 
lines •10 
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The global context in a sense partially gave rise to these 
departmental di visions. The economic difficulties of the seventies 
intensified in response to the political drama which increasingly 
contributed towards Pretoria's pariah status. The Soweto uprising, 
the Angola debacle, the death in detention of Black Consciousness 
activist Steve Biko, and mass resistance to apartheid which took on 
an increasingly anti-capitalist rhetoric further contributed to the 
deterioration of the economy characterised by high unemployment and 
an outflow of foreign capital. It soon became painstakingly clear 
to hardline Nationalists that volkseenheid had been sacrificed for 
the unity of the capitalist class. This class and the military 
were to become strange bed-fellows allying to bring about political 
and economic reforms essential to the defence of the state. 11 
While Vorster had taken the first steps towards socio-economic 
reform, he did not envision an alternative society but rather 
reassured the white electorate with an increasingly moral 
persuasion that their objectives could be realised within the 
context of an evolving apartheid. Thus, cloaking white supremacy 
under the banner of "multinationalism" (not to be confused with 
Canadian multiculturalism) meant the continued emphasis upon ethnic 
groups termed "nations" as opposed to individuals. This new 
doctrine, however, allowed for the erosion of various apartheid 
measures which were justified as having been temporary 
restrictions . 12 
The changing balance of political power stemmed from growing class 
divisions among Afrikaners. By 1970, 88% of Afrikaners were 
urbanised as opposed to 8% who were still economically active in 
the agricultural sector. White collar jobs amongst Afrikaners had 
increased dramatically (to 65%) while 27% retained blue-collar 
work. Significant share increases both in the manufacturing and 
mining sector coupled with a narrowing English-Afrikaner per capita 
income ratio lent itself to the changing class structure of 
Afrikaners. The Afrikaners, however, were still over-represented 
in the state sector (36% compared with 14% of English). As their 
economic interests converged, attitudinal changes reflected 
increasing support amongst Afrikaners for more verli9te policies. 
Yet, although class was an important factor shaping attitudes, 
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other factors remained; separatist indoctrination and apartheid 
structures not to discount the significant class differences which 
still existed between English and Afrikaners in spite of the 
latter's upward mobility. 13 
The declining power of white agriculture and the growing influence 
of mining capital prompted some Afrikaner capitalists to lend 
voice to the concerns of English businessmen and their criticisms 
regarding state sector encroachments. While more amicable advances 
towards English and foreign capital seemed to gage the declining 
strength of Afrikaner nationalism, nationalist policies continued 
to reflect ambiguity towards foreign capital. Although anxiety to 
attract it prompted generous concessions to foreign oil compani~s 
like Shell, Nationalists remained stubborn and steadfast 
"restricting foreign shareholdings in banks and insurance companies 
to 50%. 1114 Therefore, while English-Afrikaner relationships had 
improved, the English were still locked out of the decision-making 
public sector despite remaining the country's most powerful 
economic group. 
The so-called Information or "Muldergate" scandal in 1978-1979 
exposed the South African Department of Information's use of large 
secret government funds to propagandize for the National Party by 
way of setting up and paying for a new national daily paper, the 
Citizen. Illicitly channelling funds through individual government 
departments in order to covertly influence the formation of 
opinions within the Republic and abroad ultimately brought 
Vorster's premiership to an end. 15 Furthermore, the involvement of 
his likely successor Dr. Connie Mulder, then Minister of 
Information, prompted a challenge within the National Party caucus. 
Cape leader, P.W. Botha was eventually to usurp the leadership 
position. 
Botha continued to pursue the Bantustan policy which had been 
accelerated under Vorster yet he was not prepared to force 
independence upon unwilling Bantustans. He openly recognised the 
failure of apartheid, recognised the permanence of urban Africans 
and pushed ahead with promises to re-incorporate "coloureds" and 
Indians within the political sphere. The Botha regime proceeded to 
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implement what was termed "Total Strategy", a package of domestic 
and regional modifications designed to break up the block of 
hostile political forces then developing. Using carrot and stick 
tactics, Botha aimed to coddle various black leaders so as to 
divide growing opposition. The dissipation of the buffer states 
with the collapse of the KATANO regime in Portugal, the 
decolonisation of Mozambique and Angola, and mounting insurgency in 
Rhodesia, prompted the Pretoria regime to implement its "Total 
Strategy" against the increasingly hostile Front Line States. This 
entailed an attempt to reorganise the south African state into a 
Constellation of South African States (CONSAS) so as to entrench 
the existing patterns of economic domination. It was consequently 
reformulated in response to the damaging effects of Mugabe and his 
ZANU party's unexpected electoral victory in Zimbabwe. The 
formation of the South African Development Co-ordinating conference 
(SADCC), a network of eight regional players excluding the 
Republic, furthermore, sabotaged CONSAS with their joint strategy 
to reduce dependence on the South African economy. 
The alliance between big business and the South African military 
reflected in essence a coup d'etat. 
social base and strategy of the state. 
It marked a shift in the 
The State Security Council 
handled all matters pertaining to national security and were now 
responsible only to the State President. The military influence was 
clearly dominant as Botha' s state imposed reformist initiative 
unleashed unparalleled coercion and brutality to cope with what the 
government presented as "total onslaught" by Marxist enemies 
against the Republic. The State Security Council comprised senior 
military commanders and some high level bureaucrats; it could 
override a decision made at any level within the state apparatus. 
The so-called parliamentary system soon came to be but a euphemism 
for an increasingly powerful shadowy council. 
Aiming to co-opt "coloured" and Indian communities into the NP 
power structure, Botha legislated the Tricameral system in 
accordance with the wishes of white voters. The new constitution, 
approved by referendum, brought these previously excluded 
communities into the legislative body of government. White 
supremacy, however, was preserved when noting the 4: 2: 1 ratio 
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existing between whites, "coloureds", and Indians respectively. 
Each parliamentary chamber would be responsible for their "own 
affairs", while general affairs including foreign policy and 
defence would require each house to pass relevant information 
through the President's Council. The dispute breaking mechanism 
was, therefore, under white control. 
The symbolic inclusion of these communities came in response to 
mounting pressures to reform the existing system which excluded 
blacks. Al though many whites viewed the new dispensation as a step 
in the right direction, others supported its co-optive character 
viewing it as a means to create a buffer or front-line to absorb an 
expanding onslaught from the "enemy". Nevertheless, despite the 
fact that this new arrangement invited conflict rather than co-
operation, opinion polls confirmed that the result was indeed a 
vote for reform. There "was growing support for more verligte 
policies and for 'power-sharing' with blacks, including Africans. "16 
Although the Nationalists had consolidated their power, the so-
called power-sharing was stringently opposed by rightist elements 
who saw the new dispensation as clearly compromising Afrikaner 
sovereignty. The interests of profit-seeking big business were 
fingered as having undermined the racially protectionist status-
quo.17 Botha's rival verkrampte dominee Andries Treurnicht had 
earlier warned delegates that "free markets would jeopardize the 
whole edifice of apartheid." More in tune with the Transvaal wing 
of the NP, it representing the centre of petty bourgeoisie/working 
class interests, Treurnicht confronted Botha's Cape wing which had 
long been the stronghold of the most developed sections of 
Afrikaner capital. The ensuing stand-off was, furthermore, 
underpinned by a structural crisis characterized by skilled labour 
shortages, the limits of the white consumer markets and the high 
black unemployment rate. Economic adjustments would also require 
political and ideological reform. 18 
The showdown between verligte and verkrampte elements within 
Nationalist ranks saw a break-away by the Conservative Party from 
the National Party in 1982. Yet unlike the split which had taken 
place thirteen years earlier, the establishment of the CP with its 
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power base in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, immediately 
politicized local government. The new challenge was formidable as 
the Party received representation on a number of local councils as 
a result of defectors from the NP in the Transvaal. The NP's 
reform programmes, thus, came under harsh scrutiny particularly as 
it affected local government. The CP purported to be the 
institutionalised defender of traditional Afrikaner nationalist 
beliefs and values. The rightist challengers were unflinching in 
their attempts to paint the NP and its reformist directives as 
·traitorous and as having abdicated its position in the 
aforementioned role. Contesting municipal by-elections so as to 
mobilise support for its policies, the CP succeeded in ousting the 
Progressive Federal Party as the official opposition in the 1987 
general election. Furthermore, CP triumphs in three Transvaal by-
elections in 1988 seemed to suggest, as not unrealistic, the 
possibility of a general election victory in the next two years. 
The ensuing schism concerned different approaches to Afrikaner 
survival and conflicting strategies to maintain Afrikaner power. 
The National Party had not abdicated its position, reasoning that 
it could best defend the state by under-stressing exclusi vist 
racial symbols. While the posturing of the party and even its 
manifest did not promote the image of an ethnic body within white 
politics, its underlying cohesion derived from Afrikaner 
nationalism and its role within the racially constructed political 
realm need not be discounted; nor can the possibility that ethnic 
sentiment will again mobilise if sufficiently threatened. 
Regardless of the shift in image, the National Party remained 
committed to Afrikaner values and its socialising agencies. 
Throwing down the referendum gauntlet, President F.W. de Klerk had 
received an overwhelming mandate in favour of reform thereby 
neutralising the party political Conservative opposition. 
Afrikaner nationalism's decline can be attributed to its own 
success which forced it to bureaucratise its institutional 
structure and broaden its appeal, so breaking with traditional 
exclusivity. The decline of nationalism in Quebec did not follow 
similar lines. Although the "Quiet Revolution" had been ushered in 
by a new technocratic elite which represented a departure from the 
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traditional hierarchy, separatist nationalism had only been quelled 
temporarily as Franco-phone political power brokers increasingly 
experimented with the idea of using the Quebec state as a lever 
with which to further their lot both socially and economically. 
Quebec: Post 1960 Epilogue 
A central feature of the Quebec state in this period was that it 
actively sought to aid French Canadian economic aspirations. This 
was significant in that nationalism had until then contributed to 
a "lag" in political modernisation which had unfortunately arisen 
in the absence of government initiaves within the economic realm. 
Nationalism came to be viewed as a progressive force breaking with 
the stigma of conservatism. "Rattrapage" replaced "la survivance" 
as the new bureaucratic elite cultivated a growing appetite for 
change. The growth of public sector unionism accompanied demands 
that the Quebec government restructure recruitment practices as 
well as the internal operations of private corporations. Although 
the new middle class and the technocratic intelligentsia had 
facilitated the expansion of public sector employment, education 
and administration, the persisting cultural division of labour at 
elite levels in private industry and commerce continued to 
highlight economic grievances. 19 Anglophones still occupied top 
management jobs while French Canadians were under-represented in 
professional and financial categories. The new aclerical elites 
had not as yet dislodged ecclesiastical control particularly within 
the educational sphere. 20 The French Canadian masses still remained 
prisoners of the belief system upon which New France had been 
founded. 
The lag in political modernisation undoubtedly accounts for the 
slow development of nationalism in Quebec. It was only at this 
time that the new government petty bourgeoisie constituency began 
to look to political power as the root to satisfactory entry into 
the country. Cultural revitalisation accompanied the successful 
manoeuvre by the new leadership class in which it laid hold to the 
state apparatus so as to further its economic and political 
position. The "volkskapitalisme" which had been partly 
responsible for the later developmen;t of Afrikaner nationalism 
prior to 1948 was only now being felt in Quebec. The de-
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clericalisation of educational, heal th and welfare structures 
marked the decline of "laissez-faire" policies and an increase in 
state interventionism which was viewed as being more consistent 
with the needs of growing monopoly capitalism. 21 
The "state" actively sought, henceforth, to encourage an 
entrepreneurial spirit within the greater population. Its role 
consisted primarily of providing assistance to French Canadian 
businesses by making public resources available. This included the 
construction of super highways as well as the nationalisation of 
power companies. The fruits of the revolution were, however, most 
notable within the social sphere. The strengthened social security 
system and the state-run hospital insurance scheme of 1961 (the 
latter serving as the fore-runner to the socialisation of medicine 
less than a decade later) proved to be but the beginning of a 
liberalising process which consequently rationalised the system of 
education. 22 This entailed the expansion of French universities, 
the replacement of church-run classical colleges with CEGEPS 
{College d'Education generale et professionel), and the radical 
revision of school curriculum in line with the recommendations of 
the Parent Royal Commission. 23 
The cultural renaissance which ensued was marked by the mutual 
rediscovery of French Canada and France (This reaffirmation of 
links had been relatively absent within the Afrikaner context in 
all likelihood due to language and particularly, ideological 
cleavages which had postured hostility between the Netherlands and 
its long abandoned former colony). Closer links in the form of the 
Quebec Delegation Generale in Paris, cultural agreements, and the 
France-Quebec Office de la Jeunesse were given political salience 
in 1967 as visiting dignitary General de Gaulle euphorically 
saluted the independentist cause when proclaiming the nationalist 
slogan, "Vive le Quebec libre." The reverberations and the 
honeymoon which followed between the two French "states" was 
illustrative in that it signified that the French Canadian 
collectivity, while remaining distinct from its continental 
brethren, shared a common link, it being the French language. 
Implicit in this reaffirmation was the acknowledgement that the 
linguistic dimension remained central to the Canadian conflict. It 
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also seemed to suggest that the revolution had not as yet been 
concluded. The French Canadian masses had relished the opportunity 
to vent their frustrations and display their nationalist 
sentiments. Despite the Creditist phase and the re-election of the 
Union Nationale, the currents of change had not subsided. 
Although the Cite Libre group had recoiled from an outright 
rejection of capitalism and an endorsement of socialism, its 
functional approach had recognised the labour movement as the only 
progressive force that could bring about change in Quebec. The 
Cite Libre group had in a sense served as a catalyst to the upsurge 
of left wing nationalism in Quebec. New opposition groups began to 
identify with African decolonisation, the Cuban Revolution and the 
African-American civil rights movement. Despite the plurality of 
foreign models, however, no one particular ideology could then be 
identified with the whole of Quebecois society. This, in all 
likelihood, accounts for its divergence from its Afrikaner 
counterparts which had up until recently been synonymous with 
Christian nationalism. The new petty bourgeoisie in Quebec, like 
the Afrikaners, had enlisted nationalism as a weapon, yet the 
liberal nationalism which it espoused aimed to shed the myths of 
the past rather than co-opt them. They, therefore, tended to break 
the ideological web which had until then nurtured a traditional and 
messianic conservative nationalism. The increased role of the 
state had an economic purpose which was initially to combat the 
recession. It represented a trend towards democratisation in its 
effort to dispense with the clericalism which had strangled and 
subdued Quebec society. Not so with the Afrikaner regime which 
presented itself as an expression of the volkswil and enacted 
legislation accordingly. Ideological rigidity had restricted the 
democratisation process from taking place within the Republic. 
The modernisation of education, increased government planning with 
regard to industrial development, secularization and the 
bureaucratization of the welfare state marked a move towards 
democratisation. The erosion of clerical power and influence saw 
romantic nativism replaced with a more secular version of self-
determination. Various manifestations of political nationalism 
came to the fore reflecting increased differentiation within Quebec 
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society. Frehch Canadian nationalism intensified as a political 
response to social and economic development. The "Quiet 
Revolution" was characterised by, among other things, heightened 
ethnic and class di visions. The state served as the focus of 
intergroup struggle. Economic demands continued to mar federal-
provincial relations while only Quebec conceived of this issue in 
terms of its cultural implications. 24 
"Maitres Chez Nous" (Masters in our own house) had originally 
conveyed a cultural meaning and had referred to an ideological 
liberation from the fatalistic comp].,acency of the past and a 
movement towards cultivating a collective future. Nevertheless, 
this slogan increasingly began to connote a political nationalism 
which prompted even those within the ruling Liberals to make 
demands on behalf of Quebec. Constitutional expert, Paul Gerin-
Lajoie, spoke of a "special status" for Quebec while Rene Levesque, 
an outspoken nationalist in the Lesage cabinet, proposed an 
associate state relationship between Quebec and English Canada. 
Lesage had confronted Ottawa with demands for increased provincial 
jurisdiction in taxation, social welfare, and foreign and cultural 
policy. 25 
Milner and Milner argue that the quasi-nationalism of Lesage merely 
reflected the inability of reformists to meet growing expectations 
and hopes that they themselves had unknowingly built up. Vilifying 
Ottawa for not conceding jurisdictional power and failing in this 
regard exonerated the Liberal elite. 26 The Quiet Revolution 
witnessed primarily ideological change yet structural changes were 
not forthcoming except within the socio-cultural domain. French 
Canadians were still absent within the upper echelons of the 
economy as the Federal government regulated economic activity and 
continued to have primacy over immigration. 27 Foreign interests were 
dominant and their control actually enhanced with the modern 
economic infra-structure brought about through reform. 
The passivity of the Quebec government had reflected its small and 
poorly developed bureaucracy. Yet., with developing new social· 
consciousness, the anti-etatisme of the past gave way to a 
revitalised working class militancy tempered only by the efforts of 
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nationalist ideologues who obscured class differences. The working 
class succumbed to the tenets of nationalism sensing that their 
proletarian struggle could but only be achieved within the context 
of national liberation. Separatist platforms increased as 
politicos argued for independence. 
The prevalence of separatist movements and journalistic reviews 
reflected a shifting nationalism which resolutely turned to the 
future rather than to the past ( which had been the case with 
traditional nationalism). One could even say that independentism 
was not an ethnic nationalist movement but in fact, represented a 
wish and a strategy to conquer state power. Striving to keep 
astride with democratic principles, the independentist strategy 
contributed to the opening up of Quebec to the world. 
Independentist platforms multiplied. L'Alliance Laurentienne under 
the leadership of Raymond Barbeau lasted between 1957 and 1962. Its 
objectives included the denunciation of the colonial situation in 
Quebec, criticism of the limits of traditional nationalism as well 
as promoting political independence as the instruments with which 
to liberate and develop the nation. Its attachment to traditional 
patriotism and its notable corporatist orientation contributed to 
its conservative image which ultimately detracted from its appeal. 
The Action Socialiste Pour L'Independence du Quebec (ASIQ) was 
founded in 1960 with the intention of aiding to bring about the 
absolute independence of Quebec and a national proletarian 
liberation. It denounced the devastating effects of Canadian 
federalism and capitalism which plunged the French Canadians into 
the role of an oppressed colonized population. It, furthermore, 
recognised the obvious link between achieving independence and 
installing a socialist regime. The movement lasted five years 
becoming marginalised yet simultaneously giving birth to a number 
of other political organisations in the sixties. The Rassemblement 
Pour L' Independence Nationale (RIN) initiated by twenty young 
intellectuals, writers and artists eventually became transformed 
into a political party in 1963. It was essentially a movement of 
popular education which realised that only by achieving political 
independence could necessary powers be acquired. Tuning into the 
counter-culture of that period, it conducted popular assemblies, 
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sit-ins, strikes and music galas to spread its appeal. It 
presented seventy-six candidates in the 1966 provincial elections 
receiving 9% of the vote. Nevertheless, its president Pierre 
Bourgault proposed the dissolution of the party two years later 
encouraging members to give their support to the Parti Quebecois. 
The RIN had also spawned splinter groups notably Marcel Chaput's 
Parti Republ icain du Quebec ( PRQ) . 28 
Amongst the most notorious independentist movements was the Front 
De Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) which carried out acts of terror and 
sabotage against selected targets primarily symbols of the British 
Crown and federalism. Its covert operations intensified between 
1968 and 1970 as a series of bombs were exploded against dominant 
capitalist institutions. The founders of the FLQ came from the 
ranks of the RIN as well as various lecturers of the Revue 
Socialiste. While openly adherents of leftist ideology, 
independentism was foremost on their agenda. 
Anti-colonialist thinking had not fallen upon deaf ears as the 
independentist agenda remained unfulfilled. Left-wing nationalism 
found an audience as it could use third-world exploits as a 
reference. Democratic principles buttressed this idea. 
Nationalists within the South African Republic were keenly aware 
that their exploits were out of step with colonial struggles then 
taking place. Democratic principles threatened to dislodge 
Afrikaner power with a leftist majoritarian African government-in-
waiting. 
The new revolutionary (albeit "quiet") pitch of the masses 
reflected a growing disappointment with "lame" political parties 
who had committed the Quebec nation to a federalist formula 
characterised by Anglo eco-cultural domination. The Union Nationale 
and the Liberal Party were seen to have betrayed the interests of 
the working class. While the National Party had long 
institutionalised its leadership position as spokesman for an 
Afrikaner nationalism within the Republic, no one political party 
within Quebec had earned the right to carry a similar torch. 
Growing divisions within the rank and file Quebecois, furthermore, 
made such an eventuality all the more intangible. 
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The Canadian crisis prompted revision of the existing bi-cultural 
arrangement. The clamouring of separatist movements demanded 
immediate attention. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Bi-
Culturalism had not borne fruit. The existing political 
inequalities between the two communities had not been redressed. 
The RCBB recommendations had not significantly incorporated 
Francophones within federal state bureaucracies. 29 French Canadians 
outside of Quebec continued to be assimilated while immigrants 
within the province chose to identify with English-speakers. 
Furthermore, the "revenge of the cradle" had become irrelevant in 
light of the declining French Canadian birth rate. 30 English Canada 
had turned a deaf ear to bilingualism. French Canadians then 
comprised 28% of the total population of Canada yet they accounted 
for 70% of the bilinguals. Conversely, the Anglophones who 
represented 72% of the total population only contributed 30% of 
bilinguals; and half of those bilingual Anglophones resided in 
Quebec. 31 Although the crisis had provoked the entrance of French 
Canadian elites within the federal civil service structure, their 
numbers were disproportional. The RCBB's language policy merely 
alienated the Quebec elite for it did not focus upon structural 
changes then taking place in Quebec. It did not attempt to 
integrate elites economically precisely because it failed to 
consider the territorial definition of bilingualism and the 
language frontiers in the political economy. 32 
The new French Canadian elite decided to make their presence felt 
within federal structures. English Canadians had grown weary of 
nationalist provocations and separatist threats. What better way 
to silence the proverbial lambs than by summoning forth their 
respected leaders and neutralising them thereafter; 
retrospectively, it appears that prominent liberal and now former 
prime minister Pierre Trudeau had taken the bait. The one time 
social-democratic "revolutionary" and his entourage had feared the 
erosive effects that nationalism and a weak centre had inflicted 
upon the federal system. Reversing the causal factors, they felt, 
would revitalise the semi-defunct federalism. The new centralist 
liberal directive acknowledged the existence of a distinctive 
French Canadian culture and ethnic group, yet, it rejected the 
desirability of an ethno-regional nationalism. Trudeau and his 
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accomplices, the three doves, as they were dubbed, while addressing 
the cultural dimensions regarding the issue of nationality, 
remained ignorant of the economic and political dimension. 
Trudeau's functionalist approach assumed that "cold unemotional 
rationality (could] still save the ship. 1133 On this account it 
seems he was sorely mistaken. 
The federal Liberals under the leadership of Pierre Elliot Trudeau, 
prime minister since 1968, undertook to ensure equality of the 
French and English languages in the operations of federal political 
ins ti tut ions. His "bi 1 ingual and bi-cultural solution" furthermore 
aimed to ameliorate the position of Francophone minorities outside 
Quebec as well as to promote the participation of Francophones 
within senior decision-making federal structures. 34 The Official 
Languages Act of 1969, however, disassociated language and culture 
by supporting bilingualism on the one hand and multi-culturalism on 
the other. Because nationality was defined in terms of language, 
Quebec nationalism had been confu~ed as two tiers of government 
could claim to be the legitimate representatives of Francophones. 
This conflict had a diversionary effect "for it prevented the sense 
of Quebecois national identity from centring around the Quebec 
state 11 .= Nevertheless, French Canadians were less forthcoming to 
changing federal perspectives regarding the ethno-linguistic issue. 
Bilingualism received attention only in so far as it presented a 
threat within the industrial urban hubs of Montreal and Quebec 
City. Heightened consciousness created a renewed awareness and 
sensitivity to the prevailing cultural division of labour. English 
Canadian efforts to appease the Quebecois with this seemingly more 
compromising policy was not capable of stemming the growing concern 
surrounding the survival of French. Brazeau and Cloutier argue that 
these mitigating factors had "been in part negated by a time lag at 
the national level between majority actions and minority 
expectations". The bilingualism initiative had been cooly received 
by most Quebec French Canadians who had become more provincially 
focused in light of census statistics which showed "an unrelenting 
rate of assimilation of French Canadians by English Canadians 
outside of Quebec. 1136 
191 
Quebec French Canadians were not alone in their rejection of 
bilingualism. Their developing separatist cause found a strange 
bed-fellow with loyalist English Canadians, some going so far as to 
suggest that bilingualism constituted part of Trudeau's master 
plan which aimed ultimately to convert Canada to a French-speaking 
nation. Conspiracy theory adherents actually fear that the 
bilingualism strategy, which tends to favour French Canadians at 
the federal institutional level, will procreate networks of French 
communities which will automatically develop in response to demands 
for French services. The legality of these demands will eventually 
reverse occupational recruitment practices so as to favour French 
Canadians . 37 
Claims such as these appear to be paranoid propaganda, yet they 
well illustrate the ambiguity which has coloured Trudeau 
functionalism. Rioux's sustained critique of Trudeau's anti-
nationalism is illuminating. He reasons that functionalism itself 
took on the characteristics of an ideology which concerned itself 
only with the preservation of the stable relations which had been 
established between social classes and between nations. It was 
undesirable to destroy the equilibrium which a series of 
counterweights had succeeded in installing. As such, Trudeau 
opposed Quebec independence reasoning that it would be as 
abandoning French Canadians outside of the province; Quebec was 
also, he reasoned, not an economically viable political unit. 
Theoretically, Trudeau rejected nation-states and endorsed abstract 
states. 38 Be that as it may, Trudeau was willing to flex the 
muscles of a strongly revitalised federal government in order to 
emphasize this point. His offensive culminated in 1970 with the 
invocation of the War Measures Act, empowering the Canadian armed 
forces with emergency regulations; hundreds of suspected agitators 
were detained without trial in the wake of resurgent FLQ terrorism. 
It appeared as though the violent "resistance" politics espoused by 
the FLQ merely reflected the anxieties of the Quebecois masses. 
Nevertheless, strategies involving the use of terror failed to 
create the revolutionary fervour which had preceded the Castro 
regime. French Canadians, while sympathising with FLQ demands, 
denounced their methods following the kidnapping and murder of 
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Pierre Laporte. The October Crisis, as it came to be known, 
divided nationalists over differing strategies setting back the 
separatist cause in spite of the in-coming PQ government procession 
six years later. The crisis, despite the coverage it has attained, 
remains a blip on the nationalist horizon. It can be likened to the 
AWB Ventersdorp incident which had forced nationalists to exchange 
blows. Both the FLQ and AWB have been presented as radical foils 
.to institutionalised nationalist parties. Although the FLQ had 
been a product of Fanon and Che Guevra while the AWB identified 
more with Mein Kampf, each viewed violence as a means to captivate 
the vulnerable masses (ethnically defined). Both movements had 
gained notoriety as radical nationalist extremists, their divergent 
ideologies retrospectively less noteworthy. The FLQ, nevertheless, 
contributed towards the developing independentist cause. Its 
revolutionary ideology was forward-looking and, therefore, relevant 
in this respect while that of the AWB was outwardly reactionary and 
notably regressive; in this respect it had been side-lined by the 
democratic reform process. 
The expanding French Canadian bureaucratic elite had tuned into the 
prevailing nationalist current so as to wage a political offensive 
against the fiscal powers of the Federal government. This 
signalled a move toward prmtincial centralization of local services 
as well as the balkanisation of an already struggling economy. 
This regionalist directive threatened to weaken existing national 
( in the federal sense) corporations which relied heavily upon 
centralised decision-making structures. 39 
Restlessness and growing interest in nationalist projects continued 
with the language riots in the Montreal suburb of St. Leonard as 
the local Catholic school board eliminated English as a language of 
education. The ensuing state of flux gave way to premier Robert 
Bourassa and his heart-felt economic program which sought to 
alleviate ethnic tensions by concentrating on financial management 
and job creation. Nevertheless, unable to overcome the bias of 
private enterprise which inhibited the development of a competitive 
French business sector, the premier and his provincial Liberal 
Party were prompted to enact language legislation so as to address 
nationalist grievances. Bill 22 empowered the government to limit 
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access to English schools to those who already possessed a working 
knowledge of English. It, furthermore, established programmes for 
the francisation of firms doing business with the government, yet 
remained rather lax with regard to the use of French in business. 
Business, which was predominantly English speaking, refrained from 
harsh criticism of the new legislation sensing the need to placate 
nationalists and support the efforts by government to resolve the 
economic malaise.= 
While English business had had to remain servile in response to 
nationalist linguistic legislation within Quebec, so too had it 
refrained from voicing its disapproval with regard to apartheid 
legislation within South Africa as carried out by nationalists 
there. The expanding nationalist civil service bureaucracy had in 
both cases sought to protect and enhance its cultural, ethnic, 
racial, linguistic and/or status objectives which included economic 
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empowerment. Labour legislation which prominently characterised 
apartheid served the interests of agriculture and, therefore, the 
expansion of Afrikaner power. Similarly, linguistic legislation 
aimed to curb the perpetuation of English-business patronage and 
the cultural division of labour. 
Nationalism has been blamed in many sectors for having created the 
shift in economic activity westward. Disagreement surrounds cause 
and effect. Popular opinion suggests that the decline of Montreal 
has come about with nationalist and separatist agitation, while 
others proclaim that it is the decline of Montreal which has 
contributed to nationalism and separatism; that is, with the 
economic shift, French Canadian leaders were prompted to re-
evaluate existing links with adjacent provinces as well as to 
question the federal link. 
French Canadian leaders advocated a reformed federalism which would 
entail the enlargement of the legislative competence of Quebec in 
fiscal, social, linguistic and cultural matters. In this way, the 
duality of Canada would be strengthened as Quebec would be 
recognised as a province unlike others. Afterall ,1 its borders 
contained the only Francophone majority and therefore, greater 
national responsibilities existed which exceeded other provinces. 
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Nevertheless, recurrent constitutional impasses which denied Quebec 
distinct .status prompted the rise of a radical challenge to its 
place within the federation. The moderate nationalism which had 
until then attempted to reform institutions and broaden the 
economic arena came to be seen as a cultural, linguistic and even 
an ethnic crusade bolstered by the rise of the Parti Quebecois. 
Taking 41% of the popular vote, the Parti Quebecois was catapulted 
to power in the 1976 provincial elections. The Bourassa government 
had been accused of worsening relations with the union movement. 
Numerous scandals had erupted and open collusion between the state 
and interest groups were reported to have existed. The Parti 
Quebecois represented a sovereignist strategy and. constituted a 
major new political force; for it differed from its independentist 
predecessors. It had swallowed the smaller movements (notably the 
RN, RIN, and MSA) and coughed up a new beginning. Rene Levesque, 
its first president, was hailed as a true nationalist leader. The 
PQ had been born in 1968 and in a relatively short space of time 
had captured the aspirations of a marching nation. Rather than 
striking a blow at the reformist past, the PQ presented itself "in 
a line of evolutionary succession with reformist elements within 
successive Quebec governments."= It was a natural conclusion of 
sorts. The party appealed to French Canadians with its openness 
and egalitarianism. It monopolised the independence issue as well 
as a social-democratic ideology. 
The PQ programme aimed to defuse opposition as well as consolidate 
its support. Its political survival depended upon gaining the 
confidence of organised labour and pushing ahead with reforms 
benefiting the workers. The government, furthermore, wished to 
affirm its undaunting nationalist credentials. 42 This entailed 
· dealing with the unresolved language question. The Canadian divide 
had deepened. The administrative costs and responsibilities 
relating to the provision of bilingual services across the country 
prompted numerous provincial governments to shift away from the 
spirit of the British North America Act. That is, a new vision of 
Canada emerged which comprised two unilingual parts, those being 
French and English. Premier Levesque was no exception as the 
passing of Bill 101 was soon to demonstrate. The bill severely 
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curtailed access to English schools, directed new immigrants to 
French ones, introduced francisation programmes for all firms with 
more than 100 employees, and forcefully banned most English public 
signs. French was made the sole official language of the National 
Assembly and the courts, thus putting it on the same footing in 
Quebec as English in other provinces. Other provincial premiers 
rejected proposals for the reciprocal broadening of linguistic 
rights. As Arnopolous and Clift well sum up, "The two economic 
solitudes which used to exist on the same territory are now pulling 
apart geographically. Increasingly, Quebec is conceded to be a 
French economic territory where the use of English is reserved for 
communications with the outside ... For at that moment, Quebec will 
have achieved something unprecedented in its history: a new found 
unity resulting from the fusion of society and of the economy which 
in the past had been the opposing polls around which French and 
English had rallied." 0 
The Parti Quebecois, however, had still not fulfilled the national 
dream. Furthermore, the wounded federalist octopus continued to 
spread its intimidating tentacles delivering a seemingly crushing 
blow to the separatist cause during the 1980 referendum. Rene 
Levesque's catastrophic "beau risque" policy and promises of 
federal renewal had all but destroyed the pro-sovereignty party. 
The post-Referendum blues had cultivated an atmosphere of lethargy. 
The business class had been staunchly opposed to separatism yet, 
with their new found self-confidence, they softened their 
opposition to an independentist formula. The Meech Lake Accord 
gained notoriety with its five conditions which premier Bourassa 
declared as non-negotiables. The business class subsequently fell 
in behind those demands while playing down the notion that 
sovereignty would necessarily invite catastrophe. Fears of an 
American reaction were, furthermore, dispelled. The Parti 
Quebecois had been rejuvenated under its new leadership. Jacques 
Parizeau made a solemn promise to return the party to its true 
nature and make Quebec sovereignty its absolute priority. 
The failure of Meech Lake had augmented the new 1982 Constitution 
which had all but deprived Quebec of its veto powers regarding the 
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passing of constitutional amendments. 44 This led some to declare 
that Canada was finished. French Canadian Quebeckers increasingly 
realised that their lot as a "distinct society" was but a laughable 
invention, an exercise in wishful thinking within the confines of 
federalism. The French Canadian province pad received a cultural 
indictment. And the sovereignty movement had once again been 
propelled on to the centre stage. 
Concluding Remarks 
The conflict and overlap between reality and myth are critical to 
an understanding of developing Afrikaner and French Canadian 
nationalisms. Initially, the harsh frontier realities created the 
need for a unifying myth. The myth was founded upon devoutly 
religious grounds so that it could gain acceptability and readily 
diffuse into the consciousness of practising faithfuls. The myth 
later became spiced with an agrarianist character so as to remain 
constant with the prevailing economic realities. With 
industrialisation, rural farm life increasingly passed out of the 
realm of fact to that of myth. Nationalism had been in part 
propelled by fact-based mythology. The developing crisis concerned 
the inability of the myth to adapt to changing circumstances. 45 
Nevertheless, an element of messianism remained and ethnic 
realities did not detract from the continued appeal of the national 
myth. Eventually, these myths could no longer subsist without firm 
grounding. The protectors of the past were confronted with global 
realities. The myths were increasingly viewed by the masses as 
ideological sham and so rejected by new generations of pragmatic 
leaders: The shedding of myths may actually be seen as a re-
evaluation of nationalism, exposing its treacheries and endorsing 
its legitimacy within the narrowed bounds of negotiated 
acceptability and democracy. 
Emancipation from mental slavery was but a relative concept as 
nationalist ideologues wielded their own educational weapons. The 
rise of nationalism in both cases can be heralded as an 
evolutionary process whereby developing consciousness focused upon 
cultural, economic, territorial, and racial similarities and 
differences. Defining the game often tended to be obscured by new 
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forms of consciousness particularly those arising from 
industrialisation and its appendages ( ie. urbanisation) . The 
mythical web of destiny which had been weaved mostly as a defensive 
mechanism in response to encroaching "intruders" found its strength 
within the framework of ethnicity and eventually nationality. 
The legitimation function provided by the myth significantly 
empowered nationalist ideologues providing them with a "moral II 
platform from which to mobilise the masses. Afrikaner nationalists 
were highly successful indoctrinating their followers, 
incorporating the myth into a broad consciousness and creating a 
civil religion of sorts. French Canadian nationalists relied 
heavily upon clericalism as a means to mobilise their followers (or 
subdue them for that matter). Contemporary French Canadian 
leaders, however, chose to dispense with the myths which had 
historically bound their "nation". 
French Canadian provincialism did not have to contend with an over-
arching Canadian myth. Much of the Canadian problem related to the 
fact that it lacked a founding myth; nor did it possess any 
historical depth which could bridge geographical frontiers. In 
this way, French Canadians were able to retain their separateness 
in the midst of an English speaking majority. This also accounted 
for French Canadian perceptions which regarded the United states 
(with its mythical foundations, those being the American dream, 
melting pot unity and a worker's ethic) as a more ominous threat to 
its cultural survival than was its English Canadian counter-parts 
(although they were undoubtedly viewed in some sectors as an 
extension of Anglo-American economic-and cultural proliferance). 
Afrikaner republicanism was forcefully able to permeate a wide 
cross-section of the white segment population. The Afrikanerisation 
of south African society after 1948 meant that the myth would 
continue to have a significant impact upon institutional and 
economic structures which constituted the state. With the 
broadening of Afrikaner identity after 1960, the myth became 
increasingly strained as nationalists attempted to extend it in 
part to other population group segments. 
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Afrikaner exclusivism which had been the pivot of nationalism had 
increasingly relied upon sections of other population groups, co-
opting them in an effort to legitimize the prevailing state power 
structure (with its cultural symbols). The broadening process 
which stemmed from the victory of Afrikaner nationalism was, 
however, also to become its Achilles heel. Class cleavages 
( notably those between black labour and white privilege, and 
between verligte and verkrampte nationalists) became more 
pronounced as the so-called liberation movements enjoyed 
international sympathy and support. 
Afrikaners, having "matured" politically, increasingly perceived 
their future to lie with ideological blocks rather than sticking to 
dwindling ethnic exclusiveness. Even those who rejected an 
integrative solution recognised that the unfair and imbalanced 
exclusivism of the past could not be carried forth to future 
generations. Boerestaaters accept that economic sacrifices will 
have to be made, yet, conflictual political sacrifices (previously 
in the CP vain) and confrontationary options have become anathema. 
The blatant racialization of ethnicity in the Republic beckoned its 
dramatic depoliticization, lest its abuses be repeated under a new 
dispensation. Political leaders, furthermore, understand that 
nationalising race has borne only bitter fruit and has contributed 
to the polarisation of ethnically and racially based opposition 
movements. As such, Afrikaner nationalism has been able to tread 
water on the political outskirts by condemning the racialism which 
had historically been its ideological mentor. 
The ideological ascension of apartheid had undercut the theme of 
struggle characteristic of early Afrikaner nationalism for it had 
become forever tainted with white supremacist racial doctrine. Its 
decline had been prompted by its own success. Casting off the 
ideological albatross marked an about-face which could potentially 
amount to political suicide. The fruits of apartheid had reached 
an economic threshold prompting an ideological reappraisal albeit 
within the bounds of changing nationalist objectives. 
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The Achilles heel which had long crippled French Canadian 
sovereignty interests remained a fatalistic economic prognosis. 
Yet, unlike the ideological pitfall which afflicted Afrikaner 
nationalism, the French Canadian variant possessed not the seeds of 
its own destruction. It had lagged upon the fears of indigenous 
business and consoling promises of constitutional renewal 
culminating in the "non" referendum vote of 1980. Even the most 
ardent of nationalists, notably Rene Levesque, had had cold feet 
compromising full independence with his proposals for sovereignty-
association. The economic link within Canada had achieved an 
inflated value. French Canadians were unwilling to accept the 
exaggerated costs of independence. Consequently, Federalists 
within Quebec and most prominently premier Robert Bourassa were 
able to walk a middle road seducing the masses with nasty forecasts 
and promises of a "profitable federalism". Renegotiating the 
constitutional division of powers would likely further set back the 
sovereignty option. Nationalists could be deactivated, ironically, 
by their own reformist initiatives. Nevertheless, constitutional 
decay and changing economic realities meant that the tap could be 
reopened. 
of trade 
That is, English Canadian intransigence and the removal 
barriers with the United States radically cut the 
perceived risks associated with separatism. 
Elite accommodation has only recently been jeopardized. The 
institutionalisation of separatist sentiment under the Parti 
Quebecois banner supported by recessionary economic realities 
(partly due to deficient federal fiscal policies) underpin this 
phenomenon. French Canadian ethnicity now has an accepted 
territorial boundary in the wake of Trudeau's failed "bilingualism" 
farce. The progressive assimilation of French Canadian communities 
outside of these borders has renewed interest in exclusivist ethnic 
solutions including regional disengagement. Declining dependency 
upon the centre aided by the opening of trade borders with the 
United states has, furthermore, lent itself to the viability of 
dismembering the Canadian state. Separatism has ironically been 
hailed as a solution to the existing injustices presently 
associated with Quebec's ethnic nationalism. Political 
modernisation would, some argue, remedy the defensive posture of an 
exclusivist nationalism which has nationalised citizenship 
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regardless of the cultural preferences of non-French. Separatism 
would reduce the prospects of cultural assimilation because French 
Canadians would be more able to safeguard the French character of 
a new state. The threat posed by the English speaking minority 
would be consequently demagnified. 
The divergent paths of Afrikaner and Quebec nationalism are a 
direct result of the modernisation process which vilified Afrikaner 
exclusivism and showed indifference or structurally promoted the 
Quebec variant. Symptomatic of these changes was the 
institutionalised structure of nationalism. The National Party has· 
long occupied the position as volksleier and representative spokes-
party of Afrikaner nationalism while French Canadian nationalism 
has never possessed a similar single institutional embodiment. 
Ironically, these realities have shifted. No longer does Afrikaner 
nationalism have one voice while the Parti Quebecois has 
increasingly been viewed as the spokes-party for a separatist 
ethnic nationalism. 
Changing Afrikaner identities prompted by the modernisation process 
reflected a rejection of racism and discrimination. This must 
necessarily be attributed to political expediency whereby the 
National Party recognised that Afrikaner interests could best be 
secured by confronting change when it did instead of at a later 
stage. The opportunities created by the changing world order and 
particularly the end of the Cold War led nationalists to de-
emphasize territorial ethnic nationalism probably hoping to 
negotiate reforms so as to ensure their cultural survival within a 
new dispensation (spearheaded by their power and resolve). The 
National Party took the initiative in an effort to partially 
reclaim the moral ground which had been severely compromised under 
its oppressive structures. 
Changing French Canadian identities had gradually become more 
provincial in focus. The failure of Trudeau's "bilingualism" 
policy further prompted French Canadians to increasingly identify 
with the Quebec state although not necessarily with the government 
of the day. The changing world order also significantly affected 
the blooming of nationalism as the bipolar world gave way to an 
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increasingly multi-polar network of regional blocks. The opening up 
of trade borders within North America and specifically the North 
American Free Trade Agreement in tandem with a more confident 
national bourgeois elite made the previously negative consequences 
of separatism seem that much less ominous. French Canadian 
nationalism had already dispensed with the reactionary conservatism 
of the past during the Quiet Revolution. Nationalism had taken on 
a more aggressive tone and was not forced to retreat from any 
universally abhorrent doctrinal appendage (as had been the case 
with apartheid and the racial nationalism it espoused). 
Political prognosis is a dangerous game for its predictive accuracy 
often comes into question. Generally, failures in political 
fortune-telling tend to discredit entire works. Occasionally, the 
expectations that are raised consequently become frustrated. 
Nevertheless, even the most modest of scholars succumb to the urge 
recognising that the successes and personal reward forthcoming make 
navigating the minefield ultimately worthwhile. 
Afrikaner nationalism has entered a new phase. The multiplicity of 
proponents at the negotiating table demonstrates differing 
conceptions and strategies regarding survival. The National Party 
continues to represent the recoiling interests of "Afrikanerdom", 
striving towards the attainment of an order which will protect the 
rights of minorities. Its ideological disposition remains 
consistent with developing circumstances. Ultimately, it seeks to 
safeguard the cultural status and economic position which has thus 
far blemished the Afrikaner name. Casting aside the racialism upon 
which it has grown, and accepting democratic principles enshrined 
within a new constitution strengthens its compromising objectives. 
The National Party appears headed for a "power-sharing" formula in 
which it will continue to wield state power in conjunction with a 
new black African elite. The regime's power will undoubtedly 
impress itself upon the character of the new dispensation thereby 
ensuring the cultural survival of the Afrikaners. Of course, the 
sun will eventually set upon the National Party but not before the 
hands of revolution have been well checked. 
202 
The National Party has not hedged its bets. Needless to say, the 
National Party has not attempted to squeeze out other nationalist 
parties and organisations from the negotiation process. 
Ironically, the National Party encourages their proliferance rather 
than attempting to co-opt differing strategies within one Afrikaner 
institutional monolith. The existence of seemingly more radical 
nationalists indeed acts as a foil to the more compromising NP 
image. Simultaneously, other recognised nationalist organisations 
can further the interests of their followers so gaining additional 
concessions cumulatively in the interests of Afrikaners (this of 
course, keeps with the assumption here argued that Afrikaner core 
interests are generally the same). Appeasing various Afrikaner 
aspirations can surprisingly off-set renewed conflict (particularly 
when one notes that a proportionally high percentage of Afrikaners 
are well armed). 
The Boerestaaters including the Afrikaner Volksunie and Professor 
Carel Boshoff's Afrikanervryheidstigting (Avstig) are likely to 
succeed in part in their efforts to secure a territorial "homeland" 
whereby Afrikaner values and customs would take precedence, albeit 
within the confines of non-racialism. Ironically, this faction of 
Afrikaners are aiming to co-opt themselves within apartheid 
structures almost masochistically it would seem. Afrikanerskaap 
deprived of baaskap would depend greatly on the extent to which 
ethnicity could be depoliticized. Down the line, Afrikaners living 
outside these established borders may themselves come to be seen as 
diaspora population. A Boerestaat could be the last preserve of 
Afrikaner ethno-nationalists. The interspersed nature of 
Afrikaners elsewhere would prevent a nationalist revival although 
a politically (and economically) viable Boerestaat could 
conceivably provide the mobilising impetus. The "common society" 
which will herald the new South Africa need not negate the 
existence of territorial homelands, for the offspring of apartheid 
have become part and parcel of the political landscape. co-
operative ethnic networks such as Cosag, may contribute towards the 
long-term acceptance of ethnicity as a just concept within the new 
South Africa; another winfall for Afrikaner interests. Finally, 
the existence of marginalised para-military organisations (ie. the 
AWB and Wit Wolf) could well absorb the brunt of post-apartheid 
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frustrations thereby enhancing the image of more moderate party 
political nationalist movements. Their disruptive capabilities 
could conceivably back-fire in this regard. 
French Canadian nationalism will necessarily achieve formal 
statehood al though the time frame remains subject to changing 
circumstances. The dissolution of the present Canadian entity need 
not wreak havoc and contribute to economic peril. Canada appears 
to be faced with two options, one along the lines of Yugoslavia 
( not to be discounted in South Africa) , though its culture of 
tolerance makes this confrontationary scenario highly unlikely. 
The other can be termed the "Bophuthatswana option" whereby Canada 
can continue to exist as a fragmented and dis jointed state in 
association with Quebec; unlike the South African homeland of 
course, Canada would have historical legitimacy and a sound 
economic structure. Alaska remains part of the United states 
despite its geographical placement; likewise could be the case with 
the Atlantic provinces although they may increasingly come to be 
seen as colonial outposts of Ottawa. Be that as it may, Quebec 
separatists will, in the final analysis, have done a "hatchet job" 
on Canada. At the very least, Quebec independence is likely to 
serve as a springboard for regional disengagement. Canada, 
however, may still survive as a disjointed geographical network of 
associated provinces or states including Quebec. Negotiating this 
transition, Quebec nationalists will be sensitized to the potential 
economic consequences of an abrupt departure. 
From another angle, the extrication of Quebec from English Canada 
will destroy the cancer so to speak. Canada's remission has all but 
come to an end. Should it survive the amputation, a virtually non-
existent English Canadian nationalism may indeed develop. Likewise, 
Quebec nationalists would no longer have cause to fear assimilation 
thereby moderating "oppressive" language laws. Although democratic 
values have significantly crept into the French Canadian culture, 
the existence of only one viable separatist political party 
(assuming that the position of the Bloc Quebecois at the federal 
level will lapse into irrelevance with separation) conjures up 
gloomy scenarios; for it foreshadows the rise of the South African 
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reich and the deification of the vanguard nationalist party which 
unilaterally delivered the fruits of Afrikaner aspirations (in the 
form of a Republic). Nationalist ideologues in Quebec may also be 
given a carte blanche should they succeed in stifling the 
development of other independentist parties seeking to contest the 
seats of power. The authori tarianist longevity of numerous so-
called "liberation" movements throughout the third world further 
lends itself to this unsavoury possibility. Though remote, French 
Canadian politicians should take precautions and act upon the 
knowledge that diversification lends itself to moderation. 
The constitutional dilemma afflicts both societies. Various 
options have been tabled by all parties concerned. Nevertheless, 
defining the players, equalizing the playing field and safeguarding 
basic rights deemed to be important continue to delay a negotiated 
settlement. The currents of nationalism persist and intensify as 
the impasse continues. The Federalist union in Canada differs 
significantly from the Legislative union in South Africa. The 
former recognises the viability and necessity of a semi-autonomous 
economic unit ethnically comprised within borders protected by the 
Constitution. Thus, even those who dispute the ethnic equation are 
forced to recognise that a base exists for an ethno-regionalist 
movement in Quebec should the population of that province deem it 
to be in their best interests. As such, taking into account the. 
geographical boundaries which shape Canada, most political leaders 
who support Confederation have in fact been held hostage to Quebec 
nationalist demands; realising that Canada would cease to exist 
economically and as a geographical entity after Quebec separation. 
South African political power brokers are not similarly divided 
over the non/viability of the present constitution realising that 
the legislative union will have to give way to more decentralised 
power structures within a new dispensation. The current 
constitutional impasse concerns in part the degree to which 
regional power structures will be constitutionally guaranteed and 
protected. The dispersion of Afrikaners will preclude a regionally 
defined nationalist movement attempting to extract concessions and 
threatening disengagement from the centre should its demand not be 
met. Even a small Boerestaat would not necessarily threaten the 
integrity of the new South African state. Thus, the currents of 
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Quebec nationalism have a potentially destructive impact upon 
existing state structures while Afrikaner nationalism is relatively 
benign (except perhaps at the negotiating table) recognising that 
it will have to be subject to democratic principles. 
Whether nationalism takes mythology to bed, whether it depends upon 
cultural austerity, whether it assails the hands of time or whether 
it destroys individual liberties, it necessarily reflects a crisis. 
Identity crises mark both Canadian and South African societies as 
well as their constitutional forums which seem to run along similar 
lines. The psychological war which fuels mutual fear and ignorance 
coincides with territorial struggle. 
Much more relevant than state-imposed identities are in-group 
perceptions. Changing identities reflect in part this out-flowing 
self-expressionism which seeks to account somehow for variable 
circumstances. The Afrikaner collectivity developed after past 
labels such as Voortrekker and Boer had been relegated to the back-
logs of history. Similarly, Quebec people were regarded as 
Canayens, then as French Canadians and then as Quebecois. More than 
merely semantics, these terms differentially (according to history) 
emphasized relations between ethnic group members and the state. 
The bi-ethnic state which came about in both cases had attempted to 
conjure up an over-arching co-optive identity supported by the 
force of law (and of course the enforcing power). The broadening of 
identity directly conflicted with ethnic nationalist perceptions. 
It marked a step toward internationalism, deemed to be progressive. 
Conversely, at different historical junctures, in-group perceptions 
were not conducive to ameliorating relations between competing 
ethnic groups and in fact stood in opposition to the real 
exigencies and structures which constituted the state. In another 
sense, statism may be at the root of this problem. This is the 
soil in which most of the antagonisms that beset these states have 
been nourished. 
French vs. English, federalist vs. separatist, Quebec vs. English 
Canada, Afrikaans vs. English, capitalist vs. communist, Afrikaner 
vs. Africans. None of these would have acquired anything like 
their past and/or present intensities had the state not become so 
206 
critical to people's perceptions of their socio-cultural and 
economic interests. Unquestionably, the struggle for state power 
has inflamed existing linguistic, cultural and/or regional 
rivalries. New social and political superstructures propelled by 
external economic forces (particularly during the period of 
industrialisation and perhaps also unto the present age of 
information) have cultivated the emergence of a new national 
awareness which increasingly focused upon the changing power 
balance within the political and economic sphere. Strategies of 
growth based upon the use of political power for leverage aimed to 
control and set the rules of the game which uneqQally apportioned 
benefits; these benefits of course, being subjectively interpreted 
on all fronts. Collective self-assertion in a political structure 
is inevitably determined by whether the group in question controls 
or depends upon these state structures. Ethnic minority access to 
power prerequisites maximum solidarity. Cultural distihctions, 
then, which might otherwise co-exist peacefully are politicized by 
the necessity of each to gain its piece of the pie. Nationalism 
remains at the forefront of the struggle for liberation, no longer 
necessarily from colonial oppressors, but from those socio-economic 
processes which threaten to perpetuate the mythical canoe of 
internationalism as well as the loss of national identity. 
This thesis has attempted to grapple with changing consciousness as 
it has evolved within two dual societies. While intentionally 
avoiding the complex debate on nationalism, it has implicitly 
sought to illuminate those factors which have significantly 
contributed towards the development and evolution of ethnic power. 
Identifying these contributants within a comparative context lends 
itself to social scientific research, and therefore, predictive 
analysis. Anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, demographic 
differentials, group perceptions, and the division of labour have 
figured prominently as variables influencing the course of 
nationalist development. The coincidence of class and ethnicity 
aligned under the auspices of mobilising actors with common 
objectives necessarily reflects built-in group constraints which 
have historically promoted compliance through the ordering of 
society perceptions. These perceptions are in turn, blanketed by 
a religious cloth of mythical destiny. Nationalism corresponds to 
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a mobilisation on the part of an ethnic movement, an in-group 
forged with similar traits and developed commonalities which has 
drawn upon its common experience so as to maximise its position 
vis-a-vis other groups. Nationalism, it has been argued, concerns 
itself not only with statist objectives and political power but 
with cultural motifs, status and survival issues. Group enclosure 
appears to be most pronounced when in-group members perceive that 
their interests have been threatened. Frequently, this sense of 
being wronged or inferiorized comes about with contextual 
transformation. The ref ore, not only are in-group members f creed to 
consolidate and mobilise in response to an encroaching 
centralising state entity but likewise must they stave off those 
perceived · threats associated with social processes ( ie. 
industrialisation, urbanisation, democratisation) which .both 
directly and/or indirectly revile those bonds of exclusivity 
responsible historically for group survival. 
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